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ABSTRACT 
 
EMBODYING TECHNOLOGY: 
A HERMENEUTIC INQUIRY INTO CORPOREALITY AND IDENTITY 
AS MANIFESTED IN A CASE OF STRAP-ON DILDO USE 
 
 
By 
Amy E. Taylor 
August 2012 
 
Dissertation supervised by Eva-Maria Simms 
 This dissertation takes a deep look at a first-person narrative from a man who 
develops complete impotence following androgen-deprivation treatment for prostate 
cancer.  After feeling depressed for some time about what he imagined to be the 
permanent loss of his sexual life, the man, pseudonymously called Michael in this 
dissertation, tried using a strap-on dildo.  Michael was surprised and pleased to find that 
using the dildo for sex brings him sexual satisfaction including orgasm.  The dildo 
transforms "from object to organ” as Michael gradually comes to experience the dildo as 
a part of his own body.  He also experiences a shift in his gendered and sexual identity, 
discovering that the dildo is neither a prosthetic penis nor a medical device, but a post-
gendered object subject to playful interpretation.  This dissertation aims to elaborate how 
the phenomenon presented in the case study narrative takes place, to discuss the 
implications this phenomenon has in a number of theoretical domains, and to apply these 
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findings to clinical practice.  It uses phenomenological elaboration and hermeneutic 
narrative analysis to explore the case study phenomenon.  Then, the case study 
phenomenon is interrogated from various theoretical approaches in order to elaborate the 
implications of this phenomenon regarding the relationships between physical body 
morphology, lived embodied experience, and gender identity, the relationship between the 
body and sensorium-expanding technology, and the breadth and range of human 
sexuality.  The case study narrative serves as a locus for dialogue between feminist 
phenomenological and feminist poststructural thought on the question of the relationship 
between the material body and identity, and also includes discussions of transsexuality 
and male lesbian identities in terms of how the case study phenomenon is related to the 
embodied experiences of people in these groups.  The dissertation also explores how 
Michael’s partner contributes to Michael’s change in embodied experience and identity 
and contributes to the creation of an imaginative and playful space for sexuality to 
emerge, suggesting that sexuality is created in an interpersonal context rather than being 
located in a single person or having a particular aim or trajectory.  Dissertation findings 
suggest that conceptual and technical playfulness, including the creation of an 
imaginative and playful space, may be beneficial in the clinical treatment of sexual 
"dysfunctions," persons with non-binary or flexible gender identities, transsexual persons, 
and for clinical conceptualization of sexuality and embodiment in general.  Dissertation 
findings imply that there exists great complexity and variability in embodied experience, 
that the body is deeply significant for developing identity and that bodily changes may 
alter identity, and that sexuality is an event that emerges with others. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction, Purpose, & Methodology 
 
Despite my reservations, I eventually agreed to experiment with a strap-on dildo. My 
expectations, though, were muted. At most, I thought I might be able to please my partner. 
But I honestly did not envision recreating a fully satisfying sexual experience. 
 – Warkentin, K., Gray, R., & Wassersug, R., 2006, p. 391 
 
 
I. Introduction & Research Questions 
 The above quotation comes from a person who, in the following, shall be referred 
to as “Michael.”  Michael was in his late fifties when he became fully physiologically 
impotent following hormone-based prostate cancer treatments.  After receiving these 
treatments, Michael felt depressed and lifeless, flawed, and believed he no longer had the 
capacity to achieve sexual satisfaction.  After spending more than a year in this condition, 
he tried intercourse using a strap-on dildo.  To his surprise, sexual satisfaction became 
possible again.  This included orgasm, satisfying sexual pleasure without orgasm, 
multiple orgasms, and other nuances of experiencing himself as sexual, sexed, and 
gendered which he describes in his first-person narrative in the case study by Warkentin, 
K., Gray, R., & Wassersug, R. (2006). 
 Michael's case presents a fascinating phenomenon that has relevance for multiple 
theoretical, and consequently practical (particularly clinical) problems.  It raises questions 
about the relationship of the body to external material objects: How is it possible for a 
person to achieve orgasm by means of an external object?  How does this object become 
a part of the felt and sensed body such that Michael can experience pleasure with it?  
Furthermore, what does the phenomenon of the body extending itself with an external 
object reveal about human corporeality generally?  The case also has relevance for 
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questions about the relationship of the body to a person's sense of identity, particularly in 
terms of the person's sex or genderi.  What does it mean about the body that it can acquire 
a new sexual organ, or an organ with significance for sexual identity?  What might it 
reveal about the relationship between gender or sexual identity and what the body feels 
like?  What is the relation of the dildo to the penis, and more generally, what is the 
relation of a bodily modification or addition to a person's body and that person's identity?   
Finally, this phenomenon is relevant for understanding sexuality, or the sexual 
body (or as a translation of the fourth chapter of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of 
Perception phrases this, “the body in its sexual being”).  What does Michael's change in 
terms of sexual functioning and experience during the process of dildo incorporation 
imply about sexuality generally?  How does the sexual body adapt to change, and how is 
it possible for it to change?  How does Michael’s case challenge common constructions 
of sexuality?  Michael's case presents a phenomenon that is at once believable and 
astonishing, shedding light on a real but unarticulated (or under-articulated) phenomenon, 
adding to multiple conversations about the self and the body.  This dissertation aims to 
elaborate this phenomenon in order to put it in dialogue with various theoretical 
problems, and then apply these findings to practice, especially the practices of clinical 
psychology.     
 Before I begin to introduce Michael's case and my means of unfolding it further, I 
wish to briefly explain my interest in this topic.  Michael's case narrative presents an 
intersection of a number of different but related topics that are of interest to me: the 
body's ability to be altered by all kinds of technologies, the experience of living in an 
atypical body or otherwise feeling different from the norm, the relationship of the felt 
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body to the meanings inscribed on the body by one's sociocultural context, the 
relationship between expressing or representing one's identity and a personal, perhaps 
private, sense of self.  All of these topics are related thematically; they all have to do with 
examining the boundaries of what it means to be human, particularly the boundaries of 
being a human body, and the significance of relating to other human beings in being 
human.  In clinical practice and in my own experience, I notice human beings struggling 
against definitions of what it means to be human (or to be an adequate human body, to be 
a woman, to be a man, to be mentally healthy, to be lovable, and so on), trying to adapt to 
a form, or to exist where an alternative form seems all but unintelligible in the social 
world.  This project, which explores a human being adapting and renegotiating his body 
boundaries and identity in a striking way, is meant to open up the meaning of “human” 
and point to the complexity diversity of human phenomena and possibility. 
* * * 
 This dissertation begins with a brief case history analysis of the phenomenon of 
dildo embodiment as presented in the case by Warkentin et. al. (2006), as well as two 
additional but briefer case study articles, the first of which (Gray & Klotz, 2004) refers to 
the same patient, and the second of which refers to another patient who underwent the 
same androgen deprivation therapy and considered using a strap-on dildo as a means of 
renegotiating his sexuality (Wassersug, 2009).  These two additional cases do not include 
first person narratives or extensive detail, but are included to support and validate the first 
case as more than an anomaly, since the same or a similar phenomenon appears in 
another person, and the phenomenon is observed in the same patient by a different group 
of researchers.  The phenomenon of dildo embodiment will then be developed in a series 
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of theoretical and interpretive chapters.   
 This first chapter, in addition to narrative summaries and brief analysis of 
Michael's case and related case write-ups, includes a description of the methodology used 
in unfolding the phenomenon in Michael's case and supporting cases.  It situates this 
project in the context of ongoing conversations and explains the purposes of this research, 
thus providing an explanation of the relevance of this research.  This chapter also 
elaborates the various questions and practical applications each chapter will address, and 
briefly references questions and possibilities for research which may follow from 
elaborating the phenomenon of dildo embodiment in this dissertation.   
 Chapters 2-4 each deal with a theoretical problem which has practical relevance, 
particularly in the realm of clinical practice.  While each of these chapters has a distinct 
aspect of the phenomenon at its center (and superficially appear to deal with quite 
different topics), because these chapters are all examining a particular phenomenon from 
a different point of view, these chapters will overlap in some ways.  Additionally, while 
there are certainly a number of aspects of this phenomenon worthy of analysis, the ones 
here were selected because they elucidate the phenomenon at the level of the embodied 
experience, or what the phenomenon reveals about human beings as embodied.  Chapter 
5 unfolds this clinical relevance and also deals with how the problems raised in the prior 
chapters are understood in sociohistorical context and in institutions relevant to clinical 
practice.  This chapter discusses how gender and sexuality and generally regarded by 
expert clinical knowledge and the medical model, including a discussion of how sexual 
dysfunction and variations in sexual and gender identity are conceptualized.  It then 
elaborates an alternative approach based on ideas from previous chapters with an 
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emphasis on embodied experience as a significant aspect of clinical conceptualization 
and practice.  These findings are relevant not only for groups referenced specifically, 
including persons with impotence, transgendered persons, etc., but for understanding 
human experience in general, insofar as we are all embodied, sexed, sexual, and gendered 
beings.   
 Chapter 2 is a discussion of the body's relation to external objects and addresses 
the question of how a body is able to make an external object into a bodily organ.  This 
chapter includes a general discussion of material objects or “things,” and how an object 
becomes a technological extension of the body.  It does this via phenomenological 
literature on the body's boundaries and phenomenal field from Merleau-Ponty and 
Heidegger.  It also uses literature which focuses specifically on the relationship between 
the body and specific technologies, particularly from “postphenomenology” which takes 
particular interest in how technologies, particularly simple tools like the strap-on dildo, 
mediate human experience.  This chapter explores ideas from Don Ihde, Peter Paul 
Verbeek, and Bruno Latour.   
 Chapter 3 is about sex and gender in relation to the body.  This chapter elaborates 
how changes in the body are related to changes in sex and gender identity.  It includes 
debates in gender theory about whether sex and gender identities are part of one's innate, 
prediscursive and embodied way of being, or whether sex and gender refer to imposed 
categories that are merely inscribed upon the body.  It situates Michael’s case within this 
representation/ material binary.  It addresses the status of the dildo in relation to the 
material penis and the symbolic phallus.  The discussion in this chapter includes works 
by Luce Irigaray, Iris Young, and Judith Butler.  This chapter also addresses transsexual 
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phenomena and the relationship between gender and sexual identity and the body present 
in trans bodies.  It incorporates writings by and about being transgendered or transsexual, 
particularly the work of Jay Prosser.  The chapter overall explores the relationship 
between one's felt body and one's sense of being a given sex or gender, and again, how a 
change in the body relates to identity.   
 Chapter 4 is about the sexual body and sexuality.  This chapter is based on 
Merleau-Ponty's “The Body in Its Sexual Being” from Phenomenology of Perception.  It 
critiques and elaborates Merleau-Ponty, and includes critiques made by Iris Young and 
others that Merleau-Ponty refers to a particular kind of body and thus creates a normative 
standard for being embodied.  Then, making use of both Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology 
and critiques or revisions of it, the chapter presents a phenomenological reading of the 
phenomenon of sexuality as presented in the Michael's case study.  It reads Michael's 
narrative as a snapshot of a sexual world.  Specifically, it contrasts Michael, whose sexual 
horizon expands following a change to his physical body, to Merleau-Ponty's discussion 
of Schneider, a patient whose sexual horizon recedes following a physical change.  It also 
includes an elaboration of the role of others in composing these horizons, an particularly 
Michael's sexual partner, since the emergence of sex as an event between people is left 
out of Merleau-Ponty's particular existential-phenomenological discussion of sexuality.  
Thus, this chapter is a revision and elaboration of Merleau-Ponty's way of understanding 
the body in its sexual being. 
 Chapter 5 applies these findings to clinical practice.  It provides a sociohistorical 
discussion of how Western culture regards issues surrounding masculinity and femininity, 
impotence, and gender variability.  This includes a discussion of the DSM's stance on 
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gender-related diagnoses and rules based on Harry Benjamin's initial “findings” about 
transsexuality, which define and regulate sex transitions.  The clinical implications of 
findings from previous chapters are elaborated.  This elaboration draws from Didier 
Anzieu's concept of the “Skin Ego” and his invitation to engage in imaginative 
psychotherapeutic case formulation and intervention.  This chapter discusses how 
Michael was able to succeed in his “transition” and suggests some ways clinicians might 
differently regard, and therefore differently treat patients with issues surrounding the 
sexed, sexual, and gendered body. 
 The dissertation closes with a summary of findings and suggestions for further 
study.  This dissertation is a pilot study, in some sense, since it is meant to open up a 
phenomenon that is relatively unexplored, likely leading to further questions.  Each 
chapter addresses an aspect of the question, “What is happening here?” with regard to the 
case phenomenon, unfolding the phenomenon in order to elaborate sets of relevant 
questions, all of which may be explored further either theoretically or empirically.  The 
final chapter of this dissertation will offer some possibilities for following up on this 
preliminary research. 
 
II. Case Summary: The Phenomenon of Dildo Embodiment 
 In Michael's narrative from the published case study by Warkentin et. al., 2006, 
Michael describes encountering traditional treatments for physiological impotence 
(surgically inserting an inflatable device into his penis, injecting drugs into his penis, or 
using a vacuum pump device) which either do not work for him or that he finds too 
unappealing to try.  Michael feels desperate and depressed, believing his sexual life has 
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ended.  He describes himself as “sexually incapacitated” and his penis as a “functional 
failure” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  Michael’s close lesbian friend tells him that she 
attains sexual satisfaction via strap-on dildo, and suggests he could do the same.  Michael 
doubts this, but his depression begins to abate with the opening up of this possibility.  
Eventually—over a year later, and with a number of worries and reservations—he 
accompanies her to a sex shop and buys a dildo.   
 Michael also “discussed extensively” with his female partner (to whom this 
project gives the name “Susan”) the possibility of using a dildo for penetrative sex.  
Susan is “supportive of the exploration” and they have sex with Michael wearing the 
strap-on dildo (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  Michael is amazed and delighted by the 
“naturalness” of the act, stating, “It caught me by total surprise how natural intercourse 
felt with this strap-on device” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  Michael and Susan 
continue to engage in dildo sex with increasingly positive results.  “[S]exual satisfaction 
has become easier, because both of us have come to accept the dildo as part of our sex 
play” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392). 
 Michael describes trying various sexual positions with the dildo and reports that 
he and Susan “have both been able to have orgasms many times using the dildo” 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).  He adds that there are some things he is able to do with 
the dildo that were not possible when he was able to have erections.  For instance, he says 
“with the dildo, I am able to continue pelvic thrusts long and hard enough that [my 
partner] now regularly achieves an orgasm in the missionary position” (Warkentin et. al., 
2006, p. 392).  Michael also says, “I discovered that I [...] could enjoy sex without 
orgasms,” and “I can [...] have multiple orgasms!” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  He 
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describes the sexual experimentation that he and Susan engage in, and says that 
eventually, he is even able to attain pleasure from receiving oral sex while he is wearing 
the dildo.   
 Through this process, Michael changes the way he thinks of himself, moving from 
“functional failure” to “joyfully empowered.”  He says that sex becomes more playful 
than it was prior to using the strap-on dildo, and states that he can enjoy “the 'play' part of 
sex” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393) and that he thinks of the dildo as “'a toy'” 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  Others in Michael's life, particularly Michael's partner, 
add to this atmosphere of erotic playfulness.  Michael describes one morning when he 
walked into the bathroom to discover “the dildo sitting upright on the counter-top 
wearing one of my favorite neckties,” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392) interpreting this as 
a signal of Susan's “personification and personalization” of the dildo, and her pleasure 
and acceptance in the dildo as a part of Michael.  Michael comes to experience a 
“transference from 'object' to 'organ'” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393) with respect to the 
dildo, and alongside this development, his attitude toward the dildo, dildo sex, and his 
identity change.  Michael’s words are quoted extensively throughout this dissertation as 
this phenomenon is elaborated, and Michael's entire narrative is available in Appendix 1 
of this dissertation. 
 Gray & Klotz (2004) refer to the same patient, affirming that he was able to have 
satisfying penetrative sex using the strap-on dildo. Wassersug (2009) describes a patient 
he calls “Dr. A” as a “62-year-old medical school professor, diagnosed 10 years ago with 
prostate cancer” (p. 634).  This man became impotent following hormonal prostate cancer 
treatment.  Wassersug (2009) states “ADT [androgen deprivation therapy] has led to 
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profound changes in Dr. A, such that he no longer considers himself a man... [he] now 
considers his gender to be that of a eunuch” (p. 634).  Dr. A is described as finding this 
label empowering, and as having a fulfilling and orgasmic sexual life, and as having a 
long-term female partner he met after identifying himself as a eunuch.  His “sexuality no 
longer depends on a functional penis” (p. 635) and his sexual life includes the use of 
dildos (p. 636).  According to Wassersug (2009), the patient regards using a dildo for 
sexual activity as “sexuality reborn” (p. 636), much like Michael’s experience of re-
creating sexuality with the strap-on dildo. 
 Michael's narrative and supporting cases are fascinating for a number of reasons.  
Not only do they address how external objects become body parts and what constitutes 
the relationship between the body and sex/ sexuality/ gender, but does so in a way that 
seems to open up a new, surprising dimension of what it means to be a body.  This 
phenomenon addresses the question of what it means to have a sexualized or gendered 
body since it provides an example of flexible and adaptive sexuality which appears in an 
atypical body, in a person whose sense of personal and gender identity changes.  By 
observing gender and sexuality in flux, this case provides a unique opportunity to catch 
them becoming.  The persons in these cases reveal, both with and without explicit 
awareness that they are doing so, how gender becomes embodied, or how gender (as well 
as sexuality) is an embodied event.   
 Michael goes through a change in sexuality.  He experiences a loss which 
ultimately becomes a gain as he finds a new way of being a sexual body that includes 
possibilities that were unfamiliar before he incorporated the dildo.  At different points in 
his narrative, Michael implies or describes his dildonic body as lesbian, hyper-masculine, 
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feminine, and dispersed across space.  The implication is that sexuality is not linked to 
body parts, or at least, not permanently or specifically linked—it can relocate.  It is also 
surprising that bodily supplementation is possible to the degree Michael's case suggests.  
What is initially a loss, and culturally framed as a lack, loss, and non-event alike, 
becomes Michael's gain.  This dissertation will aim to open up or give language to a 
particular world, or a particular way of being a body as it appears in this case study.   
 
III. Methods & Approach 
Phenomenology 
 This dissertation uses a phenomenological research style in that it aims to produce 
close descriptions of lived human experience.  These descriptions are meant to reveal a 
phenomenon so that it may be better understood.  Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology 
serves as a starting point because this dissertation is about an embodied human 
experience, and this approach places great significance on the body as a source and locus 
of meaning.  Merleau-Ponty (1962) writes of the errors of prior ways of thinking about 
the body: “while the living body became an exterior without an interior, subjectivity 
became an interior without an exterior, an impartial spectator” (p. 65).  Here, the body 
and identity are joined (although the particular ways in which they are in relation is 
ambiguous, and is a major theme of this dissertation).   
Case Study Methodology 
 This dissertation will be an interpretive, hermeneutic unfolding of the narrative 
from the study by Warkentin et. al. (2006) along with contributions from the two 
supporting case studies.  I am approaching this narrative as a “revelatory case study” 
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(Yin, 2009) and as a “theoretical-heuristic case study” (Edwards, 1990).  According to 
Yin (2009), a “revelatory case” is one which provides to a researcher a unique 
opportunity to “analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible to social science inquiry” 
(p. 48).  Although this usually refers to phenomena which are rarely observed because 
they occur rarely, such as the aftermath of a singular event, one could apply the concept 
of a “revelatory case” to a case which does not appear for observation except in rare 
instances, regardless of how frequently it may occur.  This method is justified here 
because the phenomenon in the case is not accessible otherwise (further material about 
the same case is presented by Gray & Klotz, 2004).  The phenomenon of strap-on dildo 
incorporation is difficult, if not impossible (particularly within the limitations of my 
study) to access. It is probably not rare or new, but mostly hidden because it is a taboo 
subject and people do not openly speak about it.  It presents itself between sexual partners 
or confidantes, in support groups, or between therapists and their patients.  Indeed, I have 
searched online and offline support groups and discussion boards for men using dildos as 
a way to expand their sexual lives and/ or cope with impotence, and have not been 
allowed access to these intimate communities.  In every case, I was explicitly refused 
access or my requests for access received no response.  These included groups for 
younger men and groups for gay men, since I imagined these audiences may be more 
open to including me.  These also included support groups to which I was referred by Dr. 
Richard Wassersug, one of the authors of the primary case study analyzed in this 
dissertation.   
 Another option I considered was to extend the scope of this phenomenon to 
include multiple instances of strap-on dildo use, whether by self-identified men, women, 
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trans persons, or persons who do not identify with any of these categories.  However, it 
was not clear that this would be the same phenomenon in all instances, nor that the 
phenomenon would be much more accessible even with an expanded population of 
potential participants.  My purpose here is to better understand the phenomenon in its 
most foundational dimension in order to articulate themes and questions for future study.  
Another way of saying this would be that this project attempts to “front-load 
phenomenological insight” (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008) in order to “inform the way 
experiments are set up” (p. 38).  The insights gleaned from my project are meant to 
inform the design and content of later studies.  For this kind of case study, “the case study 
is... worth conducting because the descriptive information alone will be revelatory” (Yin, 
2009, p. 49).  This dissertation’s descriptive analysis of the case introduced by Warkentin 
et. al. (2006) opens up this otherwise inaccessible phenomenon.  It asks a broad “what” 
question—what is going on, what is the meaning of this phenomenon—as a preface to 
possible “how” questions—how does this phenomenon occur.  In this sense, my 
dissertation is a prolegomena to possible future empirical studies of this phenomenon, 
once the phenomenon itself is better defined.   
 The method used in this dissertation may also be classified as a “theoretical-
heuristic” case study (Edwards, 1990, p. 20).  In this sort of case study, a case is selected 
because it is “likely to be revealing,” meaning that various sorts of questions may be 
addressed by the case.  As Edwards (1990) states, “The researcher should motivate the 
selection of a specific case in the context of the theoretical goals of the study” (p. 20).  
Michael's case is selected here because it may be interrogated from multiple theoretical 
perspectives, with multiple kinds of questions.  This research method aims to open up 
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nuances of this case for further study and also learn about corporeality, gender, and 
sexuality through what this case reveals.  In sum, the selected case provides access to a 
phenomenon that is relevant for various theoretical questions.   
Hermeneutic Approach and Narrative Analysis 
 This project is a hermeneutic exploration of case study information.  
“Hermeneutic” means simply a way of interpreting a text.  The reading of the case study 
narrative in this dissertation uses a combined “hermeneutic of care” or restoration and 
“hermeneutic of suspicion” or demystification as outlined in Josselson's (2004) narrative 
approach.  These two approaches to the narrative unfold distinct meanings.  Narrative is 
understood here as “an organized interpretation of a sequence of events” (Murray, 2003, 
p. 113) which represents an attempt by the narrator to create order and structure to his or 
her world and sense of selfhood (Murray, 2003).  Narrative analysis attends to the 
structure and content of the narrative, discerning the different parts of the narrative 
including the main plot and sub-plots and connections among these (Murray, 2003).  It 
attends, also, to the way the narrator tells her or his story—what is emphasized, which 
words are chosen, what metaphors are used, the order in which events are presented, etc. 
(Murray, 2003).  A narrative approach is well-suited here since Michael presents his case 
as a narrative, a tale of transition.   
 The goal of this two-sided hermeneutic approach to narrative is to “examine the 
various messages inherent in [a]... text, giving 'voice' in various ways to the participants” 
(Josselson, 2004, p.1). This involves looking for the meanings present in the text, 
including not only what the narrator presents straightforwardly, but the meanings he gives 
to those facts. These meanings include what is presented indirectly, implicitly in the text.  
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That is not to say these meanings are disguised, but that they require elaboration, either 
via restoration of the meaning present (hermeneutic of restoration) in the text or 
explication of meanings that are pointed to but left unarticulated (hermeneutic of 
demystification).  
 One may also think of this as examining the “visible and invisible” in the text, to 
borrow from Merleau-Ponty's text with that title.  Looking for the participant’s intended 
meaning in the narrative is the visible dimension, and the invisible lies in the elisions, 
absences, and surpluses of meaning present in parts of the text.  These “invisible” 
elements give some context to the text, and evidence as to how the meanings present 
came to mean what they do.  This is the basic project of the hermeneutics of suspicion.  
Josselson writes, “the researcher working from the vantage point of the hermeneutics of 
suspicion problematizes the participants' narrative and 'decodes' meaning beyond the 
text” (2004, p. 5).  This also includes examining the context, including sociohistorical 
context, which gives meaning to the narrator's text, or allows the narrator to give 
meanings to his own text.   
A basic assumption in this paired hermeneutic approach is that the other is 
speaking truthfully (thus, one approaches their text faithfully, drawing it out and restoring 
or expressing the meanings therein).  As Josselson states, “The aim of the hermeneutics 
of faith is to re-present, explore, and/or understand the participantive world of the 
participants... The [narrative] thus provides a window on psychological and social 
realities of the participant” (2004, p. 5).  A hermeneutic of suspicion adds that the 
participant's words are overdetermined and point to meanings beyond her or his attention 
or awareness.   
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 Understanding Michael’s experience and giving it voice is a hermeneutic of 
restoration.  Interrogating Michael’s text and drawing out the surpluses of meaning is a 
hermeneutic of demystification.  This analysis attends both to what the participant states 
about how the phenomenon took place, and sources of meaning beyond this.  It does not 
seek a straightforward cause and effect, but multiple pieces of meaning that reveal the 
phenomenon. Stated broadly, this project examines Michael's world both from his 
perspective and from a critical observer's perspective; it reads the text of Michael's life 
from over his shoulder and watches from some distance away.   
 One might also see this approach as an attempt to understand a phenomenon aside 
from discourse but also as it is contained in discourse.  Hence, this analysis attempts to 
not assume the meanings of terms and concepts like “transsexual,” “transgender,” 
“homosexual,” etc.  Rather, it attempts to understand the embodied experience of 
sexuality and get a sense of the participant’s self-understanding, without the imposition of 
predetermined identity markers.  For instance, it would detract from the phenomenon to 
try and understand Michael’s sexuality as straight, queer, trans, etc., before getting a 
sense of what this experience might be like for him, or how he understands himself.  
When discussing Michael's experience, attempting to see it as mediated through the lens 
of gender categories is an imposition.  Michael's experience seems to transcend gender, 
and is best understood at the level of embodiment.  These initial descriptions provide a 
snapshot of a sexual world, or a possibility of how to be a human being with a body.  It is 
this concrete phenomenon that this project will move through with various questions and 
ongoing discussions to better understand the meanings and implications of this world.  
This project will preserve the critical reading of this phenomenon and how it is 
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constructed, but will also aim to reveal the prediscursive, embodied phenomenon.  This is 
also meant as a beginning to an improved phenomenology of the sexual body, as other 
discussions leave elements lacking (elaborated later in this dissertation).  Hopefully, it 
will lead to later work which will supplement this project by using my elaboration and 
questions to explore other cases and applications. 
Validity 
 How can I respond to my research questions adequately using a single case? 
 The advantage to studying this single case is that it presents a rare, likely singular, 
circumstance to study a particular phenomenon.  The disadvantage of using a single case 
gathered by other researchers is that the case may not provide as detailed or as conclusive 
a response to the project’s research questions, even if it is possible to gather as much 
detail as possible about the case by communicating with the case study's authors.  
However, because the purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the phenomenon 
and open up possibilities for further inquiry, the results need not be generalizable.   
 This project aims for “touchpoint validity” (Fischer, 2005), the goal of which is to 
“connect with theory... in a productive way” to affirm, revise, or expand this theory.  It 
also works toward “revisionary validity” which aims to revise prior understandings of a 
phenomenon for “a change in conception or depth of understanding” (p. xvii).  This 
project, particularly the fifth chapter on clinical applications, also aims for “efficacy 
validity,” which is met when a project “make[s] a difference for theory and/ or practices” 
(Fischer 2005, xvii).  In sum, the validity of this project is based upon its ability to 
develop theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of dildo embodiment as presented 
in the case study narrative and to develop a body of theory related to this phenomenon.   
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 How do I know my case study (or studies) is not an anomaly? 
 Here, having multiple case histories likely would be of value.  The following 
published case study (on Dr. A, mentioned above) is available in addition to the primary 
case study discussed in this dissertation: Wassersug, R. (2009). Mastering Emasculation. 
Journal of Clinical Oncology.  This case provides evidence that the phenomenon from 
the Warkentin et al case is not an anomaly, but provides little additional description for 
analysis since it is a brief article which does not include many details about the practical 
actions leading to dildo incorporation in this patient.  On the other hand, because this 
project is a “revelatory case study” which is meant to reveal a phenomenon that has not 
been studied in this way previously, it could be approached as a pilot study.  That is, this 
project would reveal a previously silent phenomenon, and the analysis of Michael's case 
could then be used as a guide for the analysis of further cases.  The aim of this current 
study is to describe a phenomenon in sufficient detail to approach an explanation for its 
meaning and how it takes place.  Finally, even if this is a very rare phenomenon, it 
illustrates some human possibilities surrounding corporeality, sexuality, and 
transformation of personal identity.   
  Will using material that is already published for my analysis be a problem? 
  This project aims to open up the phenomenon of strap-on dildo incorporation.  It 
is intended to discuss the phenomenon as presented by the primary case study in a way 
that can lead to further inquiry.  The project has a slight disadvantage in that it is using a 
text mediated through other researchers rather than one gathered by the author.  However, 
the case authors are available to provide context for the research.  Also, the 
methodological approach used here (combined hermeneutic of demystification and 
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restoration) aims to understand the meanings around a text, and takes into account the 
situation of the research.  Finally, even though the author of this dissertation did not 
gather this narrative, the narrative preserves the participant's voice. 
 
Summary 
  This dissertation explores a number of questions about the body and identity as 
revealed by the phenomenon of strap-on dildo embodiment.  These questions are 
connected by examining how changes to the body relate to experience and identity.  
Apparent paradoxes about the body, or ways of being a body which seem to conflict, 
appear throughout the dissertation.  These include the social body and personal body, the 
material body and the representational body, the socially constructed body and the felt 
body.  The dissertation as a whole argues for a thesis that human experience is varied and 
flexible, and that changes or variations in embodied being constitute different worlds as 
opposed to flawed or reduced worlds.  This is also an attempt to overcome a dichotomy 
between the idea that there is a particular essence to being human or a particular way of 
being human, and the opposite extreme that embodied experience is irrelevant in light of 
what Ihde (2008) calls “textism,” or the tendency to reduce everything to a text abstracted 
from experience.  This project is interested in experience, and the way experiences lead to 
particular results or shapes identity.  Practices change the body, and the body is how we 
connect with and create worlds (Bourdieu, 1977; Young, 2005; Ahmed, 2006).   
   This study will hopefully be of relevance to academic conversations by 
enriching the human science understanding of the body and identity.  Further, it is also 
intended to serve social justice ends by expanding the way we think about sex, sexuality, 
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and gender.  Finally, this research is meant to be of clinical relevance to doctors and 
therapists alike, particularly in the areas of health psychology, couple therapy, and sex 
therapy when treating individuals experiencing issues related to sexuality, gender identity, 
and sexual “dysfunction.” 
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Chapter 2: Humans & Things 
 
The pressures on the hand and the stick are no longer given; the stick is no longer an 
object perceived by the blind man, but an instrument with which he perceives. 
– Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 176 
 
 Merleau-Ponty describes the human world as organized in reference to our bodies; 
“the body is our general medium for having a world” (1962, p. 179).  What it means to be 
embodied, however, or what constitutes embodiment, is difficult to define.  The body is 
vague.  For instance, Merleau-Ponty describes a blind man who modifies his body to 
incorporate a walking stick: “Once the stick has become a familiar instrument, the world 
of feelable things recedes and now begins, not at the outer skin […], but at the end of the 
stick” (1962, p. 175).  His body boundaries have changed to include the stick, and it has 
become another organ, or an extension of his skin.   
 This chapter explores how the strap-on dildo, an object separate from Michael's 
body, becomes a means of experience for Michael.  Michael goes from regarding the 
dildo as a “piece of purple plastic” to an “organ” of his own body (Warkentin et. al., 
2006, p. 391), and experiences the dildo as such—evidenced not only by his explicit 
statements, but by his ability to achieve sexual satisfaction through the dildo, a striking 
example of an object working in concert with the body, or extending the body beyond the 
skin.  This raises questions about Michael's case and human-technology relations in 
general, including: How is it that objects may change a human's experience of the world, 
or of his or her body, or both?  How does an object become experienced as a part or 
extension of one's body, rather than something that is merely laid upon the body?  When 
is an object not merely being used by a body, but has become a part of body?  How is an 
object, such as the strap-on dildo, “in-corporated” and what is the experience of bodily 
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extension like?  This chapter addresses these questions by bringing the case study 
phenomenon into dialogue with phenomenological (mostly Merleau-Ponty's discussions 
of the phenomenal field in Phenomenology of Perception and to a lesser degree 
Heidegger's discussions of tools in Being and Time) and “postphenomenological” 
(primarily from Don Ihde and Peter Paul Verbeek, supplemented by Bruno Latour's work 
on the agency of objects) ideas about human-technologyii relations.  This chapter 
examines how these theoretical approaches elaborate what takes place in Michael's case 
and supporting cases, and how Michael's case may inform these theories.  This chapter 
includes both findings about Michael based on this way of looking at human-technology 
relations, and an argument for this way of thinking about technology-human relations.  
The overall aim of this chapter is to better understand how human beings and external 
objects relate in order to better understand the physical body and identity more broadly.   
  
I. Theoretical Framework for Understanding Relations Between Humans & Things 
Material Hermeneutics 
 Phenomenology and postphenomenology provide ideal starting points for a 
detailed exploration of how human beings and technologies relate at the level of 
embodied human experience and action.  As mentioned in chapter 1, phenomenological 
research aims to provide detailed descriptions of human experience.  In this chapter, 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and examples of human-technology relations, and to a 
lesser extend Heidegger's phenomenological discussion of tool-use in Being and Time 
(particularly I.III, sections 15 and 16), provide jumping-off points for a detailed 
description of human experience relating to objects at the level of embodied activity.   
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 Postphenomenology is grounded in these phenomenological approaches to 
human-technology relations, but also elaborates and critiques them.  Postphenomenology 
is “a modified, hybrid phenomenology” (Ihde 2009, p. 23) that preserves 
phenomenology's recognition of the importance of embodiment and experience, but also 
takes cues from pragmatism and poststructuralism.  It is interested in “retaining the rich 
descriptions of phenomenology” (Ihde, 2002) and the emphasis on human experience and 
human-world relations that come from phenomenology, but with a greater emphasis on 
material and praxis.  Ihde calls himself, at one point, a “phenomenological materialist” 
(2002, p. xv).  Verbeek (2005) calls this methodology a “material hermeneutics” in which 
“an analysis of the technological mediation of our experience produces a new 
interpretation of hermeneutics” (p. 119).  It avoids the idea that we can understand things 
“as they really are,” discover predetermined essences, or “return” to something more 
“original,” as phenomenology seems to imply, or has been accused of attempting 
(Verbeek, 2005).  Rather, postphenomenology is interested in the concrete practices 
between humans and things that constitute their relationships.  For instance, Merleau-
Ponty states, in the context of distinguishing phenomenology from science, that 
phenomenology returns us to “direct experience” (p. ix).  This seems to imply not only 
that human-world relations are of primary importance, but also (and here is the point of 
disagreement), that there are more and less direct levels of contact with the world.  This 
problematically implies a true “essence” and impels us to venture nearer, and, 
paradoxically, removes us from pure descriptions of experience.  It seems that Merleau-
Ponty suggests that there is a world, rather than worlds of experience.  Verbeek (2005) 
summarizes the critique thus: “An uninterpreted world, a world in itself, cannot be 
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experienced; an untouched world cannot be lived in.  Human beings never encounter a 
world in itself, only and always a world for them” (p. 107).   
 Despite this critique, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology presents a basis for 
understanding how human beings and their worlds come about.  Merleau-Ponty states 
that, “there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know 
himself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xii).  Indeed, this may be Merleau-Ponty’s response to 
the critique that he only recognizes a single world.  This shared world is the common 
world of human experience, the grounded phenomenological space in which human 
beings agree and meet (without this kind of space, we risk a problem of relativism—the 
idea that there are no limits to human experience or what constitutes a human world).  
Because “man” only knows “himself” in the context of interactions with other beings in 
the world, Merleau-Ponty already places human beings, and his phenomenology, in the 
realm of practices and presence.  The aim of his project does not appear to be only to 
understand what makes these practices possible or what human essence precedes them, 
but also those practices themselves (Verbeek, 2005).  Merleau-Ponty states that we are 
“immediately in touch with the world” (p. xiii), meaning we are always already in the 
world, and it is not possible to know ourselves as though we were separate from it.  Our 
human existence precedes essence, and our existence is our concrete practices.   
Things Themselves 
 This chapter refers to objects, things, artifacts, material objects, technologies, 
equipment, nonhumans, and perhaps more, all to speak about external material objects 
that engage with human beings in some way.  There will be some distinctions among 
these terms along the way, but all of these terms are meant to refer to specific objects that 
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appear in the human world.  “Technology” refers to technological devices that make up 
much of the population of objects in the contemporary world, or a particular class of 
things with which human beings engage.  This term, however, is meant to be distinct 
from technology in general, or technology as some sort of force or mindset (or 
technology with a capital “T” associated with later Heidegger's critique of technology 
(Ihde, Verbeek)), and instead refer to specific technologies and their concrete applications 
as they appear in different contexts.  “It does not alter our sense of incorporation if the 
instrument is simple or complex, modern or ancient.  In all... cases, it enters into my 
bodily, actional, perceptual relationship with my environment” (Ihde 2009, p. 42).  Thus, 
context and use are the most significant features for categorizing objects, for instance, 
whether the object is being actively attended to or used as a means to do something else, 
whether the object has become “transparent” to the user as though it were a part of his 
own body, what sort of possibilities for use the object presents and how human beings are 
taking up these possibilities (or how the object is shaping human action via the 
possibilities it presents), and so on.       
 Postphenomenology may also be thought of as a literal response to Husserl's 
original phenomenological command, “To the things themselves!” (Verbeek 2005, Ihde 
2009).  Another point that follows from postphenomenology's critique that 
phenomenology has sometimes been more interested in finding essences than in 
elaborating concrete and specific practices (Verbeek, 2005) would be to say that it has 
overlooked things in favor of examining essences and abstractions.  This applies 
particularly to Heidegger's later philosophy of technology, as presented in “The Question 
Concerning Technology” and elsewhere, particularly veers from understanding specific 
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human-technology interactions.  As Ihde (2002) explains, Heidegger regards technology 
as “a sort of transcendental dimension that posed a threat toward culture, created 
alienation, and even threatened a presumed essence of the human” (p. 113) instead of 
exploring particular, concrete technologies (Ihde, 2002).  The postphenomenological 
approach, as well as all of the approaches used in this chapter to analyze the phenomenon 
of Michael’s particular engagement with a technological device, regards viewing specific 
technologies as important (rather than talking about technology in general, or technology 
as an idea only).   
 This approach is more closely in line with early Heideggerian work, which seems 
to begin a project that postphenomenology takes up: “to articulate the way in which tools 
play a constitutive role in the relation between human beings and world” (Verbeek 2005, 
p. 82).  In Being and Time, “technology... is a way of revealing the world instead of a 
reduction of our access to it” (Verbeek 2005, p. 80).iii  It develops the idea that 
technological artifacts “generate specific forms of access to the world for human beings” 
(Verbeek 2005, p. 76) and “disclose a world” (Verbeek 2005, p. 79).  Heidegger's early 
philosophy of technology, as presented in Being and Time, gives an account of human 
engagement with external objects that offers some basis for analyzing a relationship 
between a human being and a specific external object.  Thus, postphenomenology takes 
up the descriptive, close look at the world that phenomenology provides, but focuses on 
concrete practices in human-technology relationships.   
 Based on this understanding of technology, it may be possible to apply this mode 
of understanding technology to even the most complex human technologies; however, the 
purpose and scope of this chapter limits our discussion to those simple technologies, like 
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the strap-on dildo, that may be understood as tools.  All following references to 
“technology” are limited to this class of technologies (see footnote 2). 
Co-constitution of Subject and Object 
 Postphenomenology also takes objects or things seriously by recognizing that 
“subject and object are not merely intertwined with each other but constitute each other” 
(Verbeek, 2005, p. 112).  This is an attempt to draw out the implication from Merleau-
Ponty and to a lesser extent Heidegger that objects form the basis for the other's existence 
(rather than merely being in some type of relation to one another).   It seems that what 
Merleau-Ponty does “is to develop an analysis of the relations between human beings and 
their world, and he localizes this relation primarily in perception.  Merleau-Ponty does 
not, then, describe the world, but rather the way in which human beings comport 
themselves to it” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 108).  There is space, however, to develop this 
system of relations into an understanding of how subjects and objects are co-constituted. 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception provides “a very subtle and 
nuanced discussion of the role of the body, perception, and action, that is embodiment 
through technology” (Ihde 2009, p. 36), adding that for Merleau-Ponty, the body is 
“praxical.”  Merleau-Ponty writes, “What counter for the orientation of the spectacle is 
not my body as it in fact is, as a thing in objective space, but as a system of possible 
actions, a virtual body with its phenomenal 'place' defined by its task and situation.  My 
body is wherever there is something to be done.” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 249-50).  
Hence, what postphenomenology attempts to do, and what this chapter attempts to do, is 
to use implications from phenomenology both to look at specific, concrete and contextual 
technologies, and to focus on the relation between human beings and world in terms of 
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how these constitute one another (meaning, too, how objects mediate this co-
constitution).   
 Verbeek (2005) calls the idea that subject and object constitute one another a 
“reinterpretation of phenomenology” (p. 112).  This reinterpretation means that human 
beings and world are both defined in terms of their relations with other things and 
humans, as opposed to referring beyond themselves to a predetermined “essence” 
(Verbeek, p. 150).  Latour, whose work shall be elaborated later in this chapter, presents 
entities that cannot even be clearly understood as either subject or object, but instead are 
“hybrids” (Verbeek, p. 152).  Humans and “nonhumans” (as Latour calls them) are not 
separable.  Verbeek (2005) notes, "the relation between subject and object always already 
precedes the subject and the object themselves, which implies that the subject and object 
are mutually constituted in their interrelation" (p. 130).  The precedence of the 
relationship further implies that subject and object have no definite essence or fixed way 
of being; rather, they come about mutually.  For example: “Someone who wears 
eyeglasses... is not the same without them” (Verbeek 2005, p. 130).  Similarly, Michael is 
not the same without the dildo; his world is shaped by this relation. The chapter addresses 
the question: is in what way do the dildo and Michael mutually constitute one another? 
 Verbeek (2005) offers a few basic questions we can use for understanding the role 
of objects in constitution, the first of which is more about how human beings “read” the 
world, the second set about how artifacts change human life, including perception and 
behavior: “What role do technological artifacts play in the manner in which human 
beings interpret reality?” (p. 121), “What role do things play in human life and action?  
How do they contribute to shaping our existence?” (p. 147).  He provides some samples 
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of how these may be applied to particular things: “In what way to telescopes... shape our 
access to the world?” and “How does the television set affect the way we divide up our 
day?” (p. 119).  This approach is used here to answer the set of questions about Michael's 
world and his experience based on strap-on dildo use.  
 In sum, the postphenomenological approach “looks at concrete technologies with 
an eye to the relations between human beings and world that they make possible and 
elucidates the structure of these relations” (Verbeek 2005, p. 9), which is what this 
chapter shall do for the phenomenon, or the particular human-tool relationship, presented 
in Michael's case narrative and supporting cases. 
 
II. Technology as Mediator 
 This section elaborates more specifically the way in which technology participates 
in human-world co-constitution, and applies these to Michael's case.   
Body 1 & Body 2 
Merleau-Ponty acknowledges two modes of possible embodied being, the lived-
body mode and the body that pertains to how others see one (a body that Merleau-Ponty 
says encompasses some area “from head to knees,” 1962, p. 173).  Ihde (2002) calls these 
“body 1” and “body 2,” and further associates body 2 with the body as inscribed by 
culture and “echoes with a Foucauldian framework” (p. 17).  The experiences of these 
two components of embodiment may also be thought of as “microperception,” or bodily 
sensory perception which corresponds to body 1, and “macroperception,” which refers to 
“the frameworks within which sensory perception becomes meaningful” (Verbeek 2005, 
p. 122) and corresponds to body 2.  The boundaries between our felt, lived bodies and our 
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culturally shaped bodies are ambiguous, as all experience is culturally mediated and 
human being is always embodied.  Each exists with the other, for embodied experience 
takes place in a cultural medium, and “for there to be a marked cultural body, or body 
two, there must be a body one that is markable” (Ihde, 2002, p. 70).  These two modes of 
embodiment may also be thought of as subjective/ objective bodies, though these terms 
are more problematic, given the difficulty or perhaps impossibility of providing a clear 
distinction between subject and object.  This is also to say that technology, which 
provides a link between these two kinds of embodiment, informs the constitution of 
subject and object, or of human and world.   
Ihde elaborates that body 1, “our motile, perceptual, and emotive being-in-the-
world” (p. xi) is a Merleau-Pontean “lived body” (corps vécu) “that holds that the active, 
perceptual being of incarnate embodiment is the very opening to the world that allows us 
to have worlds of any sense.  At bottom, the anonymity of the active, perceiving bodily 
being... could be... both preconceptual and precultural” (Ihde, 2002, p. 17).  This is also 
the aspect of embodiment Husserl (1989) calls “Leib,” which refers to the “body as 
sensory experience” as well as “lived, embodied experience” (Rodemeyer, 2012, p. 10).   
Body 2, on the other hand, Ihde describes as “a thoroughly cultural body, often 
described and analyzed in a third-person perspective... Insofar as there is experience, it is 
experience suffered or wrought upon human bodies” (2002, p. 17).  Ihde goes on to 
explain how body 2 still refers to embodied experience, but the experience of bodies as 
mediated by culture: “For most of those reared in western traditions, the female breast is 
an erotic zone, whereas for many from Asian traditions the nape of the neck is equally or 
more strongly such a zone.  These locations are... culturally constructed” (2002, p. xi).   
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This third-person, objective body is called “Körper” by Husserl (1989).  It is “the 
body as causal object, subject to laws of physics as well as intersubjective appropriation” 
(Rodemeyer, 2012, p. 10).  The Körper has two senses: it is both a physical object acted 
upon by the physical world (including physical aspects of the body itself, such as 
hormones and bodily contours), and a social object acted upon by the world of others.  
The second sense of Körper seems to be what Ihde primarily emphasizes in his 
conceptualization of body 2, but the first sense of Körper is important as well in 
understanding embodied experience.  This first sense of Körper as physical body is 
distinct from Leib because the physical Körper, although it refers to the skin and organs 
of the body, may or may not correspond to the sensory experiences of the Leib.  Indeed, 
although the way others see one’s body (social Körper) and the physical events of one’s 
body (physical Körper) may influence the way one experiences one’s body (Leib), i.e, 
feeling male or even feeling like something different than any known sex or gender, the 
“Leib might be its own ‘reality’” (Rodemeyer, 2012, p. 11).  In other words, lived 
experience is in relation to cultural mediation and biological processes, but these do not 
necessarily subsume the felt body.   
 Technologies, or things, are mediators between body 1 and body 2 (Ihde, 2002).  
Technology transcends these two bodies and changes the experience of embodiment.  The 
technological object is initially added to the physical body from without, but becomes a 
part of the lived body.  Ihde (2002) sees these as instances of “instrumental realism,” in 
which technology (specifically, tools) act as material instrumentation extending the 
body's innate capacities.  This also means that tools, or bodily instrumentation, are 
mediators between body and world.  Technologies provide another way for a body to 
 32 
 
inhabit the world or make a meaningful world.   
 One way to understand this relation is that human beings and the world “are not 
merely intertwined with each other but constitute each other” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 112).  
One point which follows from this is that human embodiment is always already 
immersed in technology or being shaped by technology.  “Embodiment is, in practice, the 
way in which we engage our environment or 'world,' and while we may not often 
explicitly attend to it, many of these actions incorporate the use of artifacts” (Ihde, 2009, 
p. 42).  Another point is that things actively shape human experience: “Things... are not 
neutral 'intermediaries' between humans and world, but mediators: they actively mediate 
this relation” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 114), and “what humans are and what their world is 
receive their form by artifactual mediation” (Verbeek, 2005, p. 130).  Technology acts in 
human life, in addition to humans taking up technology.  An important part of 
understanding human relations with technology is to make sense of the opposite 
question—how does technology act on human life?  Verbeek (2005) notes that 
technology's agency (“What Things Do,” the title of his text—italics mine) “can only 
become visible when technology is considered from the point of view of its concrete 
artifacts” (p. 6).  Technology is in relation with humans, each modifying the other. 
Mediated Action 
 Indeed, technologies are not neutral, they have certain “instrumental 
intentionality” (Ihde, 2002), meaning they shape human action in a particular way.  
Latour (2005) takes this notion further, explaining that artifacts have agency and are 
actors.  In other words, technology includes some sort of imperative that directs or 
influences action.  For instance, the computer is an interface between my fingers and my 
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text, and suggests, or allows, a certain style of composition.  I am not obligated to 
produce my text in a linear way, or to produce it in a single, careful stream.  Marshall 
McLuhan (1995) offers an example of how typing influences text, citing the poetry of e.e. 
cummings as only possible in typed form.  Analogous to the way that a keyboard shapes 
writing, how does the dildo shape Michael's embodied being?  And further, how does it 
shape his actions—what sort of imperative does the dildo provide for Michael?  Let us 
look at how Michael answers this question, first with his material description of the dildo. 
* * * 
An important part of technology's ability to engage with human beings is the 
shared materiality of the technology and the flesh (Ihde, 2002, p. 7).  Here, Michael 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006) describes the materiality of the dildo:  
In the store I debated buying a dildo that looked relatively natural or one that was 
beyond the realm of real anatomy. I finally selected one that was similar in size, 
shape, and angle to my erect penis before cancer treatments, to the best of my 
recollection. It is made of silicone, which makes it durable, appropriately stiff, yet 
still flexible, like a natural erect penis. Beyond that, the dildo that I bought bears 
little resemblance to a human penis. Granted, it has an expanded “head,” like the 
real glans penis but a uniformly smooth shaft, with none of the irregular surface 
texture caused by real-life veins. And it is purple! Clearly, it does not constitute a 
realistic bio-mimetic prosthesis (p. 391). 
 
The dildo partially suggests a penis (and particularly, his own erect penis) to Michael, but 
at the same time it is not a penis and does not (indeed, cannot) be a part of the body in 
precisely the same way.  When one uses a hammer, “the hardness—but not the 
coldness—of the nail is experienced through the hammer” (Ihde, 2002, p.7).  In the same 
way, the dildo is an incomplete mediator, and “the missing elements [of experience] can 
be filled in only by the full bodily sensory awareness that is a part of the ordinary 
experience of the artifact-user's world” (Ihde, 2002, p.7).  The possibilities left open by 
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the dildo as an incomplete mediator of experience allow room for imagination and play—
there are multiple ways to take up the dildo.  Chapter 4 discusses the way in which 
Michael and his partner make use of this space and fill in the missing element of 
experience. 
 The dildo's materiality allows it to act as an extension of Michael's body and 
change his experience of embodiment.  Based on Michael's description, it seems that the 
dildo focuses his embodied experience away from restoring the visual presence of a penis 
and instead prepares him for a novel embodied experience.  He has selected an object that 
will be functional for the sexual acts he engaged in previously, and something that is not 
“realistic,” but that moves in the direction of fantasy.  The materiality of the object seems 
to suggest playful activity, a suggestion which Michael takes up in his way of thinking 
about and using the dildo. 
 How else does the dildo influence Michael's action?  Objects may also be thought 
of as actors or agents, meaning an object does more than modify human action—it acts, 
too.  Latour (2005) understands an agent to be anything about which one could answer 
“yes” in response to the following questions: “Does it make a difference in the course of 
some other agent's action...?  Is there some trial that allows someone to detect this 
difference?” (p. 71).  A trial might be, for instance, noting the difference between hitting a 
nail with or without a hammer, or simply that the presence of the implement makes a 
difference.  Latour states, “it does make a difference under trials and so these implements, 
according to our definition, are actors, or more precisely, participants in the course of 
action” (2005, p. 71).  Objects may influence or act upon the world in any number of 
ways—Latour lists “authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest...” and more 
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(2005, p. 72), as defined by effects, rather than intentions.  Thus, objects have a distinct 
place in the human social world as non-human actors.   
 Noteworthy verbs Michael uses to describe what the dildo does include: “bears 
little resemblance,” “gives me... sexual capacity,” “pleased her,” and “sitting upright... 
wearing one of my favorite neckties.”  The dildo produces effects, making a difference in 
the course of his action and others actions.  In these examples, the dildo seems to be an 
independent object, in contrast to other moments in which Michael describes it as a part 
of himself, or as a possession belonging equally to himself and his partner.  At times, the 
dildo is part of Michael's body schema; at other times it is either too impersonal or too 
imbued with its own agency to be a part of Michael.  He attributes the effects of the dildo 
to the object itself, rather than himself by means of the dildo, or perhaps the hybrid of the 
combined intentionality of Michael and the dildo.  Objects have other ways of 
influencing the action of others (human or nonhuman/ other objects) than by extending 
the body, and to become bodily extensions, they must do something more than influence 
action.  The next section discusses other conditions of object “in-corporation.”   
Embodiment Relations 
 Ihde discusses two types of mediation, embodiment and hermeneutic, which seem 
to usefully apply to this phenomenon.  Hermeneutic relation refers to how technologies 
change the ways in which we interpret reality, which has been discussed to some degree 
already in this chapter.  Technology here is something that interfaces with the body, 
modifying felt body experience and how we live our bodies.  Ihde (2002) calls these 
“embodiment relations” and explains that a technology-body relation means 
“experiencing something in the world through an artifact, a technology” (p. xi).  Verbeek 
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(2005) elaborates: “Human contact with reality is always mediated, and technologies 
offer one form of mediation.  On the other hand,… any particular mediation can only 
arise within specific contexts of use and interpretation” (p. 11).    
 When one relates to an object via an embodiment relation, the object becomes a 
medium of perceptual experience—one lives through the technology as one lives through 
one’s body.  The technological object is initially added to the body from without, but 
becomes a part of the lived body.  A classic example would be eyeglasses: one's visual 
perception is changed by the lenses; one experiences the world through the glasses.  They 
become like a part of the body, both in that they are lived through, and in that they can be 
forgotten and become a means rather than an object of perception (Verbeek 2005).  
Heidegger discusses the transparency of tools when they are functioning properly, or how 
they “withdraw” from attention (Ihde 2009).  They are “ready-to-hand” and “make a 
practice possible without themselves becoming objects of experience or action” (Verbeek 
2005, p. 226).  Practices may develop around the object or be guided by the object when 
it possesses this transparency. 
 Another example of an embodiment relation could be the way wearing high-heels 
changes the body gestalt, or Merleau-Ponty's example of a person with a feather in her 
hat.  The person navigates herself through a doorway without hitting the feather on the 
door-frame, she has an awareness of the boundary of the feather like her awareness of her 
body boundary; the feather is a bodily extension.  A more familiar and comparable 
experience for us might be driving a car through a tunnel: 
A woman may, without any calculation, keep a safe distance between the feather 
in her hat and things which might break it off.  She feels where the feather is just 
as we feel where our hand is.  If I am in the habit of driving a car, I can enter a 
narrow opening and see that I can 'get through' without comparing the width of 
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the opening with that of the wings, just as I go through a doorway without 
checking the width of the doorway against that of my body.  (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p. 165).  
 
Merleau-Ponty explains that “the hat and the car have ceased to be objects” and are “no 
longer perceived for [themselves]” but “[extend] the scope and radius of touch.”  He 
writes, “[The stick] is a body auxiliary, an extension of bodily synthesis” (p. 176).  The 
objects that were once distinct from the body become a means of experience.  “In short, 
embodiment or bodily intentionality extends through the artifact into the environing 
world in a unique technological mediation” (Ihde 2009, p. 36).  The object mediates 
experience in a particular way, and by becoming so close to bodily experience, it 
becomes a part of the body.  “The artifact is symbiotically 'taken into' my bodily 
experience and directed toward an action into or upon the environment” (Ihde 2009, p. 
42).  As Donna Haraway asks in her Cyborg Manifesto, “Why should our bodies end at 
the skin?”  (Haraway, 1991, p. 178).  
 Michael states: “It caught me by surprise how natural intercourse felt with this 
strap-on device” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).  Michael did not expect something 
external to his body to feel “natural,” yet this “device” is quickly incorporated.  He is 
surprised by how naturally something that was part of a world that seems to be outside of 
his body becomes a part of his body, how easily his perceptual life adapts to this 
variation.  His body is not “fixed” but can be modified—not only that, but this seems to 
happen almost effortlessly.  To quote Merleau-Ponty on the blind man's ability to modify 
his body to incorporate a walking stick: “Once the stick has become a familiar 
instrument, the world of feelable things recedes and now begins, not at the outer skin 
[…], but at the end of the stick” (1962, p. 175).  The dildo has become familiar to 
 38 
 
Michael, and so it becomes part of his felt sense.  The sensory world begins at Michael’s 
body boundaries, which now includes the dildo. 
 Merleau-Ponty (1962) discusses “perceptual habits,” which are the result of 
repeated practices.  He explains that the blind man with a stick is not simply reading the 
same sensations again and again when he uses his walking stick.  Rather, with enough 
practice, he is relieved of the necessity of conscious interpretation of these sensations, for 
the stick becomes a means of perception.  Merleau-Ponty writes, “The pressures on the 
hand and the stick are no longer given; the stick is no longer an object perceived by the 
blind man, but an instrument with which he perceives” (p. 176).  The bodily field of 
action and perception shifts in a particular way, whether this is a narrowing, expansion, or 
intensification, or something else.  Michael goes on to state: “I had not expected to 
achieve an orgasm and was astonished that it happened” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).  
Michael is further astonished that his body can work with this device.  To quote Merleau-
Ponty again, “the stick is no longer an object perceived [...], but an instrument with which 
he perceives” (1962, p. 176).  His body truly does seem to end where the dildo ends; the 
dildo is no longer a mere object.  It seems that Michael expected using the dildo to be 
awkward, unpleasant, and strange.  He seemed to expect that it would not allow his body 
to perform as it did before, that it could not do or achieve the same things, and is 
surprised to find that his body is so adaptable.   
 Michael describes the development of this perceptual, embodied habit over time: 
“Each time we use [the dildo], it becomes further imbued with the knowledge of the 
previous sexual satisfaction it has provided” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).  The dildo 
is becoming acceptable to Michael, a meaningful object.  He has acquired a new 
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perceptual habit and his perceptual field is altered.  Although this seemed to happen for 
him almost immediately, it seems that a further incorporation takes place every time 
Michael uses the dildo.  One might imagine that each time he uses the dildo, he is less 
surprised by his ability to perform with it, and it becomes less of a separate object he is 
“using” and more a part of him.  Michael discusses his initial doubt about how the dildo 
is not “innervated,” making him skeptical that it could bring him any pleasure.  However, 
the dildo has become “innervated” with memory, with imagination, with his own 
perception.   
 This becomes yet more striking, as it seems Michael does not require skin contact 
to experience the dildo as part of his body: “[...]There has now been enough acceptance 
of the dildo as a sexual object—and transference from 'object' to 'organ'—that the visual 
image of my partner mouthing the dildo was indeed highly erotic in the context of our sex 
play” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393).  Michael brings a united sensorium to his 
experience of sex play, vision and touch providing sensory data that is not objectified or 
analyzed into these separate parts.  In seeing his partner's mouth on the dildo, Michael at 
once feels pleasure.  “In the gaze we have at our disposal a natural instrument analogous 
to the blind man's stick [...] To learn to see colours is to acquire a certain style of seeing, a 
new use of one's own body: it is to enrich and recast the body image” (Merleau-Ponty 
1962, p. 177).  Like a child learning to distinguish categories of color, Michael has 
learned a new way of seeing and a new use of his body—not only does the dildo feel like 
a part of his body (as he says, it becomes an “organ”), but he sees it differently, and has 
acquired a different sort of gaze.  The dildo, as part of his body, goes from an object 
external to him to something that is a part of him, or from something that is only seen to 
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something that is both seen and felt.  The dildo becomes a part of Michael's “body 1” 
experience. 
 
III. Mediation and Identity 
 Objects call forth new possibilities for the body, new or changed perception and 
actions.  How does the change in embodiment brought about by engagement with an 
object affect one's sense of identity?   
Multistability of Artifacts 
 Objects can have multiple meanings, so the way they shape or engage human 
activity is flexible.  Because objects are understood in relation to human beings, and are 
thereby inseparable from their contexts, the identity of objects is based on how they are 
used.  Ihde (2002) calls this the “multistability of artifacts.”  Multistability, or the 
presence of multiple aspects, is defined by Wittgenstein (2001, p. 167): “I describe the 
alteration (change of aspect) like a perception; quite as if the object had altered before my 
eyes.... The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception and at 
the same time of the perception’s being unchanged.”  The object remains the same, but it 
may be seen in various ways, or contains various possibilities.  Ihde (2002) and Verbeek 
both use the example of the Necker cube to explain multistability: “When we look at this 
figure, we can see more than one thing... different ways of seeing produce different 
figures.  This figure allows multiple interpretations.  What it 'really' is remains 
undetermined.  It is many things at once; it is 'stable' in multiple ways” (Verbeek 2005, p. 
118).  Different points of view, or different implied bodily locations or positions, 
correspond to different aspects or variations.   
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 Like the Necker cube, objects in the world have variations.  We can liken the 
multiple identities of objects or technologies to the multiple “things” we can see when we 
look at a Necker cube.  A Necker cube appears in multiple ways at once, so it has no 
essential or true identity, but identities determined relationally (Verbeek, 2005).  Merleau-
Ponty notes that the different aspects of an object are only intelligible as the same object 
because the body moves around this object in space: “I could not grasp the unity of the 
object without the mediation of bodily experience” (2002, p. 235).  The object does not 
have a single preferred mode of existence (an “objective” existence), but finds stability in 
whichever mode is presented by the body mediating the object in a given spacial and 
temporal context (these modes are called “profiles” in a translation of Merleau-Ponty's 
Phenomenology of Perception by Richard Rojcewicz).   
 This also includes cultural context; things are embedded in culture and derive 
meaning from this relation.  An object presents itself in different ways, for different kinds 
of use, depending on its “materiality... bodily technique of use, and the cultural-historical 
role this technology plays as a variant” (Ihde 2009, p. 18).  In other words, how the object 
appears depends on multiple contextual components.  Ihde explains that multiple aspects 
of an object (in his example, a bow and arrow as built and used differently by various 
groups across history) come about in “differently structured lifeworlds relative to 
historical cultures and environments” (Ihde, 2009, pg. 19).  This way of understanding 
technology relies on attending to the context of use, concrete practices around an object, 
and the object as material.  Verbeek (2005) elaborates: “The insight that technologies 
cannot be separated from their use contexts implies they have no 'essence'; they are what 
they are only in their use.  A technology can receive an identity only within a concrete 
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context of use, and this identity is determined not only by the technology in question but 
also by the way in which it becomes interpreted” (p. 117).  This context of use also 
includes how the body comports itself to the object, or which profile of the object 
appears, beyond how the object is interpreted according to cultural context. 
 So, what is Michael's interpretation of the dildo?  That is, what are the variations 
of it that Michael encounters, and what are the contexts that bring about these variations 
or the point of view in Michael that allows him to witness these variations?  For Michael, 
the dildo takes on various meanings, and becomes more attached to particular meanings, 
as it presents itself in different contexts and as Michael and his partner make use of it.  
For instance, it is “a purple piece of plastic” when Michael first encounters it.  This 
description implies that it is an object distant from Michael—it is rather nondescript, and 
this phrase offers no hint of it as a useful object, or even a complete object.  It is a mere 
“piece” of something.  Later, Michael refers to it as “our dildo,” which implies a different 
set of meanings—this is a shared object that belongs to Michael and his partner, it is a 
link between them invested with care.  Michael also refers to it as a “prosthetic penis” at 
one point, and later, after Michael and his partner have taken up the dildo outside of any 
medical context, he refers to it as a “toy”—not as a penis or penile referent.  The question 
of how the dildo relates to the penis and the contexts that determine this relation will 
return in the next chapter; for now, it is enough to state that the dildo as an object has 
multiple context-determined meanings. 
A Different Body 
 Jensen (2009) discusses the importance of material objects in expressions of 
gender and sexual identity.  The body is not a vague abstraction which can only signify, 
 43 
 
but a lived material entity.  He writes (2009, p. 52), “Identities, bodies, and material 
artefacts all structure each other,” and offers the example of the relationship between a 
marathon runner and her shoes: “In the short term, shoes afford running, in the long term 
running re-shapes the body” (p. 52).  Human bodies become the product of technological 
objects, and human agency is shaped or mediated by non-human agents.  Michael makes 
use of the dildo, and over time, it shapes his body and world in a significant way, 
including his gendered and sexed identity.  His practices change in various ways.  For 
instance, he states, “I am able to continue pelvic thrusts long enough and hard enough 
that [my partner] now regularly achieves orgasm in the missionary position” (Warkentin 
et. al., 2006, p. 392).  Michael also states (Warkentin et. al., 2006): 
I... put on the dildo and harness ahead of time.  I covered myself with a bathrobe, 
but there was no mistaking the fact that when I looked down there was sticking 
out what looked like a large firm erection... I felt joyfully empowered... My 
thoughts went to a glib one-liner from my lesbian friend: 'A dyke with a dildo can 
outlast a male anytime.'  I realized that was equally true for a prostate cancer 
patient with a dildo...” (pp. 392- 3).   
 
Michael's sexual performance changes with dildo incorporation, but also his way of 
seeing himself and the world.  He feels empowered by his performance capacity, but 
clearly different from how he felt about his body and performance when he had a prostate 
and erections, or when he was not using a dildo.  The next chapter will detail the 
implications of this for gender identity in particular, but it seems that the repeated activity 
of using the dildo has shaped not only Michael's body, but his sense of identity.  Like 
running shoes shape a person's actions and body such that she becomes a runner, the 
dildo shaped Michael's actions and body toward a new sense of identity.   
 Verbeek (2005) describes Ihde's notion that technology “plays a constitutive role 
in the production of scientific knowledge” (p. 144).  He describes how technology allows 
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for different sorts of perceptions than would otherwise be available—for instance, the 
way in which a camera or a microscope enable human beings to perceive the world in a 
different manner (Verbeek, 2005, p. 134).  If mediated perception plays a constitutive role 
in scientific knowledge, it seems that it would play this role in human knowledge 
generally.  Not only does Michael's embodied activity and perceptual world shift, but 
consequently, Michael's knowledge about the world seems changed following use of the 
dildo (and use of hormonal drugs).  The “reality investigated” changes based on the 
instruments used (Verbeek 2005); the instruments bring forth aspects of reality.   
Michael's experience of reality changes greatly, particularly his experience of sex, 
revealing a more complex world of sexuality than hegemonic standards imply (which 
shall be elaborated further in chapter 4).  Prior to prostate disease and using a dildo, 
Michael “found it incomprehensible when a woman claimed she had pleasure from 
sexual stimulation and yet had not had an orgasm” and that “sexual arousal that did not 
lead to ejaculation was frustrating” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).  However, after 
dildo incorporation, “I... could enjoy sex without orgasms.  I can also have multiple 
orgasms!” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).  Michael also states, “I find it easiest to 
achieve orgasms when my partner wants me to... but far more difficult on my own” 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).  New aspects of the world, particularly of sexuality, 
emerge for Michael.  
 
Conclusions 
 Objects have an active role in shaping embodied identity (just as human beings 
have an active role in creating the identity of objects).  The dildo is no exception—it 
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shapes and is shaped by Michael.  It contributes to and changes his felt sense of his body, 
and in doing so, changes his way of understanding himself. 
The next chapter will further explore how physical embodiment relates to identity, 
and will specifically address gender identity.  Like the practices described in the previous 
section on how a human being engaged in a practice shaped by running shoes makes her 
a runner, it seems that there are practices which shape gender identity, which are, 
necessarily, embodied.  Michael provides a unique window into this phenomenon 
because he presents a case of embodiment and identity in flux, in a moment when they 
may be caught becoming.  The next chapter will continue to explore the relationship of 
the body to identity by exploring how a shift in embodiment seems to produce a shift in 
gender identity for Michael.   
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Chapter 3: Body Morphology & Gender Identity 
 
[W]here is the self in relation to the body's surface? 
– Jay Prosser, 1998, p. 62 
 
 This chapter is an inquiry into the relationship between the felt body and 
discourses about the body, particularly as these pertain to sex and gender identity.  
Michael's experiences and the phenomenon he presents in some ways reveal this 
relationship.  His body changes and so does his embodied sense of himself, including his 
personal, sexual, and gendered identity.  Michael thinks of himself differently and 
encounters the world differently as he proceeds through a change in his physical body.  
The previous chapter explains how Michael's experience demonstrates that one's identity 
is lived out through the body and the extensions which become a part of it.  This implies 
that the body is not an object the self encounters, but the medium of lived experience.  
The experience he presents in his narrative implies that identity and the body are 
irreducible, or that they vary together.  At the same time, however, Michael must learn to 
live his new body.  He searches for words to identify his experience and for discourses 
matching what is happening to him.  Michael's experience is of course not totally naïve; 
rather, it takes place in a matrix of meanings he applies to himself.   
 This chapter is a continued exploration of the relationship between the body and 
identity.  It addresses discourses about gender and sexual identity as they illuminate the 
case study phenomenon, as well as how the case study phenomenon challenges or 
supports these discourses.  Additionally, this chapter addresses tensions between theories 
which present identity, and the body, as a product of language and discourse, and theories 
which present identity as emerging from the body.   
* * * 
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 This chapter makes use of a rather extensive list of terms to describe the body and 
identity.  For the purpose of clarity and to ensure consistency of use throughout, some of 
the more stable terms are defined here, taken in paraphrase from Golombok and Fivush 
(1994).  Sex refers to biological maleness or femaleness, although the extent of what 
belongs to “sex” is controversial (for instance, whether or not certain behaviors 
associated with sex are biologically based).  Which biological traits matter for 
determining a person's sex seems unclear, too (Genitalia? Secondary sexual 
characteristics like facial hair? Invisible characteristics like chromosomes and 
hormones?).  Gender refers to “social traits and characteristics associated with each sex,” 
(Golombok & Fivush, 1994, p. 3) but this term is as controversial as sex, which reveals 
that the concepts of sex and gender have unclear boundaries.  Gender identity refers to a 
person's sense of his or her own gender, and may or may not correspond to sex—for 
instance, a biological female may be “masculine” or a biological male may be 
“feminine.”  A gender role includes behaviors or characteristics deemed appropriate for a 
given sex; a gender role might be described as the gender others associate with a person's 
sex, whether or not it matches the person's gender identity.  Gender identity, then, may be 
thought of as subjectively felt gender versus gender role which refers to socially 
prescribed gender.  Later on, this chapter will discuss the meanings of transgender and 
transsexual identities.  Finally, sexual orientation refers to a person's object of sexual 
desire (whether the person is heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, or something else).  
Zita (1998) also describes this as socioerotic identity, based not only on erotic desire but 
also on sexual behavior.  It is based both what one feels and what one does, or both how 
one experiences oneself and how one presents oneself to others (these two aspects of 
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sexual identity may conflict, adding complexity to one's overall sexual identity).  As the 
attached illustration implies (Fig. 1), these aspects of gender and sexual identity exist 
along continua.  For instance, someone may have a male gender role but a gender identity 
that is female, or somewhere between male and female, or one may identify as bisexual 
but engage in heterosexual sexual behavior, and so on. 
 Like Hale (1998), this chapter uses these and other terms as approximations, or in 
somewhat “primitive” ways (p. 341) to acknowledge that all of these terms contain 
degrees of ambiguity, are used in multiple ways, and shift in meaning.  Often there are 
unclear borders between different markers of identity, particularly those categories which 
have more recently emerged into language (for example, Hale, 1998, discusses the border 
zone some find between butch lesbian women and ftms, or female-to-male transgendered 
persons).  Hale (1998, p.322) explains, “drawing a distinction between butches and ftms 
in terms of masculine subjectivity threatens to elide both some ftms’ self-identifications 
and some butches’ self-identifications relative to the categories 'man,' 'male,' and 
'masculine.'”  Thus, some of the definitions employed here are approximate, and 
descriptive rather than categorical.  This is not to say that these definitions are conflated, 
but only that the distinctions between them may be made differently by different people, 
and that some find themselves most at home in an ambiguous space between distinct 
identity categories.   
 Another purpose of maintaining the ambiguity of identity categories is to remain 
hermeneutically faithful to Michael's encounter with a changed sense of embodiment and 
gender identity.  For the most part, his narrative is descriptive in a way that suggests but 
rarely names different terms or identity markers.  For instance, at one point Michael 
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states, “I can also have multiple orgasms!  [...]My orgasms are less anatomically focused, 
radiating across my pelvis” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  He does not, however, call 
his pelvic multiple orgasms female or feminine, nor does he compare his experience 
explicitly with female experience, even if his statement here may suggest something like 
this.  Indeed, Michael's account seems to draw out some of the instability in various 
categories related to gender and sexuality, perhaps already challenging theories in which 
language is constitutive of experience, although the discourses from which these terms 
emerge also present ways of understanding or putting language to Michael's experience. 
 This chapter will discuss these discourses and ways of understanding the 
relationship between gender and the body, and will be placed in dialogue with the 
phenomenon presented in Michael's narrative.   
 
I. The Material Body and the Discursive Body 
 This section presents ideas about the ways in which the body is meaningful and 
about the relationship between the body and one's identity.  These ideas provide the 
background for understanding the phenomenon described in Michael's narrative. 
Discursive Body 
 This section elaborates a discourse about the body that regards it as fundamentally 
discursive, or constructed through language and knowledge.  Butler (1988) states that 
“gender is instituted through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood 
as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various 
kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self” (p. 519).  This is to say, gender 
has no ontological status—gender is an idea.  This idea is taken up by the body through a 
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set of acts that takes on the appearance of something with substance.  It is an 
epistemological category, a mere appearance that comes about from a way of thinking or 
seeing (the seeing and thinking is primary here, and the appearance of a category 
follows).  With sufficient repetition, gender takes on the appearance of an enduring, 
original component of one's body.  Because gender comes about through acts, it has no 
status prior to these acts (Butler, 1988).   
 These acts are ongoing and repeated.  Young's work (2005) includes accounts that 
may be read as the gendering of the body, or as descriptions of some of the acts that, as 
Butler describes it, “stylize the body”: “When I was about thirteen, I spent hours 
practicing a 'feminine' walk, which was stiff and closed, and rotated from side to side” (p. 
44).  This physical practice is a way of taking up a feminine gender, training a body to be 
a woman's body.  This practice is also a way of taking up a broader discourse about 
femininity and what it means to be a woman in a particular social and historical context.  
The modification or restriction placed on the way some bodies inhabit time and space 
illustrates the notion that “performance renders social laws explicit” (Butler, 1988, p. 
526).  As an illustration of this idea, Bordo (2004) presents an exercise for men that is 
meant to bring attention to “how female subjectivity is normalized and subordinated by 
the everyday bodily requirements of 'femininity'” (p. 19).  The participant is instructed: 
“Sit down in a straight chair.  Cross your legs at the ankles and keep your knees pressed 
together.  Try to do this while you're having a conversation... but pay attention at all times 
to keeping your knees pressed tightly together” (Bordo, 2004, p. 19).  Indeed, this 
restriction of the body reduces the range of actions that are permitted or possible, and in 
this way bodily actions are physical manifestations of oppression.  The idea of a bodily 
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“habitus,” Bourdieu's (1997) term, describes how bodily practices become persistent and 
seem to have little malleability, even if there is no essential link between gender identity 
and body.  According to Packer (2010, p. 318),  
Bourdieu defined habitus as embodied expertise: it is a set of dispositions that 
incline a person to act and react in particular ways. Habitus is a way of standing, 
talking, walking—and at the same time a way of feeling and thinking... It is 
inculcated in that one’s habitus develops in childhood as the body is molded, and 
as particular ways of acting, talking and so on become second nature. Habitus is 
'embodied history.' 
 
In other words, one learns a way of living one's body that permeates broadly and deeply, 
affecting the ways one lives one's body.  In sum, this is the way bodies are taken up by 
discourses, and the way gender is inscribed upon the body.  It should be noted that this is 
not necessarily a permanent inscription or necessarily one that becomes complete at a 
given point, as bodies change and gender (as well as other identity markers) is re-learned.   
 To elaborate further, this process provides the context in which bodies acquire 
meaning, and is not merely a layering of meanings upon a body which already possesses 
them.  Butler states, “The body is not passively scripted with cultural codes, as if it were 
a lifeless recipient of wholly pre-given cultural relations.  But neither do embodied selves 
pre-exist the cultural conventions which essentially signify bodies” (1988, p. 526, italics 
added).  In other words, bodies take on meaning within culture, and only become selves 
in culture.  This also means that sex is an effect of gender, rather than the other way 
around.  The physical body takes on certain meanings—one might think of the body as 
the text and gender as the interpretation, but the interpretation comes first and the body 
must act it out (Butler, 1988).  Parts of the body become significant, inscribed with 
meaning and definitive of a person of a certain sex/ gender.  The claim, then, is that the 
anatomical body with which a person is born only becomes significant in a context.  In 
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sum, according to this viewpoint represented here mainly by Butler, identity and the body 
are products of language and discourse.   
Material Body 
 This section explores another approach to the body which places emphasis on the 
material or pre-discursive body, regarding the body as meaningful in a certain way before 
it is invested with meaning through language and culture.  In other words, the body does 
not acquire meaning simply through language and discourse, but that the materiality of 
the body is itself significant beyond its function as a surface for inscription. 
 Because the context in which bodies come to take on meaning influences how a 
person comes to live and experience her body, it would seem that there are different 
times/ spaces/ worlds for different kinds of bodies, and particularly, for differently sexed 
bodies.  For instance, someone with an anatomically female body who acquires an 
understanding of her body and identity in a patriarchal context may live her body in a 
restricted way, as suggested by Young (2005).  Her way of engaging with the world 
differs from those in male bodies or bodies in a non-patriarchal context.  Grosz (1995) 
states that, “it is not clear that men and women conceive of space or time in the same 
way” (p. 100).  She suggests that popular ways of understanding time and space contain a 
sex bias, stating that it is also not clear “whether their experiences are neutrally presented 
within dominant mathematical and physics models” (p. 100), and adds that an alternate 
conception of space and time would make more sense out of women's embodied 
experiences.  Irigaray (1977/1993) also posits the idea that the world is structured 
differently for female bodies than it is for male bodies, meaning that female bodied 
persons structure the world differently.  From males bodies follows a masculine logic 
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(Irigaray, 1977/1993, p. 363):  
“[T]he more or less exclusive—and highly anxious—attention paid to erection in 
Western sexuality proves to what extent the imaginary that governs it is foreign to 
the feminine. For the most part, this sexuality offers nothing but imperatives 
dictated by male rivalry: the 'strongest' being the one who has the best 'hard on'...”  
 
 Irigaray's suggestion seems to be both that physical bodies, and especially the 
body's sexual anatomy, contribute to how one engages with the world in a fundamental 
way; that is, the structure of one's world (at least, or perhaps especially, one's sexual 
world) is mapped onto a structure of one's body.  The ways one thinks, understands, and 
expresses oneself are significantly determined by one's body.  It also follows, as stated 
previously, that forces of oppression in the social world influence and restrict the way one 
lives one's body—i.e., that there are specifically feminine ways of being that have been 
suppressed by dominant masculine being-in-the-world.  The restricted range of motion 
Young (2005) discusses in the example above of “feminine walking” (as well as in her 
other writings, particularly in the essay Throwing Like a Girl, 2005) is merely one piece 
of visible evidence of a total restriction on female bodies and worlds.  According to 
Irigaray: “if we refrain from invoking the hystericization of her entire body, the 
geography of her pleasure is far more diversified, more multiple in its differences, more 
complex, more subtle, than is commonly imagined” (1977/ 1993, p. 366).  In other words, 
and in contrast to Butler's account, female bodily experience contrasts significantly from 
male body experience not only in that it is restricted by oppressive conditions, but also 
differs essentially by virtue of how the body is structured (and not merely how this 
structure is taken up in social context).  This difference would be even more obvious if 
female experience were allowed to manifest itself unrepressed.  Female experience, 
however, takes place in a patriarchal world which renders it as pathological.  This world 
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sometimes even equates femininity with the pathological, damaged, or weak, or simply 
leaves female experience unintelligible or invisible.  A person is her embodied 
experience, and this experience is misinterpreted or perverted by popular, patriarchal 
discourse.   
 In contrast to Butler, Irigaray suggests that gender and sex have an ontological 
status, and are linked.  This account also suggests that feminism's primary task (at least 
politically) should be liberating female bodies/ female sexuality from dominant 
masculine (“phallogocentric”) influences so that its full unrepressed essence can emerge.  
This is a different aim than the one suggested by Butler (1990), which entails creating 
“gender trouble”—revealing gender as a constructed rather than natural category by 
highlighting its ambiguities and performativity.   
* * *  
 These divergent accounts leave the body ambiguous.  While it is clear that identity 
and the body are always in relation, it is not clear how.  That is to say, it is not clear 
whether, on the one hand, the body has a natural or perhaps authentic trajectory which 
must only be released from constraint, or whether, on the other hand, the body is a 
template for cultural inscription that in an important way only comes to be through and 
following this inscription.   
 It is also unclear whether identity—one's felt sense of gender identity, the way one 
shapes and encounters the world—proceeds from the body or is taken up by the body 
through repeated, formative acts.  In other words, while there is certainly some 
relationship between the self and the body, or a way in which the self is the body, a 
number of questions remain about the way in which this is true.  It is also worth noting 
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that both ways of seeing the body offer pictures of body and identity as irreducible or as 
parts of a co-constitutive entity, both also have points at which they risk slipping into a 
dualistic idea of self and body as separable.   
 This rest of this chapter interrogates the contrasting accounts of sex and gender as 
ontological and essential versus the idea that gender is an epistemological category of 
which sex is an effect, as informed by Michael's experience.   
 
II. Penis and Phallus: Body Parts  
 If the structure of one's world is based on the anatomical structure of one's body, 
as suggested by Irigaray and in different ways by others, then do some parts of the body 
matter more than others for this purpose (such as the “two lips” and “mucous 
membranes” that Irigaray (1977/ 1993) writes about)?  Do visible, or sometimes visible, 
signifiers of sex—breasts, penises, facial hair—matter more than aspects of sex that are 
internal or invisible, like hormones or genes?  Furthermore, what, if anything, about a 
penis is essentially masculine (alternately, what about masculinity, if anything, is 
essentially phallic)?  How are we to understand self-identified men without functional 
penises, as one might view Michael and as he may view himself, or self-identified 
women whose bodies have penises, perhaps because they are in the process of male-to-
female transgender surgery, because they possess instrumental additions (as discussed in 
the previous chapter), atypical genetics, or because they simply identify as women while 
having bodies others may regard as male?  How do body parts shape experience? 
Overdetermination of the Penis 
 The penis seems to be the human body part most inscribed with cultural 
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significance, the part most identified with the whole.  Ihde (2002), in an attempt to 
elaborate male bodily experience in a specific and self-aware way (rather than presenting 
masculinity as the unquestioned norm for all human experiences), states that “the penis is 
haunted by the phallus” and that the penis “must live up to the phallic cultural 
expectations” (p. 28).iv In other words, the penis as a signifier or product of discourse and 
the penis as a material body part have a gulf between them, with a demand that the latter 
approximate the former.  This divide corresponds to Ihde's “body 1” (the sense of being a 
body and lived experience) and “body 2” (the culturally constructed significance of the 
body, as well as the objective physical body), discussed in the previous chapter.  The 
cultural treatment of erectile dysfunction as a failure of masculinity (and the attention 
paid to the erection as the focus of sexuality in Western culture, as pointed out by 
Irigaray, above) attest to Ihde's (2002) claim.v  The penis becomes a symbol of power, 
redefined as “the phallus,” and is associated with masculinity.  Annie Potts (2000, p. 86) 
states, “The penis is distanced from its purely anatomical functions of urination and 
insemination and comes to stand as an object.  This displacement permits the penis to 
represent the phallus at a symbolic level and vice versa.”  Grosz (1990) explains “The 
phallus functions to enable the penis to define all (socially recognized) forms of 
sexuality” (p. 117), either by its presence or absence, sustained erection or failure to 
achieve and sustain erection.  The demand that the penis live up to the phallus, and that 
all sexuality be defined by the penis (that is, by its presence or absence, functionality or 
failure) places barriers on the imagination and bodily adaptation humans are capable of 
bringing to their sexuality.  In this way, the penis is overdetermined and given symbolic 
meaning apart from its materiality.vi 
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 Before trying out the strap-on, Michael is “afraid that [he] would feel foolish and 
humiliated by using a strap-on penis” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  He adds that this 
would mean confronting the “functional failure of [his] own flaccid phallus” (Warkentin 
et. al., 2006, p. 391).  He feels that his penis is not living up to the phallic ideal and 
Michael himself feels like a failure, translating his physical inability to a symbolic failure 
to meet the ideal.  Michael worries that someone he knows will discover him purchasing 
the strap on and mock him (Warkentin et. al., 2006), i.e., that society will judge him as 
sexually inadequate or inadequately male.  At this point, the dildo is to Michael, “a strap-
on penis”; it is a direct replacement for his own penis which he regards as inadequate or 
missing.  It also seems, at this point, that the forms of sexuality Michael recognizes are 
defined by the phallus.  He feels that with a functioning erection, prosthetic or not, he is 
sexual, but without it he is “sexually incapacitated” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 390). 
 This idealized, symbolic, discursive phallus is only male by association, however.  
Butler (1993) suggests that the phallus is not essentially male: “Precisely because [the 
phallus] is an idealization, one which no body can adequately approximate, the phallus is 
a transferable phantasm, and its naturalized link to masculine morphology can be called 
into question through an aggressive reterritorialization” (p. 86).  That is to say, although 
the phallus is linked with or even equated with the penis, this is a cultural link rather than 
a natural one, and an ideal which the penis (or any body part, if one were to select some 
other body part as a symbol of power) cannot carry out.  It seems, then, that the phallus 
could belong to or be applied to any body, and be taken up as a component of anyone's 
embodied experience.  Indeed, “The phallus is a mythical construct... even if more 
dominant in certain configurations than others, nevertheless spills over clear and clean 
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boundaries” (Ihde, 2002, pp. 29-30).   
While the power associated with the phallus seems to accrue in male bodies, it is 
not essentially male and is certainly accessible from non-male bodies.  Butler notes that 
many body parts may function as phalluses but only the penis becomes a symbol of 
phallic power (Butler, 1993).  One might even say that masculinity, insofar as masculinity 
is synonymous with phallic power, is not essentially male.  Ihde offers the simple 
example of a female university president having “enough 'balls' to carry the day” to 
indicate that “the phallus is not simply male” (2002, p. 29).  Indeed, power is not 
essentially located anywhere.  Halberstam (2011) suggests the dildo as a more accurate 
symbol of phallic power than the penis, as power and dominance are present in different 
bodies at different times—the phallus is detachable.   
Re-Orienting the Body 
  
 If the penis as a representation of phallic power differs from the embodied 
experience of having a penis, then it is a mistake to too readily equate the penis with the 
phallus or with masculinity, the phallus with the male, and the male with the penis or with 
the phallus.  The meanings attributed to male bodies, and particularly to male genitalia, 
may be taken up by non-male bodies.  “Cultural genitalia” (as defined by Prasad, 2009) 
differs from “physical genitalia—the anatomical possession of a vagina or a penis” (p. 
242) and provides a basis for describing how features associated with one kind of body 
may be taken up by other kinds of bodies.  Cultural genitalia is “assumed to exist... as 
evidence of 'natural sexuality,” so that “even if the genital is not present in the physical 
sense, it exists in a cultural sense if the person feels entitled to it and/or is assumed to 
have it” (Prasad, 2009, p. 242).  This means that not only is the phallus transferrable, but 
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that the penis (and vagina, and by extension, other body parts associated with sexed 
bodies) is also transferrable.  In other words, one may experience a gender identity and/ 
or live a gender role or socially assumed gender that does not match the sex and gender 
assigned to one at birth.  Prasad (2009) uses this idea particularly to refer to male 
lesbians, suggesting that males who identify as lesbian could “take on the cultural 
meaning of a vagina” (p. 243) without alternations to their physical morphology.  
 Michael discusses “reconceptualizing the situation” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 
391) once he acquires the dildo.  Michael seems to be altering his body on the discursive, 
symbolic level.  He determines that the dildo is not a “'cure' for ED” and is not “a medical 
appliance” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391), meaning the dildo is not a means of curing a 
physical disease.  Rather than trying to replace his penis or act as though his sexuality 
were unchanged, Michael takes on a different orientation toward the dildo and sexuality.  
He de-links the dildo from the penis and stops thinking of his identity and sexuality in 
terms of his ability to sustain erections.  This is quite remarkable, given the power of the 
penis to define and determine the limits of sexuality.  Michael and his partner are 
somehow able to circumvent this imposition on their sexuality (the role of Michael's 
partner in this event is elaborated in the next chapter).  Rather than work in the context of 
phallogocentric imperatives, Michael decides that he is “heading into the theater of the 
absurd, and [is] going to play the part of the lesbian!” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  
Michael re-orients his body toward a new kind of sexual identity, developing what 
Halberstam (2005) might call a “queer” orientation to the world, defined as 
“nonnormative logistics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment, 
and activity in space and time” (p. 6).  This is a different way of living one's body and 
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world outside of expected or naturalized roles.   
 While these orientations are embodied or lived through the body, they are not 
linked to the body in a singular or essential way.  Orientations “involve directions toward 
objects that affect what we do, and how we inhabit space” (Ahmed, 2006, p. 28).  
Orientations “line up” or pull us in various directions.  These accounts, rather than 
positing a male body experience and a female body experience, one kind of femininity or 
masculinity, or desire as lining up in only a certain way (i.e., in a heterosexual or 
“straight” way), instead allow for multiple kinds of embodied experiences or “pulls” and 
identities.  For Michael, thinking of dildo use as something “completely different” from 
his sexual activity prior to prostate cancer treatment leads him to experience a shift in his 
personal identity, gender identity,  and sexual orientation in terms of how he inhabits his 
sexual body and space (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). 
 It seems that the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is 
that the physical body and identity have no necessary connection.  This kind of 
reconceptualization allows for bodies made up of combinations of aspects or parts that 
are not typically thought of as belonging to the same body.  Zita (1998) notes that “the 
disarticulation of modernist body paradigms allows for new sexes, sexualities, and 
genders that can dislodge the signs of gender and sexuality from the trump of genital 
signification” (p. 82).  By thinking of the body not as a natural unity, but an assemblage 
of parts that are put together personally and culturally into an apparent whole, the body 
becomes “capable of disassembly and rearrangement” (Zita, 1998, p. 81).  Like Donna 
Haraway's cyborg, these bodies are “ambiguously natural and crafted” (Haraway, 1991, p. 
149), making sex and gender also ambiguous and malleable, leaving open new 
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possibilities for ways to be embodied or identify oneself.   
 This opens up, for instance, an option for vulnerable (non-phallic) male bodies 
that are not read as feminine, but simply a different kind of male body (Thomas, 2002, 
Halberstam, 2002).  This also allows for different categories, based on putting together 
ideas that are presumed not to go together—i.e, having a male body and lesbian desire.  
In order to recognize a male body as lesbian, we could “overlook the body as we 
habitually read it and attend to other evidence of sex identity” (Zita, 1998, p. 100), i.e., 
how the male understands himself and experiences his body, in which case  
...the penis is not disposed of, but its significance is deposed: it is no longer the 
phallus.  It remains an appendage, useful perhaps, interesting perhaps, a location 
of pleasure like the clitoris, but a perforate clitoris with some optional functions 
(Zita, 1998, p. 100). 
  
Dissociating the penis from the phallus, or the penis from the idea that the penis has come 
to represent, opens up a range of possibilities for interpreting other parts as the phallus, or 
re-interpreting the penis as something else.  This also seems to privilege the felt or 
experienced body over the body as interpreted by othersvii; that is, this way of thinking 
about sex and gender demands that we change our way of viewing a body to match what 
that body feels (or at least, prefers to be viewed as) versus basing our way of viewing a 
body on what it looks like, or is presumed to look like if we could see beneath its 
covering.   
 Zita (1998) explains that “this is an ontological shift into the 'opposite' sex 
category, not a masquerade of belonging to it” (p. 106, italics added).  In other words, 
insofar as one can be male or female, “male” lesbians are female.  This does not refer 
only to how others view a body, but how that body itself experiences the world.  “[T]he 
very idea of a male sexual identity produces sensation, produces the meaning of 
 62 
 
sensation, becomes the meaning of how one's body feels,” (Stoltenberg cited by Zita, 
1998, p. 96).  “[T]he sensations derive from the idea” rather than the anatomy 
(Stoltenberg cited by Zita, 1998, p. 97).  An idea (or a discourse) can re-orient the body in 
ways that go beyond appearance to experience.  Although the body and sex identity are 
not essentially linked, sexual identity labels are still meaningful as lived categories and 
even productive of lived experience.   
 A debatable and problematic implication of this argument (which will be 
discussed further later on in this chapter) would be that altering the body's physical 
morphology to better fit bodily contours associated with another sex is for the sake of the 
interpreting audience more than for the sake of the person altering her body.  This 
argument implies that changing body morphology is not necessary to take on a different 
sex (or that it is only one way to take on a different sex), or perhaps the function that a 
change in the physical body serves has more to do with others’ perceptions or with 
passing (i.e., being accepted as a lesbian by one's community or potential partners, being 
allowed into women only spaces, being regarded as a female by strangers) than it does 
one's embodied feeling.  Being female is defined here as an embodied feeling that 
corresponds to no particular external morphology, except by association.  As Zita (1998, 
p. 86) asks, “Why should we privilege genital anatomies in defining the truth of our 
sex?,” or broadly, the truth of our identity?   
 The following subsection will discuss how this view of the sexed body and 
identity applies to how Michael takes up the strap-on dildo.   
Dildo Dissociation 
 If the penis is not essentially male, and if the morphological form of the penis can 
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be read and interpreted as something other than a penis, and if body parts other than the 
penis can be phalluses, then surely the dildo can also have multiple meanings.  In her 
aptly titled essay, “Dildonics, Dykes, and the Detachable Masculine,” Hamming (2001) 
suggests that although the dildo seems to imply a male body, “it has the potential to be 
recoded as a post-gender, non-phallic signifier” (p. 330).  In other words, the dildo can be 
thought of as a bodily supplement rather than a replacement for a lack (i.e., the lack that 
is present in the “castrated” female, as in Freud's theory of psychosexual development, or 
a male without the ability to have erections who regards himself, like Michael does at 
first, as a “functional failure”).  The dildo should not be equated with the penis, or even 
with the phallus.   
 This means that lesbian sex with a dildo is not an imitation of heterosexual 
intercourse (or at least, not unless this is the case in the shared fantasy emerging between 
sexual partners), but rather, the lesbian is a “cyborg” with “gender flexibility” who can 
use the dildo as a “prosthesis” (Hamming, 2001, p. 330).  In this understanding, the dildo 
is an interchangeable part that belongs to no original whole that a lesbian can use to 
transform her body at will.  It may even be used to express “female transsexual desire, 
however temporary or continuous,” (Zita, 1998, p. 101), also suggesting that dildo use 
may sometimes be a voluntary and temporary transformation.  This seems to be the 
model of sexuality that Michael's lesbian friend presents to him when she “insisted that 
[Michael] consider [the dildo] 'a toy'” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391). 
 Michael's approach to selecting a dildo at the sex shop reflects the notion that the 
dildo is not a replacement penis, and therefore is not affiliated with any particular body.  
Michael observes that the dildo he selects “is appropriately stiff, yet still flexible, like a 
 64 
 
natural erect penis” but that otherwise his dildo “bears little resemblance to a human 
penis” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391), suggesting that it is something else entirely.  
Similarly, for Michael, sexual activity with the dildo is “something completely different” 
that is not “meant to restore [his] masculine sense of sexuality” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, 
p. 391).  For Michael, the dildo is not a prosthesis for performing masculinity, but a 
means of changing his horizon of sexual experience.  “The dildo acts as a post-gender 
prosthetic” (Hamming 2001, p. 337, italics added), meaning that neither Michael nor 
lesbian women who use dildos are necessarily playing at being men when they use 
dildos.  Instead, they may present “the dildonic body as altogether different” (Hamming, 
2001, p. 337).   
 In interviews with FTMs, whom one may expect to challenge the idea that the 
penis and dildo are genderless, Lee (2001, p. 354) also concludes that “being a man” does 
not require “having a penis.”  It seems that having a penis is not essential to masculinity 
for these interviewees.  She reports that, among her participants, “None had undergone 
surgery to acquire a penis and, although all reported that they would undergo this surgery 
if the cost was reduced and the techniques were improved, none considered that being 
without a penis made them 'any less of a man'” (pp. 354-55).  Masculinity is not an effect 
of bodily contours.   
 Lee states that these FTMs “appropriated the dildo as an extension of their own 
penis” (p. 355).  In other words, they already experience themselves as having penises, 
and regard surgery as an unnecessary but possibly welcome secondary step, corroborating 
the notion that felt experience derives from an idea or discourse.  This transsexual 
experience seems quite similar to Michael's experience in that the dildo is experienced as 
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a part of the body and extends the body.  It differs, however, in that Michael does seem to 
regard the dildo as essential to his sexuality in the absence of his former sexual body.  
This also seems to imply that the FTMs in this example do not regard themselves as 
missing anything (or at least, anything essential to their identities), whereas Michael felt 
damaged or incomplete without either his erection or the dildo, and does feel like less of 
a man without an erection (although when he incorporates the dildo, he regards himself 
as transforming into something different than a man and does not present this 
transformation as a loss).  This alternative transsexual discourse that is more comparable 
to Michael's experience is discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
 Michael's ability to adapt and incorporate the dildo and undergo sexual 
transformation suggests that he possessed the capacity for a different bodily schema, or 
for a different perceptual field.  Michael seems quite comfortable in what he identifies as 
a lesbian role, perhaps even more comfortable than he was in his role as a potent male.  
Indeed, Michael seems to have exchanged his masculine sexuality, “the product of 
phallocentric imperatives” (Potts, 2000, p. 88) which constitutes masculine sexuality as 
“hard and fast: it strives to achieve the powerful proportions and position of the phallus” 
(Potts, 2000, p. 88), for a new, more experimental sexuality.  Both his new, post-gender 
sexuality and his prior hegemonic, functionality-focused masculine sexuality are 
variations that Michael is able to embody. 
 
III. Transsexual Bodies and Transformations 
 Halberstam's (1999) statement, “we are all transsexuals” summarizes much of the 
argument in the previous section (including those aspects of the argument that are not 
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about transsexuality directly).  Heyes (2000) provides context for the meaning of this 
statement:  
Halberstam is concerned with identifying and making more inhabitable the spaces 
 between genders, bodies, and sexualities.  Her theoretical inclination is always to 
detach  one identity label from another, to point to the erasure of experience and 
possibility that any reduction causes, most notably the reduction of masculinity to 
an effect of male bodies (p. 178).  
 
As “genders, bodies, and sexualities” can be matched and changed any imaginable way, 
categories disappear and transsexuality becomes a metaphorical idea, or a boundary 
concept meant to represent this sex and gender flexibility.  When one recognizes the 
naturalized associations between identity markers as such, it becomes apparent that this 
flexibility exists for all bodies and identities.  “[W]ithin a more general fragmentation of 
sexual identity, the specificity of the transsexual disappears... we are all transsexuals” 
(Halberstam, 1999, p. 126).   
 Kate Bornstein's experience of her transsexuality supports the idea of transsexual 
desire as representative in the way Halberstam frames it.  Bornstein presents 
transsexuality as “a desire for transformation itself, a pursuit of identity as a 
transformative exercise, an example of desire itself as a transformative activity” (Butler, 
2004, p. 8).  She does not have “a simple desire to conform to established identity 
categories” (Butler, 2004, p. 8).  Bornstein writes, “'I'm told I must be a man or a woman.  
One or the other... Don't question your gender any more, just be a woman now—you 
went to so much trouble—just be satisfied.  I am not so satisfied'” (cited in Halberstam, 
1999, p. 131).  Butler (2004, p. 65) elaborates: “there is... a serious and increasingly 
popular critique of idealized gender dimorphism within the transsexuality movement 
itself,” invoking Bornstein's argument “that to go from F to M, or from M to F, is not 
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necessarily to stay within the binary frame of gender, but to engage transformation itself 
as the meaning of gender.”   In other words, transsexuality is the practice of undoing the 
binary categories of gender and desire and undoing the idea that certain terms or ways of 
being naturally go together (i.e., male body, masculinity, heterosexual desire for female 
bodies, etc.).  As Hale (1998) explains, “Masculine subjectivity cannot be simply reduced 
to self-identification as a man, for not all ftms self-identify as men in any simple, 
nonproblematic way” (p. 321).  Given the ambiguity of sex and gender, and the diversity 
of human experience, it seems that transsexuality is not necessarily a matter of having a 
body that is one sex while wanting to have the body of the other sex.   
Body Malleability 
 However, the deconstruction of sex and gender in general, and this way of 
discussing transsexuality in particular, raises some problems (some of which are already 
beginning to emerge in the discussion above).  At the most extreme, the lack of essential 
connection between body and identity or body and meaning (i.e., different body parts can 
mean different things, there is no particular meaning necessarily assigned to a part) 
suggests a kind of dualism or denial of the significance of the material body (Grosz, 
1994, Zita, 1998).  As Bordo argues (2004, p. 226), “here is where deconstruction may 
slip into its own fantasy of escape from human locatedness... adopting endlessly shifting, 
seemingly inexhaustible vantage points.”  In other words, framing the body as mutable 
and open to an endless range of readings seems to be an abandonment or annihilation of 
the material body, “treat[ing] the body as immaterial to (or an infinitely malleable 
accessory of) identity” (Hausman, 2001, p. 474).  If the body may be conformed to any 
identity, then specific, material bodies seem to be secondary to or even irrelevant to 
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identity.  Not only does this lose the idea that human beings are their bodies, but it seems 
to overlook aspects of human experience that do not fit this discourse—e.g., Michael's 
experience, mentioned above, that not having an erection does make him less of a man, or 
the experience of a transsexual who does want to alter her or his body contours. 
 This dislocation also contains the problematic suggestion that gender identity, 
sexual identity, and perhaps sexual orientation may be adopted voluntarily, i.e., if there is 
no link between the body and identity, one may choose one's identity and one's body and 
alter these at will.  One of the problems with the notion of sex and gender voluntarism is 
that it does not necessarily challenge hegemonic categories of sex and gender.  
Halberstam (2005, p. 18) asserts that gender flexibility and resistance to “labeling,” 
should not be regarded as a “sign of progress and liberation” because these qualities do 
not, in fact, challenge heteronormativity and rigid sex and gender categories.  Rather, 
gender flexibility is a valuable commodity in that it indicates a willingness to behave as 
an ideal consumer ready to adapt oneself to any trend.  In sum, fluidity points to a lack of 
substance.   
 Grosz (1994) articulates the problem with regard to sexual difference:  
I am reluctant to claim that sexual difference is purely a matter of the inscription 
and codification of somehow uncoded, absolutely raw material... That is to deny a 
materiality or material specificity and determinateness to bodies... It is to make 
them infinitely pliable, malleable (p. 190). 
 
On the other hand, “Bodies are not fixed... Differences between bodies, not only at the 
level of experience and subjectivity but also at the level of practical and physical 
capacities, enjoy considerable social and historical variation” Grosz (1994, p. 190).  
Things which seem unchangeable or impossible in one sociohistorical context are entirely 
possible in another, suggesting an incredible variation in bodies and in sexuality.  This 
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implies that while bodies across time and place may have incredible variations, individual 
bodies are not infinitely flexible.  The body's inscription with sex identity does not imply 
“a protean self ambulating between 'positionalities'” (Zita, 1998, p. 107); the body is, in 
fact, “located” not only spatially but historically.   
 Michael's transition to using the dildo is not a simple, fluid transition of the sort 
which suggests that sexual and gender identity may be exchanged voluntarily, nor that the 
material body is irrelevant to how one understands or constructs one's identity.  His 
transition requires courage and imagination, and a long process of “reconceptualizing... 
sexuality and gender performance” (Wassersug, 2009, p. 2).  In addition, it requires 
Michael to learn how to live his body differently, implying that gender performance here 
constitutes a body 1viii change.  In other words, Michael's transition to using the dildo is 
also a transition in terms of how his body feels and how he experiences it, in addition to 
coming up with new concepts or language to describe his experience.  While the dildo is 
detachable, Michael's association with it is neither voluntary nor temporary—once 
Michael has incorporated the dildo into his body and into the sexual world he shares with 
his partner, it remains a part of him, even if his flesh is not in direct contact with it.  He 
reports an anecdote that took place after the dildo had been part of his life for some time: 
“in order to tease me, my partner started playing with the dildo in a flirtatious fashion... I 
found the activity erotic and sufficiently distracting that I had to ask her to stop so I could 
concentrate on what I was doing” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393).ix  Bodies and 
identities change but are not interchangeable. 
Return of Sex 
 Based on this apparently overlooked significance of the material body, one might 
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ask, in Jay Prosser's (1998) words,  
if sex as much as gender is performative, an effect of our doing not a fact of our 
being (“gender all along”), how can we conceive of the transsexual as intervening 
in sex at all?  If there is no sex left over, no immanent sexed part of the self that is 
not already gender, what substance is there for the transsexual to change? (p. 64) 
 
 Indeed, what is the “leftover substance”?  If any body can be adapted to any 
identity without physical alteration (as in the case of Zita's male lesbians), then sex 
change would seem to be mainly about aiding others in correctly interpreting a person's 
sex and identity, and therefore, in becoming more accepting of the person's desires and 
gendered expressions.  The sex change will reduce the “imposition of other-extending 
attributions that 'sex' the flesh” (Zita, 1998, p. 107), or the way that others' interpretation 
of one's body influence one's experience as male or female (for instance, if I am assumed 
by others to be a man, my sexed experience is different than if others assume I am a 
woman), and the individual's struggle against misinterpretation will decrease.  The body 
is altered for the sake of others to adhere to normalized categories, with the implication 
that it would not be necessary to alter the body if society at large were more accepting of 
a range of sex and gender identities, including a range of what, for example, a “male” or a 
“lesbian” may look like.  This also leads to the conclusion that transsexuals are sex and 
gender conformists, willing to adopt culturally imposed categories for the sake of 
recognition by others as their experienced sex or gender, rather than challenging the 
rigidity of these categories and demonstrating, for example, the broad range of what a 
“man's body” can be.  This further implies that the surgery involved in a sex transition is 
akin to cosmetic surgery, altering a surface for the purpose of looking more how one 
wants to look, but without much effect on one's feeling of identity (Prosser, 1998).  From 
this perspective, altering sexually interpreted body parts seems less significant (i.e, this 
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change makes no real difference, so it should not be so regulated) because these surgeries 
are not necessary or do not feel necessary to the persons who undergo them.   
 An alternative interpretation of sex change that perhaps better accounts for why 
someone would go through the process of body alteration would be that these persons are 
demonstrating and reasserting the significance of sex, the body, and physical morphology 
for reasons beyond how the body is read and responded to by others (rather than 
undergoing unnecessary surgery!).  Prosser (1998) writes, “In transsexuality sex returns, 
the queer repressed, to unsettle its theory of gender performativity” (p. 27).  As opposed 
to Butler's formulation which “retain[s] a dualism of discourse and matter where matter is 
posited as radically anterior” (Budgeon, 2003, p. 42), sex transition demonstrates the 
significance of the body and reclaims the category of “sex” (hence reclaiming a sex/ 
gender distinction, rather than reducing sex to gender). 
 This further confirms that individual bodies are not entirely flexible and 
malleable—sex and gender are not costumes that can be exchanged at will.  Rather, 
becoming a biological sex is a process, and a long-term, arduous one at that.  The image 
of a transsexual body in transition is not one of performance and play, but “a map of the 
loss and longing that tinges all transsexual attempts to 'come home' to the body” 
(Halberstam, 2005, p. 111).  In sum, 
[W]ords and cultural representations may have tremendous power in our lives, but 
people  live in real bodies made of substantial flesh, and those bodies routinely 
carry more weight in people's perceptions of themselves and others than do words, 
texts, or abstract discourses. (Devor summarizing Prosser, 1999, p. 207)   
 
Our physical bodies are “not simply costumes for our experience of our bodies, our 
theoretical conceptions of the body are foundationally formed by and reformative of 
them” (Prosser, 1998, p. 96).  As Colebrook (2000, p. 78) notes, “The body is, it is true, 
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only thought after the event of discourse.  But does this render the body itself an effect of 
discourse?”  In other words, experience of the body precedes organizing this experience 
into existing discourses.   
 Schewe (2009), citing Lanei Rodemeyer, states, “the body is not simply 
experienced through the medium of discourse, but rather... the body contributes to that 
discourse as we try to write the narratives of our own identity,” (p. 684).  Rodemeyer 
(2012, publication pending) notes that the body overflows discourse: “the body 
exemplifies the margins or demonstrates that which has been excluded, it stands both 
within and without discourse at once” (p. 7).  Beyond discursivity, the body “has its own 
density as well, a density that sometimes can rupture discourse” (Rodemeyer, p. 8, 2012, 
italics added).  The substance that is left over, and that ruptures discourse, marks the gap 
between sex and gender identity.  The former is not reducible to the latter, and sex does 
not only emerge from gender but vice versa.   
 Continuing to use transsexuality as a way to understand the relationship between 
body and identity, what might be a better way to describe or understand transsexuality 
than as a symbol for sex and gender flexibility?  Prosser asserts that “being trapped in the 
wrong body is simply what transsexuality feels like,” explaining, “body image is 
radically split off from the material body” (Prosser, 1998, p. 69) and this dysphoria is not 
overcome by reconceptualization alone (as in Zita's male lesbians).  The transsexuals in 
Prosser's work, feeling that “identity has... vacated... the body” (1998, p. 68), experience 
a sharp divide between gender and the body's sex.  Prosser (1998) points out that some 
transsexuals simply want “to be,” rather than to subvert or perform, and to achieve their 
desired sexed embodiment.  One's sex is not an activity, but an achievement, the telos of a 
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transition.  For Prosser, transsexuality is a body 1 (see chapter 2) condition, affecting the 
sense in which a person feels that she is her body and lives through it.  “For if the body 
were but a costume, consider: why the life quest to alter its contours?” (Prosser, 1998, p. 
67). 
Reconfiguration of the Flesh, Reconceptualization of the Body 
 The phenomenon Michael illustrates supports the notion that “gendered 
becoming” involves “a refiguring of the sexed body that takes place along corporeal, 
psychic, and symbolic axes” (Prosser, 1998, p. 67).  Michael undergoes anti-androgen 
hormone therapy and has his prostate removed surgically, a typical treatment for prostate 
cancer.  The “hormonal therapy” leaves Michael without a “functional...penis” 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  His experience parallels Prosser's description of sex 
change: “Hormone therapy begins this process, dramatically contravening the functioning 
of the gonads, refiguring the body's contours, altering tissue structure...” (Prosser, 1998, 
p. 66).  Surgery continues the “transformation of the body's surface” (Prosser, 1998, 
p.66), akin to how Michael describes the transformation of his body's surface via the 
addition of the strap-on dildo.  Michael's change follows a narrative arc, in which he goes 
from calling the dildo “this piece of purple plastic” to “the dildo” to “my dildo,” (italics 
added) at which point it is definitively a part of his body and his dildonic body and 
identity seem to match (i.e., the dildo is not an alien appendage, and Michael is not 
thinking of himself as a disfigured man with a prosthetic).  This parallels the 
“refiguration” the transsexual undergoes to, for instance, “name the somatic material 
(skin, tissue, and nerves) transplanted from his forearm or his abdomen to his groin 'my 
penis'” (Prosser, 1998, p. 67).  This transformation happens not only through re-reading 
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the body, but through changing the body itself. 
 What does the significance of the material body mean for sex and gender 
identities, like Michael's, that do not fall into heteronormative or typical categories?  In 
response to the idea that one may feel like neither a man nor a woman, Schewe (2009, p. 
684) argues in reference to Kate Bornstein that,  
Bornstein nonetheless says she feels glad she had genital reconstruction surgery 
“just for the comfort I now feel with a constructed vagina.” In other words, 
Bornstein’s certainty that she is “not a man” comes from a very different place 
than does her recognition that she is “probably not a woman either.” The former 
may be understood as a truth of the body, a feeling deeper than intellect that has 
existed for Bornstein since childhood, while the latter is an intellectual truth, 
arrived at through reading and analysis.  
 
Schewe implies that Bornstein has a true gender identity which may be discerned from 
Bornstein's feeling of comfort with her constructed vagina, and assumes that this feeling 
is more significant than and precedes Bornstein's sense that this change does not 
complete her identity, that there is something more to her that does not fit the category 
“woman.”   
 In contrast to the feeling-intellect binary Schewe invokes, Michael's experience 
seems to be that his transition is a combination of changes to his body and deepening 
self-understanding.  Feeling an identity and learning an identity seem to coexist for him.  
In Michael's case, however, this is not a transition from male-to-female, but a transition 
from a body with a “functional penis” to a dildonic and post-cancer treatment body.  
Another prostate cancer patient (“Dr. A”) who undergoes a similar hormonal treatment 
with “emasculating effects” identifies as a “eunuch” or acquires a eunuch-body.  He 
comes to realize that “his sexuality no longer depends on a functional penis” and feels 
“no longer driven in a narrow, testosterone- determined, direction to achieve orgasm 
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through coitus,” and “relies instead on his hands and sex toys" (Wassersug, 2008, p. 635).  
For both Dr. A and for Michael, transition involves changes to the body and deepening 
understanding, leading to a change in experience.  In addition, both of them maintain 
their notion of manhood—they do not feel like they are still men but with different 
bodies, they feel like they are something different than men.x  Manhood and male bodies 
remain linked for them and renegotiation involves narrating an identity that matches their 
altered bodies. 
 It seems that Prosser's discussion of transformation applies to all kinds of changes 
to the flesh, or all kinds of bodies “noncoincident with body image” (Prosser, 1998, p. 
93), which also seems to mean bodies that do not feel whole to the person living them 
(Dickemann, 2000).  Indeed, there are many ways the body can feel incomplete or 
mismatched that do not seem to fall into a sex binary.  Hale (1998) argues for greater 
“access to such medical technologies” and an end to regulations on sex transitions that 
“position male and female embodiment as all-or-nothing and as intimately linked with 
embodiments of dominant cultural norms of masculinity and femininity” (p. 334).  For 
example, “a butch dyke can obtain not merely breast reduction but breast removal and 
chest reconstruction and a non- transgendered butch leather man may receive an 
oriechtomy” (Hale, 1998, p. 334).  That persons would desire such a change suggests that 
changes to the flesh are important for alignment with identity—even if that identity is not 
hegemonically recognized.  Alterations to the flesh are not simply for the purpose of 
conforming one's body to a recognized identity, but to one's own identity.  Indeed,  
 [Prosser's] conception of borderlands as 'the uninhabitable space' between painful  
wrong embodiment and home... leads to a binary consequence for border zone 
dwellers: either we are seized by a figuration of transgender that elides our border 
zone specificities, or we are thrown out of the realm of transgender and subsumed 
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under the opposing sign. (Hale, 1998, p. 340) 
 
In other words, those bodily changes that do not fit clear definitions are not recognizedxi, 
although physical transformation may be important there, too.     
 As one's sense of self may lead to changes in the body, so do changes to the body 
result in changes to a sense of self.  An example would be “Audre Lorde’s account of the 
violation of her self-identity in losing a breast to cancer, an opposite but parallel evidence 
of the significance of skin, body, and sexualized body parts to our selves” (Dickemann, 
2000, p. 464).  Michael does feel “sexually incapacitated” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 
390) and “mutilated” (p. 393) by the loss of his erect penis, and feels “restored” by the 
dildo, but not to his former self—not to the same “whole” he was before.  Michael 
describes looking at himself wearing the dildo under a bathrobe, feeling “joyfully 
empowered” after he feared the experience would be a “demoralizing” confrontation 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393).  Michael states: “I was playing a role and doing it better 
than I ever could before I became impotent.  I had acquired a performance capability that 
surpassed 'male'” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 393).  Michael implies here that he is more 
capable in his role than he was as a pre-prostate cancer male.  He seems more at home in 
his body, and to be enjoying his body more, than he did even before his transition.  
Transitions from one recognized sexual identity to another are not the only kind of 
corporeal transformations that restore wholeness to a body. 
Body Narratives Without Disembodiment 
 The reassertion of the importance of the material body, however, seems 
paradoxically to contain its own risks of losing the significance of the body for identity.  
Recognizing the significance of the flesh for identity does not require one to recognize 
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traditional sex categories, but does it require one to maintain a disembodying divide 
between body image and the substantive body?   
 Prosser's account of transsexuality presents a radical split between physical body 
and body image.  This suggests that identity is a disembodied phenomenon—one can 
have an identity that does not match one's body.  He offers the image of “the body as a 
false outer casing with nothing inside” (1998, p. 68).  Transsexuality is, then, an 
experience of “wrong embodiment,” as described by Prosser, or of identity as divorced 
from (one's) body.  Theorizing transsexuality this way creates a split between the body 
and identity and seems to undermine the significance of the body as a source of identity; 
there is, according to this way of conceptualizing the self, a “me” that is not my body.  
This split posits a body that “should have been” (Prosser, 1998, p. 83), suggesting that 
there is a representational body prior to the physical body and creating a dualistic divide 
between material body and felt identity.   
 This divide seems to conflict with a sense of identity as deeply embodied.  Being 
“trapped in the wrong body” is indeed the medical model of transsexuality's “most 
famous rhetorical trope” (Prosser, 2005, p. 104), and reflects a dualistic theorization of 
transsexual body experience.  Deeply embodied identity seems to be closer to Michael's 
experience, and suggests a different conceptualization.  Michael seems to feel that his 
body is wrong, and that therefore he is somehow wrong.  That is, Michael's identity 
transforms along with his body, to a limited (i.e., not infinitely malleable) extent.  At the 
same time, Michael goes from a sense of missing something (his sexuality, his erection) 
to gaining something, though not a precise substitute for what he lost, as he describes it.  
Michael's body narrative describes a gradual transition through different modes of 
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embodiment, which includes changes in his physical body and different ways of thinking 
about and experiencing his body.  This transformation does not include anything “prior” 
to the body, such as a sense of true gender that precedes his transformation (i.e., he is not 
transitioning back into a man): “Neither the self nor the body can be chosen because they 
are very often lived as though they are already there.  The body is already the self.  The 
self is already the body” (Budgeon, 2003, p. 46).   
 How, then, can we theorize changes to the material body, like the one Michael 
undergoes, which avoids a binary between representation and material?  Presenting the 
body as an “event” offers an alternative way of thinking about the body that preserves its 
materiality without reducing it to discourse or to performance, and retains an emphasis on 
narrative production: 
...bodies are inherently implicated in the ongoing process of the constitution of 
self-identity yet never wholly contained with the realm of representation... in 
order to understand the ways in which [we] actively live [our] embodied 
identities, we need to develop an approach which can envision a body beyond the 
binary of materiality and representation—the body not as an object but as an 
event” (Budgeon, 2003, p. 36).  
 
An “event” refers to “the space in between subject and object” (p. 3, Mølbak, 2010).  An 
event is not located, but is a process that takes place in a “non-place” that privileges 
neither the “objective reality” of “substance,” nor “subjective” experience (pp. 3-4, 
Mølbak, 2010).  The body is not simply material substance, nor is it simply interpretation.  
Material body and representational body, subject and object, are together an irreducible 
whole in ongoing development.   
 As suggested in the previous chapter, subject and object, or body and identity, are 
co-constitutive.  Regarding the body as an event avoids creating an opposition between 
the discursive or representational, on the one hand, and the body as experienced on the 
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other hand.  Michael invokes different ways of understanding his body as it changes and 
as he incorporates the dildo.  This includes taking up different discourses and 
performances, most prominently, “play[ing] the part of the lesbian” (Warkentin et. al., 
2006, p. 391).  He also learns from felt experiences: “it caught me by surprise how 
natural intercourse felt with this strap-on device” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  
Neither discourses nor Michael's physical experience alone account fully for his 
transition.  Instead, we might view Michael as a “psychological subject who is always in 
the process of becoming and does not interact outside of a particular interaction with the 
environment... the sense of identity is not rooted within, but is the identity of a 'style of 
becoming' or a series of transformations” (Mølbak, 2010, p. 6).  Identity is an embodied 
transformative process, taking place ongoingly in the world, and in the space between 
material and discourse. 
 
Conclusions 
 Neither identity nor the body preexists the other; instead, they form an irreducible 
whole.  A change in the body changes one's felt sense of identity.  Altering the contours of 
one's flesh may eliminate the sense that one's body, and therefore oneself, is wrong.  
Michael's sense of his body as a failure meant that he also viewed himself as a failure.  
Altering his body boundaries and applying a different discourse to his body (not one of 
failed masculinity, but of alternative sexuality) allowed Michael to experience his body 
differently.  He came to experience the dildo as an appendage of his altered body rather 
than a shameful prosthetic signifying bodily failure.   
 The next chapter elaborates the context in which this change comes about, as this 
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process does not take place “inside” Michael.  Rather, his transformation is permitted and 
supported by others, particularly his partner.  In other words, Michael's identity is not 
located entirely inside the boundaries of his skin.  Others provide a context in which 
Michael can live his new sexual body. 
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Chapter 4: The Sexual Body & Others 
 
Let us try to see how a thing or being begins to exist for us through desire or love and we 
shall thereby come to understand better how things and beings can exist in general. 
– Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 178 
 
 This chapter addresses how a sexual body comes to be in the world.  It continues 
the notion that the body is an event, or, that the body (here, the sexual body specifically) 
is in a continual process that involves not only self-narration but is held in place by the 
world of people and things.  It is an ongoing creation between subject and object, 
between one's experience and the world in which this experience takes place.  “The event, 
as the basis of both subjective experience and objective reality, designates a 'happening' 
that is not caused by a thing... and is not owned by a subject who is its agent or source” 
(Mølbak, 2010, p. 3).  Others take up the body as an object, and one's lived experience as 
a body that exists on a continuum between activity and passivity, is significant in 
sexuality as well as in developing and maintaining an identity.   
 This chapter is a response to Merleau-Ponty's question about “the relation 
between sexuality and existence” (Stoller, 2010, p. 104).  It critiques Merleau-Ponty's 
specific notion of sexuality (as heteronormative, sexist, and able-ist) while staying with 
the spirit in which Merleau-Ponty takes up his elaboration of “the body in its sexual 
being.”  This chapter builds upon Merleau-Ponty's elaboration to address how Michael's 
post-prostate cancer sexual body emerges at the level of bodily sensation, as well as how 
the emergence of this sexual body constitutes a change in Michael's identity. 
I. Merleau-Ponty and the Sexual Body 
 
 In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes “how a thing or being 
begins to exist for us through desire or love” as a part of his project to “elucidate the 
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primary function where we bring into existence [...] space, the object or instrument, and 
describe the body as a place where this appropriation occurs” (1962, p. 178).  To 
understand the body's hold on the world, Merleau-Ponty examines a particular kind of 
hold; that is, he examines the kind of hold on the world present in sexuality.  He states, 
“sexuality, without being the object of any intended act of consciousness, can underlie 
and guide specified forms of my experience” (p. 196).   
 Sexuality as a kind of force that “underlies and guides” existence contrasts with 
ways of understanding sexuality that present it as a superficial or contingent aspect of 
human existence.  Merleau-Ponty (1962) presents sexuality as “interfused with 
existence... so that it is impossible to determine, in a given decision or action, the 
proportion of sexual to other motivations, impossible to label a decision or act 'sexual' or 
'non-sexual.” (p. 196).  Sexuality is a modality of existence, as opposed to a set of drives 
or reflexive, physiological responses (Grosz, 1994).  This also means that certain kinds of 
injuries will have an effect on sexual life that one would not expect if sexuality were a 
mere response to a physical stimulus, or a reflex, as Merleau-Ponty (1962) discusses in 
the case of Schneider.  Rather, sexuality is “co-extensive with life” (p. 196) and “It is at 
all times present there like an atmosphere” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 195).   
 In Merleau-Ponty's view, sexuality is a part of expression in the world, not a 
symbolic representation or cognitive function.  It “condenses [a person's] basic mode of 
relating to the world” (Heinämaa, 2003, p. 66), meaning particularly the world of others 
and how one relates to them.  It is not “self-enclosed” but “referential” and is “intentional 
in the sense that it modalizes a relationship between an embodied subject and a concrete 
situation” (Butler, 1989, p. 87).  In other words, like other aspects of embodiment, 
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sexuality takes place in the world and places one in relation to the world.  Sexuality is a 
way in which one is called into the world and shaped by the world.   
 The importance sexuality occupies in human life emerges from “a more general 
drama which arises from the metaphysical structure of my body, which is both an object 
for others and a subject for myself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 194).  Merleau-Ponty 
(1962) writes that “sexual experience... [is] an opportunity... of acquainting oneself with 
the human lot in its most general aspects of autonomy and dependence” (p. 194) and 
“begins with the opening out upon 'another'” (p. 194).  It is the mode in which one is 
caught up in the world of others, thus a foundational aspect of human existence.  Rather 
than representations or reflexes, it is a foundational part of how a person lives from 
moment to moment, with and as shaped by others.  It follows that transformations to the 
embodied self create transformations in sexuality, and the following shall explore how 
Michael and others (including Merleau-Ponty's Schneider and persons whose bodies are 
often miscategorized by others) are transformed sexually with a change in embodiment.   
Schneider 
 Merleau-Ponty approaches the question of how the sexual body orients to the 
world through the existential analysis of a case study of Schneider.  Schneider is impotent 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 181).  He is a 24-year-old man with brain injuries resulting 
from being hit by “mine splinters.”  These injuries result in “psychical blindness,” and 
Schneider seems blind to a variety of images (Gelb and Goldstein, 1918/1974).  As 
Merleau-Ponty (1962) writes, “It was through his sight that the mind in him was 
impaired” (p. 145).  The observable result of Schneider's injury is an inability to perceive 
holistically.  Sensory data flows to him without meaning and objects become 
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unrecognizable disparate bits.  He suffers various “intellectual, perceptual and motor 
disturbances” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 150) including “sexual inertia” and a generalized 
lack of initiative (1962, p. 179).  Schneider says with reference to his actions, “'I am 
scarcely aware of any voluntary initiative... It all happens independently of me'” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 120).  Schneider is describing how the “intentional arc” which 
“projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, 
ideological, and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these 
respects” has, in him, “[gone] limp” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 157).   
 Because sexuality is continuous with existence, Schneider's sexual problems are a 
component of his overall symptomatology.  His problem manifests itself in his sexual life 
in Schneider's seeming loss of all capacity for sexual satisfaction.  In fact, “the very word 
satisfaction has no longer any meaning for him” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 181).  The 
world of women's bodies does not call to him: “a woman's body has no particular 
essence... physically they are all the same” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 180).  Schneider “no 
longer asks, of his environment, this mute and permanent question which constitutes 
normal sexuality” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 181).  This question presumably has to do 
with whether the object he has settled his eyes upon is a sexually attractive object, or 
perhaps a sexually available one.  He does not see “the visible body... subtended by a 
sexual schema... emphasizing the erogenous areas, outlining a sexual physiognomy” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 180).  The sensory data he perceives, particularly the visual 
data, does not coalesce into a whole or an essence.  As a consequence, Schneider “no 
longer seeks sexual intercourse of his own accord” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 179) and he 
has no interest in looking at pornography or attractive bodies or sexual conversation.  It 
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seems that “What has disappeared from the patient is his power of projecting before 
himself a sexual world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 181).   
 Sullivan (1997) elaborates that normally, human beings have a “centrifugal” 
capacity for projection or to produce a “backdrop of a meaningful world against and in 
which I live” (p. 2).  Schneider's existence is centripetal and “operates against a given 
background” (Sullivan, 1997, p. 2).  That is to say, rather than providing his own 
meanings, he accepts given meanings.  Sullivan (1997) describes Schneider as 
“constrained” and states that “the meaning of his world is that which presses in against 
him” (p. 2).  Similarly, once Schneider's sexual partners are no longer pressing against 
him and producing sensation for Schneider, deciding for themselves that the sexual act is 
over, Schneider does not pursue his own orgasm (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).  Schneider's 
sexual activity is not teleological—he does not appear to be concerned with orgasm (the 
apparent meaning of “satisfaction” in Merleau-Ponty's discussion), nor is he an aggressor 
sexually.  His centripetal existence appears via Merleau-Ponty's descriptions as a 
particular passivity.  “Close physical contact causes only a 'vague feeling,' the knowledge 
of 'an indeterminate something' which is never enough to 'spark off' sexual behavior and 
create a situation which requires a definite mode of resolution” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 
180-181).  Because Schneider does not “require” a “definite resolution” to a sexual 
situation, he “accepts and thus is restricted by the meaning his partner has given to [the 
erotic situation]” (Sullivan, 1997, p. 2).  
 In sum, Schneider's abnormal sexuality is characterized by: a failure to view 
women's visible bodies in a sexual way generally, a failure to enjoy pornography or to be 
attracted primarily to the visual body (instead, “...it is, he says, pre-eminently character 
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which makes a woman attractive” (Merleau-Ponty, p. 180)), not actively pursuing sex and 
behaving passively in his role as a sexual partner, becoming aroused only in response to a 
partner's initiation of sexual activity or primarily responding to his partner's desire during 
sex rather than pursuing a desire of his own (although he will make “active movements... 
a few seconds before the orgasm” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 179)—“Exactly how and why 
a man who has no interest in sex has an orgasm, however brief, neither Goldstein and 
Gelb nor Merleau-Ponty explain” (Grosz, 1994, p. 108)), and finally, by failing to 
approach sex as a teleological act with the specific purpose of reaching climax.  Based on 
Merleau-Ponty's way of describing sexuality, Schneider seems to have become non-
sexual, as the world has lost its “sexual context” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 181).   
Normative Sexuality 
 Looking more closely at Schneider, however, it seems that Schneider's sexuality 
has not vanished nor has he become asexual, but that his sexuality or the sexual 
dimension of his existence has changed.  It is, perhaps, unrecognizable as sexuality in 
light of the normative sexuality implicitly posited by Merleau-Ponty.  Specifically, it 
seems that Merleau-Ponty's definition of normal sexuality refers to a style of sexuality 
that generalizes its objects, is based on visual data, and is aimed toward orgasm, as well 
as being a sexuality that belongs to a strictly heterosexual male.   
 Butler (1989) critiques this sense of “normal sexuality” set up in contrast to 
Schneider.  She notes that Schneider's deference in sex (described by Merleau-Ponty in 
the statement, “if orgasm occurs first in the partner and she moves away, the half fulfilled 
desire vanishes”) “signifies masculine 'incapacity', as if the normal male would seek 
satisfaction regardless of the desires of his female partner” (Butler, 1989, p. 92).  Indeed, 
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this seems to be what Merleau-Ponty means that Schneider lacks when he describes 
Schneider as “impotent” (p. 181).xii  Butler (1989) also points out that Schneider's lack of 
visual interest in bodies is presented as evidence of his sexual abnormality (i.e., his claim 
that women's bodies look the same to him and that personality interests him instead, and 
his lack of interest in pornography).  “Central to Merleau-Ponty’s assessment of 
Schneider’s sexuality as abnormal is the presumption that the decontextualized female 
body, the body alluded to in conversation, the anonymous body which passes by on the 
street, exudes a natural attraction” (Butler, 1989, p. 92).  It also seems that this 
anonymous body is what one may be drawn to in a given partner, in contrast to 
Schneider's concern with the particularities of his sexual partners.  The normal male 
subject's “sexuality is strangely non-corporeal” by contrast (particularly strange in the 
context of the significance Merleau-Ponty places on touch and bodily sensation, as 
opposed to visual input), and Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the “visible body... subtended 
by a sexual schema” (Butler, 1989, p. 93).   
 Butler (1989) also notes that Merleau-Ponty's description does not appear to 
consider the experience of Schneider's sexual partner—“the erotic experience belongs 
exclusively to the perceiving subject” (p. 93).  However, it seems that the most 
remarkable way in which Schneider's sexuality diverges from the norm Merleau-Ponty 
establishes, or the most remarkable way that Schneider's sexuality changes following the 
changes in his physical body, is that his sexuality has become relational in a way that it 
was not before.  It is not a production of the perceiving subject, but takes place between 
partners.  Schneider's sexuality takes place less “within” Schneider, and more between 
himself and his partner—his sexuality is even more “in the world” (as in, it is less 
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Schneider's and more an event between Schneider and another) than it was before his 
accident.  The female subject who is mostly absent as an actor from Merleau-Ponty's 
account (“female bodies... have an essence which is itself physical [and] designates the 
female body as an object rather than a subject of perception” and “she is never seeing, 
always seen” (Butler, 1989, p. 94)) seems to play a significant, if not an orchestrating, 
role in Schneider's sexuality.   
 Furthermore, Schneider acknowledges this.  He admits that he is drawn to 
women's characters rather than their bodies, emphasizing the significance of who his 
partner is for his sexual response (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).  He also reports that his partners 
take the lead sexually, and that he responds to their desires.  Rather than taking this as 
evidence that Schneider is sexually repressed or otherwise damaged as a sexual body, one 
may instead conclude that “Schneider is more true to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological 
account of bodily existence than Merleau-Ponty himself” because for Schneider, his 
partner's body is “expressive of the life of consciousness” (Butler, 1989, p. 95).  
Schneider's sexual partner's body is subtended not by a mere physical essence, but bound 
up in her character, part of a subject whose sexuality, body, consciousness, and existence 
are inseparable.  This relational aspect of Schneider's sexuality, oddly missing from 
Merleau-Ponty's presentation of normal sexuality, finds a parallel in Michael's 
experience, detailed later on in this chapter. 
Normative Bodies 
 In Merleau-Ponty's description (as well as in Western culture generally, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter), a particular kind of sexuality is established as 
normal, thereby excluding or pathologizing a number of other possible sexualities.  In 
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order to piece together this norm and gather “a concrete description of lived experience, it 
seems crucial to ask whose sexuality and whose bodies are being described…” (Butler, 
1989, p. 98).  Before offering an alternative description of the lived experience of 
sexuality, we must ask, whose body is the ideal body, or, whose body provides the basis 
for normative sexuality? 
 In describing the significance of the sensory body in human experience, Merleau-
Ponty (1962) writes,  
“[If]... we conceive man in terms of his experience... his distinctive way of 
patterning the world, and if we reintegrate the 'organs' into the functional totality 
in which they play their part, a handless or sexless man is inconceivable as one 
without the power of thought” (p. 197).   
 
Merleau-Ponty is here making the point that a human being (or “man”) is not composed 
of distinct parts which can be separated out, but that the body makes up a whole.  
Cognitive abilities are neither separable from nor more important than physical sensation, 
and cannot be pulled from a body as though cognition were the essence of what it means 
to be human while the body was merely casing for thought.  This idea contrasts with the 
notion that cognition is a more significant component of human experience than any 
other human component.  This includes body parts—hands or genitals are no more 
characteristic of what it means to be human than cognition.  Therefore, a person missing 
any of “his” component parts is no longer a “functional totality,” for all of these parts 
contribute to “his distinctive way of patterning the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 197).     
 The problem, however, is that Merleau-Ponty implies a particular whole.  While 
Merleau-Ponty may not privilege cognition over body parts, he does seem to privilege 
some bodies, body parts, or ways of living one's body over others.  Sara Heinämaa 
(2003), by way of Simone de Beauvoir, notes that the examples “hands” and “genitals” 
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are misleading comparisons, as “genitals” is an ambiguous term: “All normal human 
bodies have hands but not a similar or analogous 'sexual apparatus'” (Heinämaa, 2003, p. 
87).  To posit a single norm is to overlook the presence of two possible norms of the 
human body—female and male bodies—and the female body becomes a deviation from 
the male norm (Heinämaa, 2003).  Bodies that fit neither of these norms, such as 
intersexed bodies, are of course also excluded from the implied norm of embodiment.   
 Furthermore, the norm appears to be not only a male body, but a specific kind of 
male embodiment which is “healthy, implicitly athletic,” “externally focused” and 
“transparent” (“transparent” referring to the body as a means of action rather than an 
object of attention, as described in chapter 2) (Ihde, 2002, p. 18).  Beyond setting up a 
normative sexuality by way of contrast with Schneider, “Merleau-Ponty sets up a 
dialectic between what could be called a normative body experience and the pathological 
experience that is only indirectly noted in his famous Schneider” (Ihde, 2002, p. 17, 
italics added).  The normative body “contrasts with the debilities of Schneider—but also 
by extension with virtually any other form of unhealthy, or even less than well-
conditioned sense of body” (Ihde, 2002, p. 18).  Disabled bodies are also excluded from 
this norm, for Merleau-Ponty posits that we all tend toward a particular body, that there is 
in each of us “an I committed to a certain physical and inter-human world, who continues 
to tend towards his world despite handicaps and amputations and who, to this extent, does 
not recognize them de jure” (p. 94).  The ways in which one diverges from this normal 
body are presented her as absences or failures for which one strives to make up.  In sum, 
the “normal” body seems to exclude most bodies.   
 Merleau-Ponty overlooks the particularities of bodies, implying an ideal body or 
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way of being embodied, such that most bodies (in particular, female bodies, bodies that 
are not male or female or that are both, and disabled bodies of any variety) are only 
recognizable as deficient, not as alternative embodiments.  The bodies that neither fit the 
ideal, nor which are attempting to approximate a “normal” human body, are absent from 
Merleau-Ponty's discussion.  There is still room, however, to understand forms of 
embodiment that are not specifically described by Merleau-Ponty (Fisher, 2000) (and also 
still by means of Merleau-Ponty's approach to embodiment and sexuality, as will become 
apparent in this chapter).  In describing these embodiments,  
If we refuse to establish a singular sexual norm, those who were once 'outsiders' 
will no longer be considered illegitimate or unnatural. In accepting other sexual 
orientations as normal occurrences in the world, we also allow for a greater 
number of accounts of embodiment. (Canode, 2002, p. 34).  
 
It is precisely by reorienting himself, with help, as a new body de jure—not a 
pathological body, nor a deficient male, nor necessarily male at all—that Michael 
becomes able to develop an alternative sexual embodiment and experience sexual 
satisfaction anew (Warkentin et. al., 2006).   
Alternative Sexualities 
 By understanding Schneider's case as a snapshot of a particular kind of sexuality, 
rather than framing Schneider as a sexual failure or deficient body, we may understand 
more about sexuality generally (rather than normative sexuality alone).  Just as Schneider 
is presented as a pathological alternative to a normal body, Michael initially presents 
himself in his narrative as a deficient or damaged body.  Indeed, Michael has been 
castrated, deprived of androgens (male hormones) and is unable to develop an erection.  
Prior to using the strap-on dildo, Michael feels as though all that is left for him is to “give 
up on life” (Warkentin et. al., 2006).  Michael is separated from a component of human 
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experience, feeling his existence is unbearably limited. He regards his penis, and by 
extension, himself, as a “functional failure” (Warkentin et. al., 2006).    
 However, during the process of dildo incorporation, Michael's sexuality not only 
reappears but expands.  His orgasms are more expansive (“radiating across my pelvis”) 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).  Michael acquires more pleasure from sex, describing 
sex as more purely “playful.”  Sex no longer has a goal or particular structure, and does 
not aim simply for climax.  Instead, Michael can enjoy sex without orgasm, have multiple 
orgasms, and can continue sex after his orgasm if his partner desires (Warkentin et. al., 
2006).  “Castration” (the effect of hormonal prostate cancer treatment and prostate 
removal) does not mean that Michael's sexuality has been cut off.  Michael had imagined 
that his world would close once he lost his functioning penis, and that he would no longer 
have a connection to the world via sexuality.  Instead, his world opens broadly.  This is 
similar to the experience of “Dr. A” who identifies as a “eunuch” after undergoing 
androgen deprivation therapy for prostate cancer.  Dr. A no longer experiences himself or 
his sexuality in the same way, but does not cease to be a sexual body.  Instead, he 
becomes “more open to sexual exploration, as he is no longer driven in a narrow, 
testosterone-determined, direction to achieve orgasm through coitus” (Wassersug, 2009, 
p. 635). 
 In contrast to the way Merleau-Ponty presents the case of Schneider, Michael's 
loss of functioning ultimately becomes a gain in terms of his ability for “projecting before 
himself a sexual world” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 181).  Michael's horizons expand 
beyond where they were prior to dildo incorporation.  This transformation takes place 
gradually, from object to instrument to organ to libido-invested image that is both a part 
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of Michael's body and a part of the world, the mere sight of which is erotically arousing.  
The following section will elaborate the way in which Michael's sexuality is expanded 
following what initially appears to be a loss, and offers a description of the role of his 
partner, the voice left out of Merleau-Ponty’s account of sexuality, in mediating this 
transformation.  The next section is also intended to contrast and supplement Merleau-
Ponty's description of the sexual body via his discussion of Schneider's sexuality. 
 
II. The Event of Sexuality 
 Sexuality takes place in the world of others, shaped and co-cocreated by those 
around us.  We are “given over from the start... it would seem that our being beside 
ourselves, outside ourselves, is there as a function of sexuality itself... not the key or 
bedrock of our existence, but... as coextensive with existence” (Butler, 2004, p. 33).  If 
sexuality is a phenomenon that takes place in the liminal space between self and other (or 
indeed, something which emerges in the context of, or because of, the significance of this 
liminal space in human life), how is it that the sexual body comes to be in this space?  
What is the other's role in shaping one's sexuality and sexual body?   
 Michael and Schneider's sexual transformations both illuminate sexuality as a 
phenomenon that takes place in the world of others.  That is, sexuality is not located in an 
individual (neither Michael nor Schneider), but emerges with others.  Based on 
descriptions from Schneider's case, Schneider's sexuality appears to emerge between 
Schneider and his partner(s).  Sullivan (1997) makes the significant point that “Schneider 
accepts and is thus restricted by the meaning that his partner has given to [the erotic 
situation]” p. 2).  Schneider's inability to “project” means that one could characterize 
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Schneider as passive: “The ultimate meaning and result of this situation are things that 
are given to Schneider by his world” because he does not instead “take up the situation 
and follow it through to its fulfillment (i.e., his own orgasm)” (Sullivan, 1997, p.2), 
referring to Merleau-Ponty's statement about Schneider that, “If orgasm occurs first in the 
partner and she moves away, the half-fulfilled desire vanishes.” (1962, p. 179).  This also 
seems to mean that Schneider's sexuality has become more dependent upon his partner's 
desires.  Michael's experience parallels Schneider's here, but he does not regard his 
passivity or sexual dependence upon his partner as pathological, in contrast to how 
Schneider's experience is framed by Merleau-Ponty.   The following section 
elaborates the way in which sexuality emerges between Michael and his sexual partner 
(whom we are calling “Susan”), including Susan's role in helping Michael accept the 
dildo as a part of his sexual body.  It fills in the missing female subject from Merleau-
Ponty's account, as well as the missing description of sexual passivity or shared sexual 
experience that is implicitly present in Merleau-Ponty's account of Schneider.  Sexuality 
may be regarded as an “event,” neither caused nor owned by a single agent.  This 
elaboration follows the spirit of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology without following the 
letter; that is, the following is an attempt to present sexuality as “the opening out upon 
'another'” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 194) and the expression of the life of consciousness 
through the body, but without the biases, described above, that appear in some parts of 
Merleau-Ponty's account of sexuality. 
Sex as Imaginative Play 
 Michael's narrative presents two people as essential to his ability to achieve sexual 
satisfaction using the dildo: his lesbian friend, who helps Michael open himself to the 
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possibility that dildo sex could be sexually satisfying, and his sexual partner, Susan, with 
whom Michael fulfills this possibility.   
 Michael's friend sets the stage for the dildo as a tool for play.  Michael states that 
“she insisted I consider [the dildo] a 'toy'” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  Michael and 
Susan also treat the dildo as a toy by approaching dildo sex as playful.  In Michael's 
narrative, Susan comes across as supportive, thoughtful (in terms of planning ahead and 
surprising Michael in ways that ease his anxiety), and in possession of an affectionate 
sense of humor.  Michael approaches dildo sex initially as an event taking place in “the 
theater of the absurd” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391); that is, he is entering a space of 
imaginative play and acting, in which one may try on different roles.  Susan is 
“ultimately supportive of the exploration,” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391), also treating 
dildo sex as an exploratory, improvisational act.   
 Susan and Michael continue to “accept the dildo as part of our sex play” 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).  It is worth noting that Michael uses the term “play” 
repeatedly in his narrative to describe the sexual atmosphere between himself and Susan, 
indicating that they operate within the ambiguous space of sexuality and explore the 
possibilities of the sexual body.  Susan and Michael together extend the boundaries of 
their play and the possibilities of strap-on dildo sex.  For example, Susan “started playing 
with the dildo in a flirtatious fashion outside of the bedroom” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 
393), which Michael experiences as erotic.  Susan also performs oral sex on the dildo 
(Michael states, “My partner and I took on the challenge” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 
393)), further extending the range of their shared sexual experience.  At one point (though 
not the only point in the narrative) Susan creatively adds to the playful atmosphere 
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between herself, Michael, and “our dildo”: 
[O]ne morning, after having sex the night before, I went to the bathroom and 
found the dildo sitting upright on the counter-top wearing one of my favorite 
neckties. My partner had decided to personify and personalize it. I interpreted this 
as a signal to me that the dildo pleased her and did so because of its association 
with me. (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392)   
 
It seems that just as Michael interprets Susan's actions here as indicative of an association 
she has formed between pleasure, Michael, and the dildo, he has also formed a parallel 
association between the dildo and pleasure he experiences with Susan.  Because of her 
playful participation, the dildo has taken on a sexual meaning for Michael.  He reflects 
this with the statement, “Each time [Susan and I] use [the strap-on dildo], it becomes 
further imbued with the knowledge of the previous sexual satisfaction it has provided” 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392). 
 Michael also gradually comes to refer to the dildo as “our dildo” in his narrative, 
and says the dildo is “a normal at the same time erotic part of our lives” (Warkentin et. 
al., 2006, p. 392, emphasis added).  His sexuality seems not only contained in another 
object in the world, but in other people in the world; specifically, his sexuality is held in 
the two-person, imaginative sexual world constructed with his partner.  The dildo, as a 
symbol of this sexuality, is owned neither by Michael nor by Susan.  Sexuality is created 
in the space between partners and shared, an ongoing invention.   
“Passivity” in the Creation of Sexuality 
 Michael observes that when using the dildo, “I find it easiest to achieve orgasms 
when my partner wants me to, especially in the context of mutually satisfying dildo 
intercourse, but far more difficult on my own” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).  
Michael's world appears to be “given” to him by Susan, and he says, “I discussed 
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extensively with my partner whether she was willing to have sex with me wearing a 
strap-on dildo.  She was at first hesitant but ultimately supportive of the exploration” 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  Only in the context of Susan's support and collaborative 
framing of dildo-use as an “exploration” was Michael willing to attempt to use a strap-on 
dildo.  The space of exploration could only come about between them.  Michael is 
surprised and pleased that he “carried the act through to orgasm, to the sexual satisfaction 
of both my partner and myself” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392), emphasizing the 
importance of his partner in his sexual encounters.   Schneider's sexual receptivity and 
approach to sex as responsiveness to his partner's desires rather than the pursuit of his 
own are characterized as disconnection from his own satisfaction.  Michael finds 
satisfaction in this very situation.  He states, in contrast to Merleau-Ponty's interpretation 
of Schneider's lack of focus on achieving orgasm as disinterest in sex or sexual 
gratification:  
When I had a prostate gland, sexual arousal that did not lead to ejaculation was 
frustrating, and I found it incomprehensible when a woman claimed she had 
pleasure from sexual stimulation yet had not had an orgasm. After my prostate 
was removed, I discovered that I too could have incremental pleasure from sexual 
stimulation and enjoy sex without orgasms. (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391)  
 
Indeed, for Michael (and one may suspect for Schneider), sexual “satisfaction” is not 
synonymous with sexual discharge, just as Michael discovers (and as his lesbian friend 
knew all along) that having a functional penis is not essential for sexual enjoyment.   
 A non-pathologizing way to understand this phenomenon may be to recognize 
him as the aspect of Michael's body that Feenberg (2003) calls a “dependent body,” 
explaining that one might supplement Ihde's bodies 1 and 2 (see chapter 2), bodies which 
describe active dimensions of embodiment, with bodies as they are given over to the 
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world and reacted to by the world.  “We live our body not only as actors in the world but 
also as beings who invite action on our bodies by others” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 103).  This 
is not to say that these bodies no longer have agency nor that they are entirely dependent 
or passive, but rather to acknowledge the ways in which our bodies belong to or are 
handed over to the world.  Human beings are “dependent” in the sense that we depend 
upon others, to varying degrees at various times, to create our experiences.  Merleau-
Ponty's concept of “reversibility” helps to illustrate the way in which one may inhabit the 
dependent aspect of one's embodied existence, yet still remain an agent or a subject:  
When I press my two hands together, it is not a matter of two sensations felt 
together as one perceives two objects placed side by side, but of an ambiguous 
set-up in which both hands can alternate roles of 'touching' and being 'touched.'...  
In other words, in this bundle of bones and muscles which my right hand presents 
to my left, I can anticipate for an instant the integument or incarnation of that 
other right hand... The body catches itself from the outside... it tries to touch itself 
while being touched, and initiates a 'kind of reflection' which is sufficient to 
distinguish it from objects...” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 106-107). 
 
One may be in the position of touched and at once be a body that is able to initiate touch.  
Merleau-Ponty describes this in terms of two hands touching one another, but this seems 
to apply to two bodies in a sexual encounter, as well.  Because Michael can respond to 
Susan's touch and identify himself as one who is touching back, he is not a lifeless object-
body.  He possesses the possibility of “reversing” the situation by accepting or 
responding to Susan's actions, creating an ambiguity between being the one who is 
touched and the one who is touching.  Michael's experiences of himself as a body, 
including as a sexual body, come from his experience of being an active body, but also 
from his experiences of his body being acted upon.   
 The body described here as a “dependent body” is a particular type of passive 
body in which “our time horizon shrinks as we no longer control or plan the next 
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sensation, yet we remain exquisitely alert” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 103).  The dependent 
body conveys the “lived first-person experience of our own instrumentalized status” 
(Feenberg, 2003, p. 103).  Michael seems to “hand himself over” to the new experience 
of dildo sex, as well as handing himself over as a dildonic body to Susan, in their first 
sexual experience with the strap-on dildo.  Michael is “caught... by total surprise” 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391) at how “natural” sex feels when he is using the strap-on 
dildo.  It seems that Michael did not have a plan or a goal for this act.  Part of Michael's 
surprise is a response to Susan's actions.  Michael describes that during this first instance 
of dildo sex, Susan “reached down and held my penis in her hand... There was little 
sensory difference between this act and intercourse—my penis was not in her vagina but 
it did not know that” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  Michael says “I had not expected 
to achieve an orgasm and was astonished that it happened” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 
391).  Susan's independent actions provide the first steps to incorporating the dildo into 
Michael's sexual body and into their shared sexual life.  
 The dependent body as an aspect of the sexual body seems to be particularly 
relevant for aspects of Michael's and Schneider's experience that are overlooked in 
Merleau-Ponty's account of normal sexuality (which seems to emphasize active pursuit of 
sexual climax).  In sex, the body may lose its position as a spectator or object for itself, 
and instead become a more “immediate” form of consciousness (Feenberg, 2003).  In 
other words, sex is “a relation between subjectivized bodies” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 103).  
Each subject attempts to bring about this subject-mode in the other, calling the other more 
into immediate experience and sensation.  “Sex is the construction of the dependent body 
of this other” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 103).  Merleau-Ponty's account of normal sexuality 
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seems to overlook the experience of having oneself called forth as a dependent body, or 
the experience of being the body that is touched.  Again, this body retains subjectivity 
and is not a mere object-body.  In fact, the experience of being called into the immediate 
moment or experiencing himself as a dependent body is the opposite of Michael's 
experience prior to dildo incorporation, when he felt depressed and rejected multiple 
interventions upon his object-body as viable solutions (i.e., “Viagra... a vacuum erection 
device... a surgically implanted penile prosthesis” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 390)).  The 
experience of a body in pain or disease is described by Drew Leder: “I no longer simply 
'am' my body, the set of unthematized powers from which I exist.  Now I 'have' a body, a 
perceived object in the world” (1990, p. 77).  The body itself is a clumsy, incomplete, or 
pathological object viewed from without.  Alternately, with the help of his partner, 
Michael's body goes from being a pathological object to a sexual body, and the dildo goes 
from being an external object to an extension of himself. 
   Michael, and to some extent an alternative reading of Schneider's case, give a 
response to the question of what it is like to be an object of action, or to have the lived 
experience of sexual passivity as an aspect of overall sexual being.  Their responsiveness 
or receptiveness in sex, rather than demonstrating deficient sexuality, reveal the 
dependence upon the other that partially characterizes sexuality.  Schneider lacks an 
ability to objectively assess a situation (i.e., to tell the difference between a story and a 
riddle, to tell the difference between play-acting and reality (Merleau-Ponty, 1962)) and 
seems stuck in the immediate, to the point that he is unable to think into the future 
beyond the tasks immediately before him.  This seems to place Schneider in a permanent 
mode of dependent sexual partner, existing in the immediate moment.   
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 Michael describes coming to feel that sexuality is restored after feeling accepted 
by his partner, or rather, feeling that his dildo-body has been accepted: “sexual 
satisfaction has become easier, because both of us have come to accept the dildo as part 
of our sex play” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 392).  This acceptance allows his observing 
consciousness to recede and he simply enjoys sex in the immediate moment.  He is 
immersed in the imaginative sexual realm and experiences the dildo as an extension of 
his flesh.  Michael describes sex using the dildo, even the first time, as feeling “natural” 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391), meaning the dildo has already become a “transparent” 
part of his experience or “ready to hand” (see chapter 2).  Acceptance allows Michael to 
return to his body and return to immediate experience. 
Passing, Acceptance, and Love 
 Feenberg (2003) elaborates a second kind of passive body which he calls the 
“extended body,” characterized not by our ability to extend our body schema through 
incorporation of tools, but by what this incorporation signifies to others.  He adds that the 
body not only “acts through a technical mediation, but also a body that signifies itself 
through that mediation” (p. 105), suggesting ways for others to respond to one's body 
(Feenberg, 2003).  Merleau-Ponty's example of the blind man whose body schema is 
extended by a walking stick (see chapter 2), for instance, does not only experience bodily 
extension in the realm of body activity.  “The cane does more than sense the world; it also 
reveals the blind man as blind” meaning his body is extended “also in the passive 
dimension of its own objectivity” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 105).  This leads others to 
recognize and respond (helpfully, Feenberg assumes) to his blindness, and the blind man 
“has a non-specific awareness” of these responses and the general world they compose 
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for him (Feenberg, 2003, p. 105).  The extended body denotes the aspect of experience 
which is about the “consequences for bodily objectivity and the subject's awareness of 
those consequences” (Feenberg, 2003, p. 104).   
 Of course, there are a range of ways that others might respond to one's body, and 
the way in which a body is instrumentally extended might provide a suggestion to others 
but does not necessarily elicit a particular response.  Butler (2004) writes, “to be a body is 
to be given over to others even as a body is, emphatically, 'one's own'” (p. 20), and “my 
body is and is not mine... my body relates me—against my will and from the start—to 
others” (p. 21, italics added).  Feenberg (2003) seems to assume that others, upon 
recognizing the blind man's cane as a signifier of his blindness will respond to his 
dependent body helpfully, but there are a range of responses possible once his body is 
handed over to the world in this way.  We are left quite vulnerable to the responses of 
others to and upon our bodies.  We are our bodies, but our bodies are not entirely our 
own. The way in which our bodies are given over to others also indicates the limitations 
of sexual autonomy and how others shape our sexuality.  The extended body “signifies 
itself through mediation” and the subject's awareness of its “bodily objectivity” to others 
shape experience (Feenberg, 2003).  This includes significations of sex, gender, sexual 
orientation, etc. among other aspects of self-presentation (Feenberg, 2003). 
 Hale (1998) notes that “the operation” for FTMs, often naively conceived as a 
phalloplasty or a “phallic cure” for the “transsexual man's... condition” (p. 328) is a 
“distorting imposition” (p. 329).  To conceive of “the operation” in this way is to 
understand the ftm's “gender identification as being primarily about absence of and desire 
for a cock” (Hale, 1998, p. 329).  Indeed, if the aim of transition is to be one's felt sex or 
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gender, then one aim of the operation is to change one's signifying, object body such that 
what it signifies to others is consistent with who one feels one is or desires to be.  This is 
more than a visual change.  If the goal of transformations on the passive body (as one 
aspect of embodied experience, the aspect in which one is given over to others) is to 
communicate one's identity to others in order that others are better able to co-create one's 
world, such that one can have a different experience of his own embodiment, then top 
surgery (removing and reshaping breasts into a male-looking chest) would be more 
significant than bottom surgery (constructing a penis for an ftm):  
The most heavily weighted physical characteristic in making the gender 
attribution “female” to adults is the presence of breasts, whereas the most heavily 
weighted physical characteristic in making the attribution “male” is the presence 
of a penis. (Hale, 1998, p. 330) 
 
 Zita (1998) explains that “passing” is not a strong enough term, given the 
importance of others' responses to the passive body.  “'Passing' implies pretense and 
lying, not a new ontological reading of the body's sex,” adding that “when our 'male 
lesbian' fails to maintain a consistent female identity at all times, this is... an indication of 
the individual's inability to control overdetermined hegemonic readings from the outside 
world forced on the body” (Zita, 1998, p. 106).  The “new ontology” implies a stable 
state and something maintained “at all times,” but difficult to maintain when in conflict 
with hegemonic ideas about how body and identity align.  “The very 'I' is called into 
question by its relation to the one to whom I address myself” (Butler, 2004, p. 19).  
Consistent reading of one's body by others as different than one desires that it be read, as 
in the example of the male lesbian, “definitively 'sexes' his body,” (p. 106).  Thus, how 
others read and interpret the body impacts one's felt identity, and leads this identity to 
waver when one is continually mis-read and affects one's experience from moment to 
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moment.   
 It is through Susan's mediation that Michael comes to inhabit his new dildonic 
sexual body, or through which the dildo comes to signify a sexual extension of Michael's 
body (rather than a medical device or a means for mockery, as Michael envisions the 
dildo prior to Susan's mediation).  Susan enables particular forms of experience in him, 
but there is certainly not a single, given way of responding to him.  Indeed, Michael 
seems to sense this with his reluctance to “go into a sex shop to buy a dildo,” fantasizing 
that he, and the dildonically extended body he had just allowed himself to envision 
becoming, would be “identified and mocked by someone who knew me” (Warkentin et. 
al., 2006, p. 391) instead of embraced and adored, as it is by his partner.  Beyond this, it 
is Susan's mediation that allows Michael to form a new sexual identity that includes the 
dildo.  Michael “passes” as a dildonic sexual body through Susan's recognition, or in 
other words, Susan allows Michael's sexual body to inhabit the dildo, and his 
transformation begins.  This feat is especially impressive given the constraining forces set 
against alternative modes of sexuality, as discussed in the next chapter. 
 Walker & Robinson (2010), in their study of heterosexual couples in which the 
male partner has undergone the same hormonal prostate cancer treatment as Michael, find 
that these couples continue having satisfying sex lives when they are “unwilling to accept 
a loss of sex,” are “open-minded about specific strategies,” and “placed great emphasis 
on increasing relational intimacy” (p. 885).  Together, the partners develop a way of 
understanding and responding to the androgen deprivation therapy and prostate cancer 
that does not render the male partner asexual or deficient.  They become flexible and 
open to new modes of sexuality and maintain a loving, intimate relationship.  In their 
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analysis of an interview of a woman whose husband had undergone prostate removal, 
Rennie and Fergus (2006) comment on the way this couple shares experience: “[The 
love] has taken shape on its own, so that one [becomes] transformed by it” (p. 492).  In 
Michael's case, love is a force of literal transformation, allowing his new body to come 
into being.  Michael's case demonstrates “how a thing or being begins to exist for us 
through desire or love” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 178).   
 
Conclusions 
 Identity and sexualities exist in the world of others and objects, not simply in the 
individual mind or in reflexive action.  As Merleau-Ponty describes, sexuality is a mode 
of relation.  This chapter has been an attempt to elaborate sexuality as a mode of relation 
by presenting sexuality as an “event” between two people, rather than something that 
emerges as a purposive action from a single (male) person.  This chapter as also 
attempted to discuss sexuality outside of normative ways of viewing the body and sexual 
behavior, instead presenting sexuality as a complex aspect of self that is bound up with 
identity.  Recognizing the variability of bodies and refusing to establish a body norm also 
allows bodies to become more playful—they are not attempting to approximate “normal” 
bodies nor are they resigned to a partial life as partial and broken bodies, but instead offer 
a new narrative of the self.  Michael emerges from his experience with a new body and 
new sexual horizon.   
 The following chapter will discuss clinical implications that follow from this view 
of sexuality and the body as imaginative and co-created.  This discussion not only applies 
to Michael or patients with issues surrounding sexuality and identity, but has implications 
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for clinical conceptualizations of sexuality and embodiment generally. 
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Chapter 5: Clinical Implications 
 
 This chapter discusses implications for clinical practice based on Michael's 
experience.  It draws together and integrates findings from previous chapters and 
discusses their clinical implications.  It also places Michael's case in the context of the 
medical model views of human sexuality and masculinity that it defies, and suggests an 
alternate view of sexuality.   
 The first part of this chapter places Michael's case in the context of clinical 
(particularly, psychological, psychiatric, and medical) discourses about sexuality, sex, and 
gender.  It addresses the dominant medical model in particular and its construction of 
norms in the areas of gendered expression and sexual behavior.  This part of the chapter 
examines clinical perspectives on transsexuality/ gender identity disorder and impotence/ 
erectile dysfunction in particular, since these conditions/ diagnoses/ disorders/ etc. reveal 
the medical model's view of sexuality, gender, and the body.  This also includes debates 
about what should be defined as a disease and the problems or advantages of doing so 
and what it means to think of impotence or transsexual desires as disease (akin to the 
previous chapter's question about whether it is appropriate to view Michael and 
Schneider as flawed or deficient).  Impasses and problems with the most common clinical 
views of the body, i.e., views which tend to be pathologizing and grounded in the medical 
model, are articulated.  Elaborating these discourses also reveals how remarkable 
Michael's case is, and how he and his partner develop a mode of sexuality together that 
falls outside of these discourses.   
 The second part of the chapter is a clinical discussion of Michael's case and 
general clinical implications which follow.  It explores how Michael works around some 
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of the limitations of medical model discourses.  This conceptualization is intended to 
bypass divisions present in the questions: Is his condition a disease or an acceptable form 
of difference?  Is it a condition of the body, a medical problem, or of the mind, a 
psychological problem?  Following Jay Prosser's analysis of transsexuality, this chapter 
uses Didier Anzieu's concept of the skin ego to talk about Michael's case in an embodied 
way.  Anzieu seems to loosen the definition of what the body “should” be, and what 
masculinity looks like.  The self is returned to the body rather than the abstract norm 
implied in the medical model and the textual, non-fleshy, theoretical body presented in 
the extremes of gender flexibility.  We might conclude that what Michael's lesbian friend 
does for him is what this chapter hopes to accomplish more broadly—to offer an 
understanding of sexuality that emphasizes its imaginative, playful, and transformative 
aspects.   
 
I. Discourses on Sexuality 
Not surprisingly, like so many other cancer patients sexually incapacitated by modern 
medicine, I was clinically depressed within a few months of starting hormonal therapy. 
– Warkentin, K., Gray, R., & Wassersug, R., 2006, p. 391 
 
 When Michael begins treatments his for his prostate cancer, he is at odds with but 
also seems trapped by medical discourses.  Although they saved him from cancer, 
Michael sees medical interventions as enemies of his sexual well-being.  He cites 
“modern medicine” as the source of his “sexual [incapacitation].”  Michael's language, 
“my cancer treatments and the sexual dysfunction they caused,” points clearly to medical 
intervention (“radical prostatectomy and salvage radiotherapy” in addition to androgen 
deprivation therapy (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 389)) as the source of his sexual 
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problems.  Beyond sexually incapacitating him in the first place, medical interventions 
leave Michael no useful solutions to his sexual problems.  He states, “Neither Viagra nor 
a vacuum erection device worked for me.  I am loath to inject drugs into my penis or 
have surgically implanted penile prosthesis, the remaining medical options for treating 
ED” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 390)  As the case study authors note, “Patients on 
antiandrogen therapy are particularly unlikely to find the common medical interventions 
helpful” for impotence, as these treatments are typically ineffective or deeply 
unappealing following the medical interventions they undergo to treat their cancer 
(Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 390). 
 This section elaborates how psychology and related fields have approached sex 
and gender issues historically, up to current debates about the status of sex and gender in 
the upcoming DSM-V.  The focus here is particularly on transgender and transsexual 
identities and on impotence as a sexual disorder, and what the overlap reveals about 
clinical and popular perspectives on sex and gender.  This section is meant to offer a 
sense of how sex, gender, and the body are regarded in popular and clinical discourse, 
and provides background for the next section, which elaborates an alternative approach 
with findings from Michael's case.   
Dysfunctional Male Bodies 
 It seems that medical approaches not only “incapacitate” Michael in terms of 
causing his impotence through hormonal treatments, but also sexually incapacitate him in 
the way the medical model views and constructs sexuality and masculinity.  That is, the 
medical approach seems to view sex as a problem to be solved.  All of the interventions 
suggested to Michael, from Viagra to a penile implant, are focused on helping him to 
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achieve an erection.  The authors of his original case study call this the “coital 
imperative,” explaining that, “Most treatments of erectile dysfunction (ED) focus 
narrowly on restoring erectile function and coitus” (Warkentin, K., Gray, R., & 
Wassersug, R., 2006, p. 390).  Michael is “incapacitated” as a man in the medical model, 
since masculinity is strictly defined as the ability to achieve and sustain an erection, and 
incapacitated as sexual, since sex seems narrowly defined as coitus. 
 Angus McLaren, in his historical account of impotence, discusses how impotence 
came to be constituted as a medical problem, something to be solved via medical 
intervention rather than explored in the context of a relationship.  In 1952, impotence was 
listed in the DSM as a psychological problem (McLaren, 2007), and it has since moved 
more in the direction of medical problem.  Pfizer, makers of Viagra, retitled the problem 
“erectile dysfunction” (McLaren, 2007, p. 241), giving the problem a name implying a 
problem with bodily functioning and also implying that one should have functioning 
erections— that not to have erections meant one was not functioning appropriately.   
 Masculinity also came to be associated with genital responsiveness (similar to the 
discussion in ch.3 of this dissertation, in which masculinity is defined in terms of the 
phallus), e.g. 'he is impotent” (McLaren, 2007, p. 252).  This also implies “that sex 
necessarily meant penetration” by “narrowing the definition of male arousal” (McLaren, 
2007, p. 252).  This increasingly narrow norm of health means the definition of healthy 
male becomes harder to achieve and more all-encompassing, the medical model pushes 
further that men are mostly their erections, or that erections are all that matter in the 
sexual realm.  McLaren notes, “...Biotechnology is being used to 'fix' or enhance 
heterosexual male confidence and power, and thus avert 'masculinity in crisis.'” (2007, p. 
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236) and “Men were egged on to take Viagra, not in order to sire children, but to match a 
certain standard of masculinity” (2007, p. 250).  
 McLaren notes that, “Urologists turned to male sexual dysfunctions in search of 
more patients.  It obviously served their purposes to medicalize the issue of impotence 
and exaggerate its extent” (McLaren, 2007, p. 240).  The marketing of Viagra changed 
over time; specifically, toward a younger range of men (McLaren, 2007), redefining 
normal male sexuality as a sort of “sexual athlete” (McLaren, 2007, p. 248).  For some 
time, the target audience remained heterosexual, advertising heterosexual penetration 
(McLaren, 2007, p. 252), but gradually moved on to include men who did not identify as 
heterosexual, as well.  Overall, it seems that the discourse has gradually moved in the 
direction of producing a narrower range of normalcy.  While the medical model may 
recognize more men, i.e., has extended its reach to gay men, in doing so it also imposes 
its norms on them as a group.  “Some critics worried that one was moving from an age of 
diversity to a 'new uniformity'” (McLaren, 2007, p. 259), in that a new sexual norm was 
being put forth, sexual diversity was no longer regarded as normal, and the definition of 
sexual normalcy narrowed to include all sorts of men (young, old, gay, straight).  The 
medical model reinforces a single, narrow norm of masculinity and male sexuality, 
creating an increasingly large audience for medical intervention.  Rather than adapt and 
change their sexual activities according to context, men are pressed to match an 
increasingly narrow norm.   
 Set against this background, Michael's case seems particularly noteworthy.  He 
and Susan are able to conceptualize sexuality not as a problem to be solved, but as a 
playful process.  Michael finds that available discourses about sexuality do not 
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adequately meet his embodied experience, and he and Susan set about making a new 
discourse around sexuality.  The next major section of this chapter goes into greater detail 
about clinical implications one may draw from this process and alternate ways of 
clinically conceptualizing sexuality.   
Transsexual Diagnosis 
 For all of the problems the medical model has with conceptualizing sex and 
gender, it seems paradoxically to recognize the significance of the body for identity in its 
urgency to restore erect penises to men; that is, the medical model seems to recognize the 
significance that maintaining erections has for the masculine identity of some men.  The 
same might be said of the medical model's view of transsexuality (or, “Gender Identity 
Disorder” or GID, mirroring the language of disorder and dysfunction used to re-title 
impotence as “erectile dysfunction”), since “...the treatment proposed for the most serious 
manifestation of GID (transsexualism) doesn't try to cure us of the 'disorder'; rather, it 
concurs with our own narrative, compelling us into it as a way of resolving it” (Prosser, 
2005, pp. 106-07). Prosser (2005) discusses “how transsexual autobiography emerges at a 
homologous moment: when the transsexual autobiographer seizes on the self as a 
medicodiscursive object” (p. 126).  In other words, transsexuals came to have a distinct 
identity and the beginning of a means of self-recognition through medical discourse.   
 Regarding transsexuality as a medical problem also designates it as an embodied 
condition, acknowledging the physical significance of transsexuality rather than claiming 
it is “all in the head” (similar to redefining impotence as a medical “dysfunction”). Harry 
Benjamin is credited with the “invention of the transsexual” (or rather, the recognition of 
transsexual people as a distinct group), naming transsexuals and distinguishing them from 
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other categories, such as the category of homosexuals (Prosser, 2005).  This distinction 
informs clinical practice and DSM taxonomy follows suit.  The DSM diagnosis of GID 
“doesn't try to cure us of the 'disorder'; rather, it concurs with our own narrative, 
propelling us into it as a way of resolving it” (Prosser, 2005, p. 107).   
 This is a general trend for clinical diagnosis.  DSM-III included “premature 
ejaculation, inhibited orgasm, transsexualism, and gender identity disorder of childhood” 
and for the first time included “some different criteria sets for males and females” 
(Widiger, 2007, p. 21).  Over time (including up to the present debates around DSM-V) 
information has become more specific according to gender and sexual identity.  This is 
the first time the DSM acknowledged gender dysphoria as well, with the diagnoses 
Gender Identity Disorder in Children (GIDC) and Transsexualism (Drescher, 2010).  This 
established “transgender subjectivities as a unique psychological phenomenon in its own 
right” (Drescher, 2010, p. 437) to the DSM-using community, beyond Benjamin's initial 
“discovery.” 
 Prosser (2005) argues for the continuous presence of transsexuals, not as produced 
by discourse but as productive of it, explaining,  
the consistence and continuity of this narrative and its conventions... produced a 
medical discourse around transgender that led to the writing of a transsexual 
diagnosis in DSM-III.  The diagnosis then stands for a recognition of the 'trans-
history'... of trans narratives” (pp. 133-34).   
 
In other words, the diagnosis emerges from a common transsexual narrative 
(“autobiography in the clinician's office”, Prosser, 2005, p. 104).  This is opposed to the 
idea that transsexual subjectivity is constituted through a diagnosis, or through expert 
clinical knowledge.  Rather than being produced by discourse, transsexuals found a place 
in discourse through the clinical and medical.  Recognition of gender dysphoria as a 
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mental health concern has the function of presenting “sexual reassignment surgeries 'as a 
legitimate treatment and not an elective or cosmetic surgery'” (Lev, 2005, p. 53, quoting 
Pauly).  The presence of a GID diagnosis brings “some benefit and recognition to an 
underserved and disenfranchised community” (Lev, 2005, p. 53).   
Discursive Elisions 
 Despite the advantages discursive recognition brings to transsexual, the medical 
model's narrow views of sex, gender, and the body is reflected in its discourse on 
transsexuality, just as they are in its views of impotence.  Like the medical views of 
impotence, “the diagnostic criteria of both GID and TF are based in stereotypical sexist 
and heterosexist assumptions regarding normative male and female experience, as serves 
to reify a traditional gender-based hegemony” (Lev, 2005, p. 43).  For a person to receive 
the medical interventions involved in sex transition, they must fit a particular narrative.  
Lev (2005) notes that “many of the diagnoses in the current DSM are the legacy of... 
early explorations into human sexual deviations from what was presumed common” (p. 
38), although Kinsey's research had, at that point, called into question notions about 
common or normal sexuality (Lev, 2005).  Therefore, a major argument against the value 
of medical discourses for transsexuality is the way these discourses serve to marginalize 
and restrict transsexual identity.  Scientific discourses, such as medical and clinical 
discourses, establish norms and deviations from those norms, elaborating and describing 
deviations, and establishing norms and deviations as markers of identity rather than 
activities.  
 Even insofar as the medical model provides recognition and distinction for 
transsexuals, and is a means to providing medical and psychological resources for them, 
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it nevertheless restricts potential identities (i.e., some people may not be able to recognize 
themselves in the discourse provided by medicine, or may be specifically excluded from 
it—even as discourses proliferate, this seems to do more to reinforce a norm than allow 
for greater varieties of difference).  “The medical model has... left a problematic legacy 
by reinforcing the gender binary and therefore legitimizing only certain kinds of gender 
dysphoric people, and eliminating, or severely restricting, access to medical treatments 
for people whose gender-variant expression follows atypical patterns” (Lev, 2005, p. 45).  
Lev (2005, citing Carroll, 1999) states, “Clinicians and transgender individuals 
themselves are finding that these categories are inadequate to describe the possible 
resolutions to cross-gender experience” (p. 45), meaning that the DSM representation of 
transgender and transsexual experience (“gender dysphoria”) describes, at best, a 
subpopulation of this overall group—indeed, “the vast majority of research has focused 
on studying natal males who apply for treatments through approved Gender Clinics” and 
excludes, for examples, “FTMs, trans-identified butches, genderqueer [populations],” etc. 
(p. 45).   
 In other words, in providing a transsexual narrative, the medical model also 
delimits this narrative.  Butler, 2004, p. 71: “...for the most part the gender essentialist 
position... must be voiced for transsexual surgery to take place, and that someone who 
comes in with a sense of the gender as changeable will have a more difficult time 
convincing psychiatrists and doctors to perform surgery.”  If one's experience does not fit 
an established discourse, one will not receive the cooperation of medical institutions.   
The gatekeeping system requires that people who desire medical treatments have 
the same standardized autobiography... Cross-gendered people cannot simply 
request services, but must fit a proscribed narrative to be eligible for services... 
Those who are approved and pass through the gate have refined the same 
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'transsexual narrative,' validating it as the transsexual trajectory (Lev, 2005, p. 54).   
 
Prosser (2005) notes as well that “the standardization also renders some stories 
unintelligible... censoring the number of possible legitimate transsexual tales... the 
diagnosis acts as a narrative filter” (p. 107).  The clinician is given a great deal of power 
to approve or deny the transsexual patient's narrative.  Indeed, “The clinician's reading 
thus officially confers and by the same token may defer transsexual subjectivity” 
(Prosser, 2005, p. 108).  It would seem, then, that the discourse doesn't really flow “up” 
from transsexual experience (at least not from the experience of all transsexuals), but is 
reified via expert knowledge.  Transsexuality becomes a specific discourse that 
embodiment is forced to meet. 
Towards an Alternate View of Sex 
 This trend is towards a proliferation of discourses about sexuality.  By 
“transforming sex into discourse” (Foucault, 1978, p. 22) aspects of sexuality are 
recognized and put into discourse, leading to the recognition of groups that were 
previously outside of discourse.  However, this also leads to narrowing norms within 
these recognized groups as the groups become more encased in a discourse.  Varied 
experiences are again left outside of discourse.  At points when one does not fit,  
Modernity has solved this problem by blaming, then erasing the subalterns: if 
proletarian, we cannot “really” be queer, if queer, not “really” proletarian, if 
unable to get up the stairs, not really mobile. I suggest that an inversion: we are 
real, and if the stairs or the categories do not work, they should be redesigned 
(Jensen, 2009, p. 63).   
 
How, then, do we as clinicians do what works and respond to real bodies and real 
situations, including those that are not readily taken up by current discourses? 
 Michael's situation provides an opportunity to explore this question.  Michael 
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observes, in his narrative, that the discourses he knows do not adequately meet his 
experience (just as some transsexuals may not meet the proscribed transsexual discourse.  
He writes,  
I knew then that I could not seriously think of this piece of purple plastic as a 
medical appliance. This was important in my reconceptualizing the situation. 
Whatever I was going to do with the dildo was not in anyway [sic] a 'cure' for ED 
nor was it meant to restore my masculine sense of sexuality. If this was going to 
work, it was because it was something completely different. I had to stop thinking 
about this clinically...” (Warkentin, K., Gray, R., & Wassersug, R., 2006, p. 391). 
 
Present discourses limit our way of understanding the change in Michael's sexuality.  
Discourses about impotence and masculinity are not adequate for Michael’s experience, 
and medical discourses are also unhelpful, in the same way they may fail to serve other 
sexual minorities.  As noted in the previous chapter, imagination and relation are 
significant for transition, and for the development and emergence of identity.  It seems to 
be the job of psychologists, then, to sustain and encourage this playfulness and broad 
definitions of sexuality and identity, as well as maintaining an emphasis on what works 
rather than achieving a socially-imposed ideal.  In other words, rather than restoring 
hegemonic masculinity to Michael, a clinician might find a way to aid Michael in 
exploring the possibilities offered by his actual body.   
 The goal of this chapter might also be understood as elaborating alternative 
discourses on sexuality, as Michael's lesbian friend does for Michael when he tells her 
about his problems.  Clinicians might follow her lead by remaining open to discoveries 
about sexuality that are obscured by current discourses as well as helping people find 
their way into their own discourses.  The next section reconceptualizes Michael's case 
based on a more open, playful approach to sexuality and identity, and includes 
suggestions for clinicians.   
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II. Clinical Concepts 
 
I myself would oppose the formula: 'the unconscious is structured like a language' with a 
formulation that is implicit in Freud: 'the unconscious is the body.'  The unconscious 
seems to me to be structured like the body. 
 Didier Anzieu, 1990, p. 43 
Anzieu and the Skin Ego 
 The psychoanalytic practitioner Didier Anzieu provides a means for clinically 
conceptualizing and elaborating findings from Michael's case.  Anzieu's approach is 
helpful for a number of reasons, including his emphasis on the body and other people as 
sources of identity, and his emphasis on conceptual and clinical imaginativeness and 
playfulness.  This imaginativeness also leads to a more complex, less narrow and 
normative view of health. 
 Anzieu's approach also seems to bypass rigid conceptual divisions such as those 
between material and representation, since he is able to see the body as both, and to see 
these as intimately related features of the body.  This section provides a way of 
understanding Michael's case that does not overemphasize language or the mind, but 
recognizes the significance of the body.  This discussion will, as Anzieu prefers to do 
with psychoanalytic texts, follow the spirit rather than the letter.  That is to say, Anzieu's 
concept of the “skin ego” will serve as a starting point for an imaginative psychoanalytic 
conceptualization of Michael that reflects a clinical way of thinking about bodies which 
contrasts with the popular views, elaborated above.  
* * * 
 Anzieu emphasizes the significance of the body in identity formation.  He 
explains that “every psychical phenomenon develops in constant reference to bodily 
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experience” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 84 and p. 96), i.e., that one becomes who one is based on 
embodied experiences.  Anzieu's emphasis is particularly on the surface of the body, the 
skin.  Anzieu presents an ambiguous distinction between “the real organ with its structure 
and physiology and the imaginary one which the subject constructs as an envelope out of 
different experiences, including physical and emotional traumas, pain and pleasure, 
varieties of holding, and fantasy” (Kirshner, 1990, p. 544).  In other words, the psyche, 
the self, or identity, is an ambiguously biological and fantasied entity.  This presents a 
contrast to the over-simplified approach the medical model offers of psyche and soma: 
“the psycho-physiologist tends to reduce the living body to the nervous system and 
behavior to cerebral activities by which it is programmed through a process of collection, 
analysis and synthesis of information” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 3).  Instead, the self and the 
body's surface are more complex and interactive than the medical model may recognize.  
Recognizing this complexity may help in cases like Michael's, where the living body is 
clearly more than the nervous system.   
 Anzieu's concept of the “Skin Ego” emerges from Freud's notion that “The ego is 
first and foremost a bodily ego” (or “body ego,” in a later work by Freud) (Anzieu, 1975, 
p. 85).  Anzieu posits that tactile, sensory experiences transform into thoughts and 
symbols (1975, p. 230) and states that “The Skin Ego is a reality of the order of 
phantasy” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 4).  This means that our embodied experiences form our 
concepts about ourselves and the world, or that the body is formative of the self.  It seems 
that this is what happens in Michael's case, as his embodied experiences permit him to 
accept the dildo as an extension of his own body.  As discussed in chapter 3 of this 
dissertation, physical bodies, including skin, are “Not simply costumes for our experience 
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of our bodies, our theoretical conceptions of the body are foundationally formed by and 
reformative of them” (Prosser, 2005, p. 96).  Bodily experience is not predicated upon 
discourse, but contributes to the formation of discourse (also as discussed in chapter 3).   
 Anzieu characterizes the ego, like the skin and as it is coincident with the skin, as 
an “interface.”  It is a point of contact between inside and outside, and self and other.  
“The Ego is at once subject (the pronoun 'I' is used to refer to it) and object (it is called 
the 'Self')” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 91).  The skin and the ego are paradoxically inside and 
outside of a body, the surfaces for meeting the world.  Anzieu quotes Freud speaking 
about the formation of the ego (1975, p. 84):  
A person's own body, and above all its surface, is a place from which both 
external and internal perceptions may spring.  It is seen like any other object, but 
to the touch it yields two kinds of sensations, one of which may be equivalent to 
an internal perception. 
 
Skin is meeting point for feeling and language, for acting and being acted upon.  It is the 
“point of contact between material body and body image, between visible and felt matter” 
(Prosser, 2005, p. 72).  It makes sense for identity to emerge from this place, and that a 
change to the body is a change to oneself.  The skin is what expands to encompass other 
objects, to cover new surfaces, akin to a new sensory horizon.  Anzieu also recognizes the 
significance of others in forming identity, which is demonstrated in Michael's experience 
with Susan (as discussed in chapter 4), and is a major reason for Anzieu's emphasis on the 
body's surface.  The body, particularly the surface of the body, is where one meets others, 
as the place where “I” am.   
 In addition to placing an emphasis on shared experience and on embodiment, 
Anzieu attempts to bypass rigid divisions between the biological and cognitive, between 
the embodied and the psychological, and between the body and representation.  Anzieu 
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writes, “Western thought has been obsessed with a particular epistemological conception, 
whereby the acquisition of knowledge is seen as a process of breaking through an outer 
shell to an inner core or nucleus” (1975, p. 9).  This fits the dualistic notion of an “inner 
self” with an exterior body, as well as the idea of “having” a psychological or medical 
disorder—the disorder is presented as being contained in an individual, rather than 
representing a perspective on the way an individual lives her body or a condition that 
involves others as much as the identified disordered person.  Anzieu (1975) relocates 
significance in the body, particularly the surface of the body, asking “what if thought 
were as much an affair of the skin as of the brain?” (p. 9).  Instead of “breaking through” 
a surface, thinking is “a matter of relations between surfaces” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 10), a 
kind of touching and being touched simultaneously.  He explains that,  
By placing emphasis on the skin as a basic datum that is both of an organic and an 
 imaginary order, both a system for protecting our individuality and a first 
instrument and site of interaction with others, I am seeking to bring into being 
another model—one resting on a solid biological foundation, out of which our 
interaction with the environment arises, and which respects the specificity of 
psychical phenomena in relation to both organic and social realities. (Anzieu, 
1975, p. 3)  
 
This model contrasts with the medical model, instead emphasizing the body and 
relationality, and offers an alternative approach for formulating cases.  Michael's 
transformation seems to be a process of finding and creating a discourse as well as 
responding to events that take place on the surface of his body.  A change to the body is a 
change to a person's psyche, for they are intimately connected.   
 Anzieu places an emphasis on theoretical playfulness, which fits the playfulness 
that goes into Michael's transformation, and also the playfulness that goes into 
elaborating an under-explored phenomenon.  Anzieu explains, “My idea of the Skin Ego 
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is, admittedly, a metaphor of very broad scope” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 6).  The Skin Ego 
seems to be a concept open to development and adaptation.  In discussing Michael's case, 
this chapter takes up Anzieu's invitation to be imaginative and to apply his concepts 
liberally.  Anzieu (1975) states, “In these last decades of the twentieth century, 
psychoanalysis seems to me to have greater need of people who think in images than of 
learned scholars, scholiasts and abstract or formalistic thinkers'” (p. 6) and also, “[The 
success of] contemporary psycho-pharmacological research... has... brought about a 
narrowing of both the field of observation and the theoretical field” (p. 3).  In other 
words, theoretical openness and playfulness are missing and concepts are becoming more 
rigid—Anzieu is calling for imaginative play in clinical theory.   
 In addition to theoretical playfulness, Anzieu emphasizes conceptual openness and 
experimentation when applying these ideas to clinical practice.  He emphasizes finding 
and doing what works in clinically.  Anzieu states (in a 1975 statement cited by René 
Kaës), 
The question is not to repeat what Freud found when faced with the crises of the 
 Victorian era, but to find a psychoanalytic response to mankind's malaise in the 
 civilization in which we live. Work such as that of psychoanalysis needs to be 
done wherever the unconscious arises, standing, seated or lying down; 
individually, in a group or in a family, wherever a subject can allow his anxieties 
and fantasies to speak out to someone who is supposed to listen to them and is 
likely to help him understand them.   
 
As noted in the previous section of this chapter, clinicians are over-prepared to reflect 
dominant discourses, or overly ready to read the familiar into their patients, whether this 
is a particular narrative (such as those about masculinity or transsexuality), a rigid 
psychoanalytic perspective, or a rigid “psychophysiological” viewpoint.  “The 
hermeneutics of suspicion are reversed and reflected back on the clinicians themselves” 
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(Prosser, 2005, p. 113).  Clinicians may fall into the position of viewing the world 
through a given discourse which renders certain experiences from becoming visible or 
intelligible to them.  Anzieu encourages clinicians to stay open and imaginative, which 
seems necessary for engaging clinically with someone undergoing a transition or 
adjustment, i.e., someone who is finding her or his own meaning that may or may not fit 
available discourses.  In other words, it is the clinician's duty to adapt practice to fit 
patients' needs.  Clinical concepts cannot be applied too rigidly; it is best to work with 
loose ideas rather than an inflexible barrier.  Analytic concepts are regenerative and 
flexible, like skin. 
 Finally, Anzieu writes “I hope the idea may stimulate freedom of thought among 
psychoanalysts and broaden the range of their interventions in the treatment of their 
patients” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 6).  This discussion of Michael's case follows Anzieu's wish 
that the broad idea of the Skin Ego open up new ways of thinking and practicing 
clinically.  This discussion accepts Anzieu's invitation to do what works, e.g., take 
therapy/ analysis in whatever mode and setting works and to explore boundaries of skin, 
Ego, and practice.  References to clinicians are intended to refer to clinicians broadly, as 
Anzieu refers to the process of psychoanalysis broadly, above—the “analyst” could be a 
number of people who interact professionally with a patient like Michael, including 
doctors and psychologists.  This is an encouragement to think differently (as Michael and 
Susan manage to do), and also to practice differently and experiment with technique 
(again, as Michael and Susan do).   
The next section of this chapter further discusses clinical implications that may 
follow from Anzieu's emphasis on the significance of the body's surface and from the 
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phenomenon presented by Michael.  Anzieu’s theoretical playfulness seems to be an 
invitation for playful therapeutic technique and application of his concepts, as well.  This 
playfulness seems to match the playfulness that takes place between Michael and Susan, 
and which allows Michael's transition to take place.  A clinician may help a patient like 
Michael by employing and modeling this playful and imaginative attitude in the 
consulting room, and by maintaining a willingness to leave established discourses behind 
in the realm of clinical practice.  This next section is an attempt to bring the body more 
centrally into therapeutic work, to attend to subjective and embodied cues in addition to 
discursive cues, including those aspects of embodiment which rupture discourse.  
Clinical Thoughts and Suggestions 
 Michael experiences a rupture in his ego, his sense of self, when his physical body 
is damaged.  The loss of a functional penis means losing a part of his identity and his 
“masculine sense of sexuality” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  Medical model attempts 
to restore his erect penis do not work.  Not only do these solutions fail in their own right, 
but they frame what was happening with Michael as a specific problem to be solved.  
Instead of regaining an erect penis or masculine sexuality, however, Michael is restored 
in a different way.  He gains a different kind of sexual pleasure and undergoes changes to 
the surface of his body.  For Michael, and for others in bodily transition, changes in the 
psychic skin parallel changes in the physical skin.  This restoration is possible because 
Michael is able to experience the dildo as an extension of his sensory horizon.  He also 
receives support from a friend who suggests an alternate way of conceptualizing the 
sexual body, and engages in mutual exploration with a caring and imaginative partner.  
Both of these supportive others frame dildo use as play without prior expectations, and 
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Michael does the same.  This playful and exploratory attitude seems to open space for 
new sensory experiences that allow for a new kind of sexuality and the development of a 
unique sexuality between Michael and his partner, and a new sexual and personal identity 
for Michael.  The dildo also becomes a kind of common skin between Michael and 
Susan, a shared nonverbal object of experience that holds memories, “imbued with the 
knowledge of... previous sexual satisfaction” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 391).  The dildo 
is not merely a symbol of sexuality, but marks an actual change to Michael's embodied 
experience—the dildo is denser and more substantive than a mere representation.  
Michael and Susan are able to accomplish a unique sexuality between them despite 
engrained discourses about sexuality, masculinity, and impotence.  The following 
thoughts and suggestions for clinical practice are based on Michael's case and Anzieu's 
medical-model alternative way of clinical conceptualization.  For the sake of 
convenience, the following speaks specifically to psychotherapists, but these suggestions 
may be applicable for many forms of clinical treatment, as suggested in the discussion of 
Anzieu, above. 
* * * 
 What might a clinician do for Michael, or patients in some way like Michael?  
First of all, it seems that the clinician must provide a container for exploration.  Rather 
than approaching Michael as a person with a problem to solve, a clinician might instead 
see Michael as a person with a situation to explore.  The clinician’s goal is not to restore 
to Michael a predetermined wholeness or normativity, but to restore Michael to himself.  
The clinician may regard the body as an event (see chapter 4), or as always in transition, 
a becoming which constitutes the way a person understands her or himself and the world.  
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The body is not understood as a merely anatomical entity, nor something separable from 
identity.  Oliver Sacks equates the body ego (here, the skin ego) with proprioception, a 
sense of one's place and one's boundaries (Prosser, 2005, pp. 78-79).  Michael stretches 
his skin to include the dildo, he undergoes a change in body image, but it takes place via 
the felt body.  Like the body, the clinician might think of “the boundaries of the Ego... 
'perpetually changing'... They vary from one individual to another... and in different 
phases of life, and they encompass different contents” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 90).  The 
clinician’s reading of the body remains open to change and supplement. 
 Therapy, then, would involve recognizing and facilitating this transitional process.  
Rather than following a model of “breaking through” a skin or a surface, or of bringing 
what's inside to the outside, therapy would follow a model of developing a skin.  Therapy, 
and the therapist, would act as a containing skin for the patient.  Treatment can be a “skin 
of words” (Anzieu, 1975, pp. 203-04) that helps “re-establish symbolically a containing 
psychical skin that is able to make more bearable the pain caused by a wound to the real 
skin” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 205), “traumatic breaches” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 215) in the skin or 
in the psyche may be repaired via therapy.  Therapy would enable the patient to develop a 
new “skin.”   
 “Developing a new skin” involves helping a patient to feel whole, or restored to 
wholeness, but a personal wholeness rather than a normative one (indeed, many 
practicing clinicians already work from this principle).  In cases like Michael's in which 
someone has endured damage to the body and the ego or sense of identity, the clinician's 
job may be to help client accept and feel with his new body.  The clinician cannot simply 
convince a patient that she is whole; for example, an attempt to convince Michael that he 
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is “still a man” if he does not feel like one without having erections would be 
problematic.  Instead, the clinician might explore what the patient does feel like, and 
begin restoring her wholeness from there.  The clinician might view her role as helping 
the client feel that her or his “skin envelope” is closed and containing rather than 
damaged, or to help the patient fill in wounds in the skin envelope or stretch the skin in 
new directions to contain the transitioning self.  Anzieu notes that “to be oneself is first of 
all to have a skin of one's own and, secondly, to use it as a space in which one can 
experience sensations” (cited by Prosser, 2005, p. 61).  Therapeutic space can allow 
patients to develop complete embodied identities upon which to base new experience, 
including literal sensory experience as Michael demonstrates. 
 Developing a skin is particularly important for problems that involve the sexual 
body:  
...For the subject to acquire a sexual identity, two conditions must be fulfilled.  
One is a necessary condition: he must have a skin of his own, within which he can 
indeed feel himself to be a subject, to contain that identity.  The other condition is 
that he must have sufficient experience... of the erogenous zones on that skin and 
the jouissances that may be enjoyed there” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 219).   
 
Anzieu explains further, “[one must develop a Skin Ego] not only in order to accede to 
sexual identity... but in order first of all correctly to identify the site of erogenous 
excitation” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 221).  For Michael, then, experiencing sexual enjoyment 
with the dildo, or identifying it as “a site of erogenous excitation” (even when it is not 
attached to him, as discussed in Michael's narrative) allows him to begin developing a 
new sexual identity, and vice versa—his partner's acceptance of his dildonic body allows 
Michael to experience greater enjoyment of it.   
 There are a number of ways for therapists to help create a therapeutic space in 
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which the patient can experience her own body and begin developing a psychic skin, 
many of which some therapists do as a matter of course.  Simply looking at the patient 
may serve a containing function.  A clinician may maintain a “visual envelope” for the 
patient's body by looking at the patient during treatment, as opposed to types of 
approaches which are focused on words only and in which a patient and therapist may not 
maintain any visual contact, such as when a patient in psychoanalysis lies on the couch.  
The clinician’s gaze may also simulate the mother’s gaze in early infancy, which serves a 
significant developmental and supportive function.  The “visual envelope” is a way of 
communicating containment and acceptance of the patient’s body as well as maintaining 
a unity between body and language or representation.   
Further, therapy provides a container or a “holding space” that completes the skin 
envelope (one of the functions of the skin ego).  Creating a safe, containing space might 
also mean alterations to physical environment of the therapy space.  Based on the idea of 
the skin ego, one might “modify the typical psychoanalytic setting by making a number 
of possible physical adjustments to it… but also by taking into account the disposition of 
the patient's body and his/ her representation of the analytic space within the analytic 
setting” (Anzieu, 1975, p. 12).  For instance, a patient who feels inadequately contained 
by her skin and may regard the analytic space and analytic process as making painful 
contact with raw, uncontained contents may benefit not only from a modification of 
technique but may feel more comfortable in an altered space.  This patient may, perhaps, 
wish to sit farther from the clinician.  The clinician may find it useful to notice how the 
patient responds to the therapy setting as well as alterations or modifications of the 
setting.  The therapy space is where the patient “tries on” a new skin or stretches her skin 
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to contain new life events, and the therapy setting (or at least, the patient's feelings and 
fantasies about the therapy setting) may influence this development.   
 Modifications of the environment, or a shift in the patient's feelings about the 
containing therapeutic space, offer the clinician some notion about shifts in the patient's 
containing skin ego.  Anzieu suggestions that a therapist should attend, 
not only to the content and style of the patient's free associations, but also to the 
fluctuations of his/ her Ego; the analyst has to identify the moments when these 
fluctuations occur and to develop in the patients Ego a sufficient consciousness 
(and one capable of surviving beyond the end of the analysis) of the modifications 
of its own boundaries (p. 90).   
 
This means the therapist regards the patient as someone engaged in a process, not 
inflexible or tending toward a particular aim or goal.  Therapy has to do with helping a 
patient develop her own containing skin.  Again, the goal is not to “restore” something 
lost (in Michael's case, masculinity or masculine sexuality).  Therapy, rather, is 
constructive.  It restores a new wholeness or integrity that has to do with how the patient 
feels more so than her appearance or behavior with respect to a norm or narrative.  This is 
not to say that physical alterations to the body's actual surface may not also be a part of 
therapeutic treatment, but that therapy itself aims to facilitate the creation of a complete 
psychic skin.  The clinician may find it useful as well to notice the patient's “tactile 
reflexivity,” or the patient's experience of her own body (Anzieu, 1975, p. 62), including 
how the patient lives her body in the therapy setting.  For instance, a clinician may 
observe how a patient uses her body to inhabit the space of the therapy room—whether 
she tends to withdraw and shrink into her seat, or whether she seems to fill the space.   
The clinician may also frame her work in the context of the emerging space 
between partners; that is, rather than focusing on one individual, the clinician might focus 
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on what is created in a relationship.  Attending to the context of the patient's development 
of a new skin also means awareness of the patient's social context—the skin is a 
biological as well as a social entity (Anzieu, 1975).  Indeed, the skin is an interface 
between self and other, and the psychic develops in this space between.  In Michael's 
case, his new identity and new body develop in the context of his relationship with his 
partner.  It seems advisable, then, that a clinician working with Michael or anyone 
experiencing engaged in a process taking place in a relational context, would choose to 
bring the patient’s partner into the therapy context, since therapy is not the only container 
for developing a new skin.  Therapy might provide a safe, less restrictive space in which 
partners can explore sexual identity outside modes of dominant discourse.   
 
Conclusions 
 The space a clinician creates is not only containing, but exploratory and playful.  
This playfulness and emphasis on constructing something new rather than restoring a 
patient to a norm also means rejecting conceptual rigidity in exchange for imagination 
and fluidity.  This discussion has drawn out the importance of clinician’s task to be open 
and playful theoretically and in technical application.  Michael is open to try out a new 
way of understanding the body when he accepts his lesbian friend's suggestion that one 
can enjoy sexual pleasure through using a strap-on dildo.  He acquires a new embodied 
knowledge that transcends medical discourses about the meanings of the body and 
engrained ideas about gender and sexuality.  A clinician, in turn, could aid a patient by 
opening up new possibilities about the body that draw hegemonic ideas into question.  
This questioning may empower the patient to construct her own narrative.  Various shifts 
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become possible in the context of a playful attitude toward sexuality.  In sum, one might 
say that the clinician's task is to queer the body such that the patient will have space to 
develop her own bodily integrity.   
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
 Through phenomenological hermeneutic methods, this dissertation elaborated a 
complex phenomenon with relevance for theorizing human embodiment, identity, and 
sexuality.  These findings were placed in dialogue with various feminist and 
phenomenological perspectives, both to open up and contextualize the phenomenon, and 
to challenge and build upon existing theoretical perspectives to increase their scope and 
relevance.  Because the phenomenon explored in this dissertation has previously been 
relatively invisible (even if it is not uncommon), this primary aim of this dissertation has 
been to open up this phenomenon.  This “opening up” is intended to permit further 
interrogation and elaboration, and to offer findings that may be applied to studies of 
related phenomena.  This chapter will briefly summarize the findings and questions 
revealed in this dissertation, the limitations of this project, and directions for further 
inquiry that this project opens.   
Summary of Findings 
 The basic research questions of this project were “What is happening?,” a 
question intended to define a phenomenon, and “How is it possible?,” a question about 
the process that enables the phenomenon to come into existence.  The phenomenon this 
project centers on seems surprising at first—Michael is able to experience sexual 
satisfaction by means of an external object, the strap-on dildo.  Through 
phenomenological elaboration and close examination of Michael’s narrative, what is 
happening becomes clearer.  Michael is able to incorporate the strap-on dildo into his 
body schema and experience it as an extension of his own sensory body.  The question of 
how this happens, or what is likely to be true in order for this phenomenon to take place, 
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leads to multiple questions about human embodiment, sexuality, and identity.  For 
instance, what must be true of the human body in order for it to extend itself with an 
external object?  And what must be true of human sexuality for a person to experience 
sexual pleasure and orgasm with a dildo?  Additionally, what must be true about identity 
for a person to be able to adapt her body to a new situation, or to situate herself with a 
new body?  The responses to these questions, which follow from the basic question about 
how the phenomenon takes place, constitute the basic research findings of this 
dissertation.  These findings in turn have broader implications that may be applied and 
elaborated beyond this phenomenon, both to clinical practice and to develop greater 
understanding of human embodiment, sexuality, and identity. 
 In order for the body to incorporate an external object, it seems that the sensory 
boundaries of the body extend beyond the boundary of the skin.  The body possesses a 
“sensory horizon” which may expand to include objects that are not a part of the body.  
This implies that the body is something other or something more than the anatomical 
body.  The body is a flexible, changeable entity that may alter its boundaries.  Based on 
Michael’s experience, this flexibility seems to have some limits, for it takes time and 
practice for the dildo to feel like a part of his body.  It also seems that the object itself has 
some agency in how it is taken up—the dildo lends itself to certain kinds of practices, it 
suggests being taken up in a way that may make it easier to include in a bodily schema 
than other objects. 
 It also seems that in order for Michael to take up the dildo as part of his sexual 
body, a particular aspect of bodily experience, he had to have a particular context.  
Michael takes up the dildo as an aspect of his sexual body in collaboration with a sexual 
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partner; prior to dildo sex, the strap-on is simply a “piece of purple plastic” (Warkentin et. 
al., 2006, p. 391).  It is between Michael and Susan that sexuality emerges.  This way of 
theorizing human sexuality presents sexuality as a co-created event as opposed to 
something that emerges from a single person without definite context.  It also presents 
sexuality as something that develops imaginatively and experimentally, as opposed to 
presenting sexuality as something with a template or definite way of emerging.  
Sexuality, as it emerges through the phenomenon elaborated in this dissertation, has no 
definite aim, form, or location.   
Michael’s identity, particularly his understanding of himself as gendered (whether 
and how he is masculine or feminine) and the meaning of his sexual practices (what 
constitutes heterosexuality and what it means to “play the part of the lesbian” (Warkentin 
et. al., 2006, p. 391)) also reveals itself to have some flexibility and ambiguity, like 
sexuality and the sensory body.  Michael’s experience also reveals the felt body, or 
sensory experience, as well as bodily appearance and bodily practices, to be irreducible 
with identity.  These findings suggest that embodiment has deep significance for identity, 
and cannot be entirely subsumed by discourse.  It suggests, also, that the body is 
malleable to a degree and can change the boundaries of its felt experience.  Language and 
discourses are involved in this process, and felt experience cannot be separated from how 
a person conceptualizes her body, and to some extent how her body is conceptualized by 
others.  Michael’s identity changes as his senses and practices change.  It does not seem 
that identity is simply inscribed upon the body, nor that biology simply produces an 
identity, but that the body and discourse come together to produce a self.   
 These ideas challenge some understandings of sex, identity, and embodiment, 
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including understandings that influence clinical practice.  This dissertation elaborates 
implications for alternative ways of practicing clinically based on these ideas.  By 
acknowledging the significance of the body and felt experience, as well as the 
significance of imagination and playfulness, clinicians may help patients adapt to new 
bodies or develop new psychic “skins” to envelop their embodied identities.  This 
approach may be relevant to all sorts of clinical issues related to bodily changes, 
particularly changes to the sexual body.   
Further Implications and Areas for Further Study 
This dissertation offers relatively broad findings that suggest ways to theorize 
gender, sexuality, and embodiment.  These ways of theorizing, in addition to having 
implications for clinical conceptualization and practice, lead to a number of areas for 
further research.  Popular and general clinical understandings of embodiment, identity, 
and sexuality are limited.  There is more to find out based on unique experiences like 
Michael’s and marginalized experiences like those of transsexual, gay, or people from 
categories that are not recognized in discourse.  It is also important to understand the 
significance of the material body, that how the body feels is important, whether that 
means one’s task is to alter the body or erase the dissonance between what one wants to 
be and what one’s body is (i.e., trying to pretend to be a man without a functioning 
penis).  Reconceptualizing by thought and changing the body by getting a dildo are both 
important aspects of Michael’s transition and release from depression and dissatisfaction.  
Therapy can help one conform to what one is rather than what one is expected to be.  It is 
also important to recognize context and how things emerge between people rather than 
within people; that discourses hold people in place but imaginative space between 
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partners creates a new context.  Clinicians can help support this, help open up space and 
possibility by drawing into question those rigid categories, and attending to body and 
relationality in ways that are generally overlooked.  A valuable further study could 
investigate how clinicians are already using a playful and exploratory stance, and how 
they are not, particularly clinicians working affirmatively with transgender and 
transsexual patients, in order to build upon current clinical practices. 
Prostate cancer is very common, and changes to body form and functionality are 
universal.  Given the frequency of prostate cancer, as well as other changes to the body 
that are significant for a person’s identity and embodied practices, the implications of 
Michael’s experience may be far-reaching.  This study has implications for clinically 
treating people with body and identity issues, including people whose bodies have 
changed due to accident or natural process, or who feel there is something wrong with 
their bodies.  It shows the adaptability of felt bodies to expand sensory horizons and 
create a new skin, and how this may be useful clinically and conceptually.   
Limitations 
 As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, case study research is 
inherently limited.  Findings in this dissertation are drawn almost entirely from a single 
narrative which is based on the experience of one person.  Little is known about this 
person other than that he is in his late fifties at the time he presents his narrative, that he 
has gone through prostate cancer treatment, that he has a female partner, and that prior to 
becoming impotent he had a “masculine sense of sexuality” (Warkentin et. al., 2006, p. 
391).  These are the details about Michael given by the researchers who collected his 
narrative, and what Michael shares about himself.  He speaks descriptively about his 
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experience in his narrative, and his narrative is rich and revelatory.  It lends itself to 
hermeneutic analysis and discussion, and speaks to common aspects of human 
existence—embodiment, relationality, and sexuality.  However, because the narrative is 
circumscribed, it leaves open multiple questions about how the phenomenon would 
manifest itself in other bodies.  Race, socioeconomic status, and cultural background are 
some of the most noteworthy absences here.  These factors are not known, and this 
dissertation does not address the intersections of multiple other markers of identity with 
embodiment, gender, and sexuality.  This dissertation also has a somewhat limited 
discussion of gay and lesbian identities and strap-on dildo use, and also has room to grow 
in discussing transsexual and transgendered identities.  How originally female bodies 
may incorporate the strap-on dildo is an open question, although dissertation findings 
suggest that female bodies would be able to interpret and incorporate the dildo in their 
sensory schemas in the same way that Michael did—by taking up the dildo not as a penis 
or medical prosthetic, but as a toy, and object filled with potential.   
 The findings in this dissertation are also limited in that they are preliminary.  This 
dissertation explores an under-studied phenomenon in order to open up some basic 
questions for further exploration.  This project therefore offers some basic impressions 
and ideas that are intended as beginnings.  These beginnings may provide foundations for 
other research questions, guidelines for interviews, guidelines for selecting study 
participants, and reveal gaps that imply a need for further foundational studies. 
Directions for Application and Further Research 
 This dissertation suggests multiple questions that may be explored with further 
study, and the dissertation findings may be applied to further studying related 
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phenomenon (for instance, in the formulation of interview questions, research participant 
selection, or even in identifying a phenomenon for elaboration).  Some potential research 
questions are listed below.  The list is certainly not exhaustive, but is meant to suggest 
some possible directions.   
 If the body’s boundaries may extend beyond the boundaries of the skin, then what 
limitations are there to this phenomenon?  Can the body extend indefinitely?  How might 
the sensory body interact with other tools, or more complex technologies that may or may 
not fall into the category of “tools”?  And is the reverse possible—can the sensory body 
exclude areas of the body contained by the skin, and how is this phenomenon possible?  
Just as extending the skin to external objects has relevance for the sexual body (as 
Michael demonstrates with the strap-on dildo), what relevance might the phenomenon of 
contracting the sensory body to exclude areas covered by skin have for the sexual body?  
What significance might that phenomenon have for sexual and gender identity?   
What differences might one notice in a different body, if one were to compare the 
phenomenon that appears in Michael’s case with other cases?  For example, what might 
distinguish Michael from a man who is not willing or able to incorporate a strap-on 
dildo?  What are some alternative ways of sexually adapting taken up by couples in 
which one partner experiences impotence?  What about strap-on dildo incorporation in 
lesbians, like Michael’s friend?  What might be learned by elaborating the phenomenon 
of strap-on dildo incorporation as it presents itself in female bodies?  How might a female 
body take up the strap-on dildo differently than a male body?  What effect might strap-on 
dildo incorporation have on the identity of someone who identifies as a woman?  What 
about someone in a body others might identify as male who identifies as a woman, or in a 
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body others might recognize as female who identifies as a man?  What differences to 
these variations in gender and sexual identity make for the phenomenon of strap-on dildo 
incorporation, or adaptation to changes in embodiment?   
 
Closing 
This dissertation has been an attempt to open up a significant and underexplored 
phenomenon.  Multiple types of courage have gone into this work; the courage of 
Michael to confront his changed body and try something new, the courage of his partner 
and his friend to help create his transition, the courage of the authors of Michael's case 
study in presenting Michael's narrative before an audience, and I will add my own, to say 
the unsayable and put language to the phenomenon of strap-on dildo incorporation.  By 
means of exploring one human phenomenon, this project attempts to expand the meaning 
and complexity of human life generally.    
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ENDNOTES 
i.  This dissertation makes use of a number of terms to refer to various identity 
categories, such as sex, gender, transgender, gender identity and so on.  The way 
these terms are defined are distinguished in this dissertation is clarified in chapter 
3. 
ii.  “Technology” in this dissertation is used interchangeably with other terms, like 
 “thing,” “object,” and even “nonhuman.”  Although the discussions in this chapter 
may apply to all technologies, even complex and apparently “disembodying” 
technologies (as the author argues elsewhere: see Body and Technology: 
Reframing the Humanistic Critique of Technology in Janus Head, October 2011), 
the scope of this chapter only covers simple tools. 
iii.  This is similar to the statement I will argue for in chapter 4, in which Merleau-
Ponty seems to claim that a changed world is a reduced world (as in the case of 
Schneider) rather than a different, or in some cases, perhaps an even better, world.   
iv.  This is an inversion of Susan Bordo's (2002) statement that “the phallus is 
 haunted by the penis, and the penis is most definitely not one... it is perhaps the 
most visibly mutable of body parts... Mercurial, temperamental, unpredictable” (p. 
28). 
v.   “Erectile dysfunction” as a failure of masculinity and end of sexuality will be 
further discussed in chapter 5.  
vi.  This inflexibility creates difficulty for anyone who, like Michael, is not able to 
live up to these expectations, since their sexuality is defined as dysfunctional or 
impossible.  By de-centering the phallus from sexuality (though not from 
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masculinity) Michael is able to return to sexuality.  How Michael arrives at 
sexuality differently and how this process might be useful clinically is discussed 
extensively in chapters 4 and 5. 
vii.  Although the reader or interpreter of the body is particularly important for 
someone whose body and identity are outside the norm, as the gaze shapes one's 
experience and one's identity—this point is discussed further in the next chapter. 
 viii.  See previous chapter on Don Ihde's “Body 1” and “Body 2” distinction. 
ix.  The importance of other people, especially Michael's partner, as context for 
this transition will be discussed in the next chapter. 
x.  This is discussed in chapter 5 with regard to how medical and clinical 
approaches regard relationships between gender identity and the body in cases on 
impotence and in transsexuality. 
xi.  Chapter 5 discusses how clinical and medical approaches contribute to 
transition narratives, rendering some unintelligible and presenting limits to who 
may alter their bodies based on their recognition of particular narratives of 
transition. 
xii.  The next chapter will explore in greater detail notions of sexual failure, 
impotence, and the construction of male sexuality.  
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Appendix 1 
Michael's First-person Account (used with permission from the publishing authors) 
 
 Neither Viagra nor a vacuum erection device worked for me. I am loath to inject 
drugs into my penis or have a surgically implanted penile prosthesis, the remaining 
medical options for treating ED. Not surprisingly, like so many other cancer patients 
sexually incapacitated by modern medicine, I was clinically depressed within a few 
months of starting hormonal therapy.  
 This situation began to change when a close lesbian friend, who was aware of my 
cancer treatments and the sexual dysfunction they had caused, refused to accept my 
giving up on life. She told me that she uses a strap-on dildo. She claimed that she got 
genuine sexual satisfaction from this and thought I could too. I was very skeptical. A 
dildo is not innervated, and I imagined that sex performed with such an appliance would 
be wholly contrived and not a sensual act at all. My friend persisted in encouraging me, 
arguing that sexual satisfaction is as much in the brain as in the groin. 
 It took me more than a year to act on her suggestion. I was embarrassed to go into 
a sex shop to buy a dildo. I had never used sex toys. I was afraid that I would feel foolish 
and humiliated by using a strap-on penis. To do so meant facing fully, frontally (so to 
speak), the functional failure of my own flaccid phallus. Despite my reservations, I 
eventually agreed to experiment with a strap-on dildo. My expectations, though, were 
muted. At most, I thought I might be able to please my partner. But I honestly did not 
envision recreating a fully satisfying sexual experience. 
 My lesbian friend took the initiative to get me going on this project. She 
fabricated a harness that was customized to fit me and took me shopping for a dildo, 
which she insisted I consider “a toy.” I don’t think I could have even walked into the sex 
shop without her. I was worried that I might be identified and mocked by someone who 
knew me. In the store I debated buying a dildo that looked relatively natural or one that 
was beyond the realm of real anatomy. I finally selected one that was similar in size, 
shape, and angle to my erect penis before cancer treatments, to the best of my 
recollection. It is made of silicone, which makes it durable, appropriately stiff, yet still 
flexible, like a natural erect penis. Beyond that, the dildo that I bought bears little 
resemblance to a human penis. Granted, it has an expanded “head,” like the real glans 
penis but a uniformly smooth shaft, with none of the irregular surface texture caused by 
real-life veins. And it is purple! Clearly, it does not constitute a realistic bio-mimetic 
prosthesis. I knew then that I could not seriously think of this piece of purple plastic as a 
medical appliance. This was important in my reconceptualizing the situation. Whatever I 
was going to do with the dildo was not in any way a “cure” for ED nor was it meant to 
restore my masculine sense of sexuality. If this was going to work, it was because it was 
something completely different. I had to stop thinking about this clinically and accept the 
idea that I was heading into the theater of the absurd, and I was going to play the part of a 
lesbian! 
 Before this purchase, I discussed extensively with my partner whether she was 
willing to have sex with me wearing a strap-on dildo. She was at first hesitant but 
ultimately supportive of the exploration. We have now used the dildo many times. It 
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caught me by total surprise how natural intercourse felt with this strap-on device. I 
discovered that my hip movements with the dildo on were the same as during normal 
intercourse. Our body contact and embrace was full and natural, as well. The first time 
that we used the dildo, my partner reached down and held my penis in her hand. She had 
coated her hand with the same lubricant used to coat the dildo and stimulated my penis in 
synchrony with my pelvic movements. There was little sensory difference between this 
act and intercourse—my penis was not in her vagina but it did not know that. It was in a 
wet, warm place being firmly mechanically stimulated. My hindbrain took over, and I 
carried the act through to orgasm, to the sexual satisfaction of both my partner and 
myself. 
 My partner had not discussed with me her plan to hold my glans penis, so I was 
totally surprised by that action. I had not expected to achieve an orgasm and was 
astonished that it happened. At first I, thought it was the novelty of her holding my penis 
that brought me to climax. I thus feared that being aware, and then self-conscious, of this 
activity would defeat its effectiveness. This, however, has not been the case. If anything, 
sexual satisfaction has become easier, because both of us have come to accept the dildo 
as part of our sex play. Each time we use it, it becomes further imbued with the 
knowledge of the previous sexual satisfaction it has provided. It is thus now both a 
normal and at the same time erotic part of our lives. 
 We have both been able to have orgasms many times using the dildo. The 
knowledge that it will never become flaccid means that my having an orgasm need not 
prohibit further penetrative sex. The dildo gives me the sexual capacity to serve my 
partner more reliably than I might have been able to achieve as a potent male (with or 
without Viagra). Significantly, my partner claims that she could not previously have an 
orgasm simply by penile penetration. However, with the dildo, I am able to continue 
pelvic thrusts long and hard enough that she now regularly achieves an orgasm in the 
missionary position. We have also used the dildo with me lying on my back and my 
partner sitting on it, so she has control of the movement. This was sexually pleasurable 
for her, although I have not achieved an orgasm in this position. 
 When I had a prostate gland, sexual arousal that did not lead to ejaculation was 
frustrating, and I found it incomprehensible when a woman claimed she had pleasure 
from sexual stimulation yet had not had an orgasm. After my prostate was removed, I 
discovered that I too could have incremental pleasure from sexual stimulation and enjoy 
sex without orgasms. I can also have multiple orgasms! Without a prostate gland, my 
orgasms are less anatomically focused, radiating across my pelvis. They are of variable 
intensity but sometimes massively cathartic. When I have multiple orgasms, they are 
usually 2 or 3 within one minute or 2. I find it easiest to achieve orgasms when my 
partner wants me to, especially in the context of mutually satisfying dildo intercourse, but 
far more difficult on my own. 
 I am fascinated by the eroticism that has developed between my partner, myself, 
and our dildo. For example, one morning, after having sex the night before, I went to the 
bathroom and found the dildo sitting upright on the counter-top wearing one of my 
favorite neckties. My partner had decided to personify and personalize it. I interpreted 
this as a signal to me that the dildo pleased her and did so because of its association with 
me. 
 On another occasion, I was waiting for my partner’s arrival and decided to put on 
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the harness and dildo ahead of time. I covered myself and the dildo with a bathrobe, but 
there was no mistaking the fact that when I looked down there was sticking out what 
looked like a large firm erection. For a brief instant, it brought back my fear that wearing 
a dildo would force me to confront in a demoralizing fashion my own failed phallus, my 
mutilated masculinity. 
 But that was not at all what I felt. Instead, I felt joyfully empowered. My thoughts 
went to a glib one-liner from my lesbian friend: “A dyke with a dildo can outlast a male 
anytime.” I realized that that was equally true for a prostate cancer patient with a dildo, 
and I almost started laughing. I was playing a role and doing it better than I ever could 
before I became impotent. I had acquired a performance capability that surpassed “male” 
and I was thoroughly enjoying the “play” part of sex. 
 When I reported this experience to my lesbian friend, she suggested that my 
partner and I explore oral sex with the dildo. Once again, my first thought was, “That’s 
absurd.” But since everything else she suggested had worked better than I could have 
imagined, my partner and I took on the challenge. Simply stated, there has now been 
enough acceptance of the dildo as a sexual object—and transference from “object” to 
“organ”—that the visual image of my partner mouthing the dildo was indeed highly 
erotic in the context of our sex play. On another occasion, in order to tease me, my 
partner started playing with the dildo in a flirtatious fashion outside of the bedroom. I 
found the activity erotic and sufficiently distracting that I had to ask her to stop so that I 
could concentrate on what I was doing. 
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Appendix 2 
Text of Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License  
 
THE WORK (AS DEFINED BELOW) IS PROVIDED UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS CREATIVE 
COMMONS PUBLIC LICENSE ("CCPL" OR "LICENSE"). THE WORK IS PROTECTED BY 
COPYRIGHT AND/OR OTHER APPLICABLE LAW. ANY USE OF THE WORK OTHER THAN AS 
AUTHORIZED UNDER THIS LICENSE OR COPYRIGHT LAW IS PROHIBITED. 
BY EXERCISING ANY RIGHTS TO THE WORK PROVIDED HERE, YOU ACCEPT AND AGREE 
TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THIS LICENSE. TO THE EXTENT THIS LICENSE MAY BE 
CONSIDERED TO BE A CONTRACT, THE LICENSOR GRANTS YOU THE RIGHTS 
CONTAINED HERE IN CONSIDERATION OF YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS. 
1. Definitions 
a."Adaptation" means a work based upon the Work, or upon the Work and other pre-
existing works, such as a translation, adaptation, derivative work, arrangement of music 
or other alterations of a literary or artistic work, or phonogram or performance and 
includes cinematographic adaptations or any other form in which the Work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted including in any form recognizably derived from the original, 
except that a work that constitutes a Collection will not be considered an Adaptation for 
the purpose of this License. For the avoidance of doubt, where the Work is a musical 
work, performance or phonogram, the synchronization of the Work in timed-relation with a 
moving image ("synching") will be considered an Adaptation for the purpose of this 
License. 
b."Collection" means a collection of literary or artistic works, such as encyclopedias and 
anthologies, or performances, phonograms or broadcasts, or other works or subject 
matter other than works listed in Section 1(f) below, which, by reason of the selection and 
arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations, in which the Work is 
included in its entirety in unmodified form along with one or more other contributions, 
each constituting separate and independent works in themselves, which together are 
assembled into a collective whole. A work that constitutes a Collection will not be 
considered an Adaptation (as defined below) for the purposes of this License. 
c."Creative Commons Compatible License" means a license that is listed at 
http://creativecommons.org/compatible licenses that has been approved by Creative 
Commons as being essentially equivalent to this License, including, at a minimum, 
because that license: (i) contains terms that have the same purpose, meaning and effect 
as the License Elements of this License; and, (ii) explicitly permits the relicensing of 
adaptations of works made available under that license under this License or a Creative 
Commons jurisdiction license with the same License Elements as this License. 
d."Distribute" means to make available to the public the original and copies of the Work or 
Adaptation, as appropriate, through sale or other transfer of ownership. 
e."License Elements" means the following high-level license attributes as selected by 
Licensor and indicated in the title of this License: Attribution, ShareAlike. 
f."Licensor" means the individual, individuals, entity or entities that offer(s) the Work 
under the terms of this License. 
g."Original Author" means, in the case of a literary or artistic work, the individual, 
individuals, entity or entities who created the Work or if no individual or entity can be 
identified, the publisher; and in addition (i) in the case of a performance the actors, 
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singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, 
interpret or otherwise perform literary or artistic works or expressions of folklore; (ii) in the 
case of a phonogram the producer being the person or legal entity who first fixes the 
sounds of a performance or other sounds; and, (iii) in the case of broadcasts, the 
organization that transmits the broadcast. 
h."Work" means the literary and/or artistic work offered under the terms of this License 
including without limitation any production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, 
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression including digital form, such as a 
book, pamphlet and other writing; a lecture, address, sermon or other work of the same 
nature; a dramatic or dramatico-musical work; a choreographic work or entertainment in 
dumb show; a musical composition with or without words; a cinematographic work to 
which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography; a 
work of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving or lithography; a 
photographic work to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to 
photography; a work of applied art; an illustration, map, plan, sketch or three-dimensional 
work relative to geography, topography, architecture or science; a performance; a 
broadcast; a phonogram; a compilation of data to the extent it is protected as a 
copyrightable work; or a work performed by a variety or circus performer to the extent it is 
not otherwise considered a literary or artistic work. 
i."You" means an individual or entity exercising rights under this License who has not 
previously violated the terms of this License with respect to the Work, or who has 
received express permission from the Licensor to exercise rights under this License 
despite a previous violation. 
j."Publicly Perform" means to perform public recitations of the Work and to communicate 
to the public those public recitations, by any means or process, including by wire or 
wireless means or public digital performances; to make available to the public Works in 
such a way that members of the public may access these Works from a place and at a 
place individually chosen by them; to perform the Work to the public by any means or 
process and the communication to the public of the performances of the Work, including 
by public digital performance; to broadcast and rebroadcast the Work by any means 
including signs, sounds or images. 
k."Reproduce" means to make copies of the Work by any means including without 
limitation by sound or visual recordings and the right of fixation and reproducing fixations 
of the Work, including storage of a protected performance or phonogram in digital form or 
other electronic medium. 
2. Fair Dealing Rights. Nothing in this License is intended to reduce, limit, or restrict any uses free 
from copyright or rights arising from limitations or exceptions that are provided for in connection 
with the copyright protection under copyright law or other applicable laws. 
3. License Grant. Subject to the terms and conditions of this License, Licensor hereby grants You 
a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright) 
license to exercise the rights in the Work as stated below: 
a.to Reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work into one or more Collections, and to 
Reproduce the Work as incorporated in the Collections; 
b.to create and Reproduce Adaptations provided that any such Adaptation, including any 
translation in any medium, takes reasonable steps to clearly label, demarcate or 
otherwise identify that changes were made to the original Work. For example, a 
translation could be marked "The original work was translated from English to Spanish," 
or a modification could indicate "The original work has been modified."; 
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c.to Distribute and Publicly Perform the Work including as incorporated in Collections; 
and, 
d.to Distribute and Publicly Perform Adaptations. 
e.For the avoidance of doubt: 
i.Non-waivable Compulsory License Schemes. In those jurisdictions in which the 
right to collect royalties through any statutory or compulsory licensing scheme 
cannot be waived, the Licensor reserves the exclusive right to collect such 
royalties for any exercise by You of the rights granted under this License; 
ii.Waivable Compulsory License Schemes. In those jurisdictions in which the right 
to collect royalties through any statutory or compulsory licensing scheme can be 
waived, the Licensor waives the exclusive right to collect such royalties for any 
exercise by You of the rights granted under this License; and, 
iii.Voluntary License Schemes. The Licensor waives the right to collect royalties, 
whether individually or, in the event that the Licensor is a member of a collecting 
society that administers voluntary licensing schemes, via that society, from any 
exercise by You of the rights granted under this License. 
The above rights may be exercised in all media and formats whether now known or hereafter 
devised. The above rights include the right to make such modifications as are technically 
necessary to exercise the rights in other media and formats. Subject to Section 8(f), all rights not 
expressly granted by Licensor are hereby reserved. 
4. Restrictions. The license granted in Section 3 above is expressly made subject to and limited 
by the following restrictions: 
a.You may Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work only under the terms of this License. 
You must include a copy of, or the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) for, this License with 
every copy of the Work You Distribute or Publicly Perform. You may not offer or impose 
any terms on the Work that restrict the terms of this License or the ability of the recipient 
of the Work to exercise the rights granted to that recipient under the terms of the License. 
You may not sublicense the Work. You must keep intact all notices that refer to this 
License and to the disclaimer of warranties with every copy of the Work You Distribute or 
Publicly Perform. When You Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work, You may not impose 
any effective technological measures on the Work that restrict the ability of a recipient of 
the Work from You to exercise the rights granted to that recipient under the terms of the 
License. This Section 4(a) applies to the Work as incorporated in a Collection, but this 
does not require the Collection apart from the Work itself to be made subject to the terms 
of this License. If You create a Collection, upon notice from any Licensor You must, to the 
extent practicable, remove from the Collection any credit as required by Section 4(c), as 
requested. If You create an Adaptation, upon notice from any Licensor You must, to the 
extent practicable, remove from the Adaptation any credit as required by Section 4(c), as 
requested. 
b.You may Distribute or Publicly Perform an Adaptation only under the terms of: (i) this 
License; (ii) a later version of this License with the same License Elements as this 
License; (iii) a Creative Commons jurisdiction license (either this or a later license 
version) that contains the same License Elements as this License (e.g., Attribution-
ShareAlike 3.0 US)); (iv) a Creative Commons Compatible License. If you license the 
Adaptation under one of the licenses mentioned in (iv), you must comply with the terms of 
that license. If you license the Adaptation under the terms of any of the licenses 
mentioned in (i), (ii) or (iii) (the "Applicable License"), you must comply with the terms of 
the Applicable License generally and the following provisions: (I) You must include a copy 
of, or the URI for, the Applicable License with every copy of each Adaptation You 
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Distribute or Publicly Perform; (II) You may not offer or impose any terms on the 
Adaptation that restrict the terms of the Applicable License or the ability of the recipient of 
the Adaptation to exercise the rights granted to that recipient under the terms of the 
Applicable License; (III) You must keep intact all notices that refer to the Applicable 
License and to the disclaimer of warranties with every copy of the Work as included in the 
Adaptation You Distribute or Publicly Perform; (IV) when You Distribute or Publicly 
Perform the Adaptation, You may not impose any effective technological measures on the 
Adaptation that restrict the ability of a recipient of the Adaptation from You to exercise the 
rights granted to that recipient under the terms of the Applicable License. This Section 
4(b) applies to the Adaptation as incorporated in a Collection, but this does not require 
the Collection apart from the Adaptation itself to be made subject to the terms of the 
Applicable License. 
c.If You Distribute, or Publicly Perform the Work or any Adaptations or Collections, You 
must, unless a request has been made pursuant to Section 4(a), keep intact all copyright 
notices for the Work and provide, reasonable to the medium or means You are utilizing: 
(i) the name of the Original Author (or pseudonym, if applicable) if supplied, and/or if the 
Original Author and/or Licensor designate another party or parties (e.g., a sponsor 
institute, publishing entity, journal) for attribution ("Attribution Parties") in Licensor's 
copyright notice, terms of service or by other reasonable means, the name of such party 
or parties; (ii) the title of the Work if supplied; (iii) to the extent reasonably practicable, the 
URI, if any, that Licensor specifies to be associated with the Work, unless such URI does 
not refer to the copyright notice or licensing information for the Work; and (iv) , consistent 
with Section 3(b), in the case of an Adaptation, a credit identifying the use of the Work in 
the Adaptation (e.g., "French translation of the Work by Original Author," or "Screenplay 
based on original Work by Original Author"). The credit required by this Section 4(c) may 
be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, however, that in the case of a 
Adaptation or Collection, at a minimum such credit will appear, if a credit for all 
contributing authors of the Adaptation or Collection appears, then as part of these credits 
and in a manner at least as prominent as the credits for the other contributing authors. 
For the avoidance of doubt, You may only use the credit required by this Section for the 
purpose of attribution in the manner set out above and, by exercising Your rights under 
this License, You may not implicitly or explicitly assert or imply any connection with, 
sponsorship or endorsement by the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties, 
as appropriate, of You or Your use of the Work, without the separate, express prior written 
permission of the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution Parties. 
d.Except as otherwise agreed in writing by the Licensor or as may be otherwise permitted 
by applicable law, if You Reproduce, Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work either by 
itself or as part of any Adaptations or Collections, You must not distort, mutilate, modify or 
take other derogatory action in relation to the Work which would be prejudicial to the 
Original Author's honor or reputation. Licensor agrees that in those jurisdictions (e.g. 
Japan), in which any exercise of the right granted in Section 3(b) of this License (the right 
to make Adaptations) would be deemed to be a distortion, mutilation, modification or 
other derogatory action prejudicial to the Original Author's honor and reputation, the 
Licensor will waive or not assert, as appropriate, this Section, to the fullest extent 
permitted by the applicable national law, to enable You to reasonably exercise Your right 
under Section 3(b) of this License (right to make Adaptations) but not otherwise. 
5. Representations, Warranties and Disclaimer 
UNLESS OTHERWISE MUTUALLY AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES IN WRITING, LICENSOR 
OFFERS THE WORK AS-IS AND MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY 
KIND CONCERNING THE WORK, EXPRESS, IMPLIED, STATUTORY OR OTHERWISE, 
INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, WARRANTIES OF TITLE, MERCHANTIBILITY, FITNESS 
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, NONINFRINGEMENT, OR THE ABSENCE OF LATENT OR 
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OTHER DEFECTS, ACCURACY, OR THE PRESENCE OF ABSENCE OF ERRORS, WHETHER 
OR NOT DISCOVERABLE. SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF 
IMPLIED WARRANTIES, SO SUCH EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. 
6. Limitation on Liability. EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW, IN NO 
EVENT WILL LICENSOR BE LIABLE TO YOU ON ANY LEGAL THEORY FOR ANY SPECIAL, 
INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF 
THIS LICENSE OR THE USE OF THE WORK, EVEN IF LICENSOR HAS BEEN ADVISED OF 
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. 
7. Termination 
a.This License and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automatically upon any 
breach by You of the terms of this License. Individuals or entities who have received 
Adaptations or Collections from You under this License, however, will not have their 
licenses terminated provided such individuals or entities remain in full compliance with 
those licenses. Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 will survive any termination of this License. 
b.Subject to the above terms and conditions, the license granted here is perpetual (for the 
duration of the applicable copyright in the Work). Notwithstanding the above, Licensor 
reserves the right to release the Work under different license terms or to stop distributing 
the Work at any time; provided, however that any such election will not serve to withdraw 
this License (or any other license that has been, or is required to be, granted under the 
terms of this License), and this License will continue in full force and effect unless 
terminated as stated above. 
8. Miscellaneous 
a.Each time You Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work or a Collection, the Licensor 
offers to the recipient a license to the Work on the same terms and conditions as the 
license granted to You under this License. 
b.Each time You Distribute or Publicly Perform an Adaptation, Licensor offers to the 
recipient a license to the original Work on the same terms and conditions as the license 
granted to You under this License. 
c.If any provision of this License is invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, it shall 
not affect the validity or enforceability of the remainder of the terms of this License, and 
without further action by the parties to this agreement, such provision shall be reformed to 
the minimum extent necessary to make such provision valid and enforceable. 
d.No term or provision of this License shall be deemed waived and no breach consented 
to unless such waiver or consent shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged 
with such waiver or consent. 
e.This License constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the 
Work licensed here. There are no understandings, agreements or representations with 
respect to the Work not specified here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional 
provisions that may appear in any communication from You. This License may not be 
modified without the mutual written agreement of the Licensor and You. 
f.The rights granted under, and the subject matter referenced, in this License were 
drafted utilizing the terminology of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (as amended on September 28, 1979), the Rome Convention of 1961, the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 
1996 and the Universal Copyright Convention (as revised on July 24, 1971). These rights 
and subject matter take effect in the relevant jurisdiction in which the License terms are 
sought to be enforced according to the corresponding provisions of the implementation of 
those treaty provisions in the applicable national law. If the standard suite of rights 
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granted under applicable copyright law includes additional rights not granted under this 
License, such additional rights are deemed to be included in the License; this License is 
not intended to restrict the license of any rights under applicable law. 
 
Creative Commons Notice 
Creative Commons is not a party to this License, and makes no warranty whatsoever in 
connection with the Work. Creative Commons will not be liable to You or any party on any legal 
theory for any damages whatsoever, including without limitation any general, special, incidental or 
consequential damages arising in connection to this license. Notwithstanding the foregoing two 
(2) sentences, if Creative Commons has expressly identified itself as the Licensor hereunder, it 
shall have all rights and obligations of Licensor. 
Except for the limited purpose of indicating to the public that the Work is licensed under the 
CCPL, Creative Commons does not authorize the use by either party of the trademark 
"Creative Commons" or any related trademark or logo of Creative Commons without the 
prior written consent of Creative Commons. Any permitted use will be in compliance with 
Creative Commons' then-current trademark usage guidelines, as may be published on its 
website or otherwise made available upon request from time to time. For the avoidance of 
doubt, this trademark restriction does not form part of the License. 
Creative Commons may be contacted at http://creativecommons.org/. 
 
 
